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ABSTRACT
Pay secrecy is a burgeoning debate in compensation research. On one side of the debate,
it is argued that pay secrecy is a useful and beneficial practice because it can prevent potential
dissatisfaction and destructive competition possible when people make unfavorable pay
comparisons. On the other side, it is argued that pay secrecy is undesirable because it obscures
the motivational properties of pay and does not prevent people from making pay comparisons,
nor safeguard them from the resulting dissatisfaction. Despite the popularity of pay secrecy in
organizations today, extant research has failed to provide any definitive answers as to whether
secrecy is a beneficial pay communication practice. For both academics and practitioners, the
effects of pay secrecy largely remain unclear. The current dissertation represents one attempt to
address these shortcomings.
First, this dissertation seeks to clarify our comprehension of the pay secrecy construct.
Toward this end, problems in existing research are outlined, including the conflation of outcomes
that often occurs in pay secrecy studies. As a remedy, the incentive and sorting effects of
compensation are introduced as distinct theoretical tracks for separating secrecy’s effects. The
pay secrecy construct is further elucidated by building on prior work (Holtzen & Gupta, 2014) to
develop a comprehensive matrix of pay secrecy.
Second, this dissertation aims to enhance and refine our understanding of the effects of
pay secrecy. Using the incentive and sorting tracks, motivation and satisfaction dynamics are
explored in conjunction with other relevant compensation system characteristics. This approach
allows us to discern the underlying mechanisms that uniquely affect motivation/performance in
the context of expectancy theory, and satisfaction/turnover in terms of equity theory principles.
To provide a more nuanced examination of the unique behavioral responses to these dynamics,

functional versus dysfunctional effects are explored by conceptualizing the effects as two
separate continua. Within this framework, functional effects occur both when desirable
behaviors are promoted and when undesirable behaviors are hindered. Conversely,
dysfunctional effects manifest when desirable behaviors are hindered and when undesirable
behaviors are promoted. This distinct conceptualization allows for a comprehensive examination
of the extensive range of responses that secrecy may elicit.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Pay is powerful. Adequate pay provides individuals with the means to satisfy a variety of
needs (Lawler, 1971), ranging from lower-order concerns such as food and shelter (Maslow,
1943) to social status and other higher-order needs (Frank, 1999). Research consequently
indicates that pay is a compelling motivator (Rynes, Gerhart, & Minette, 2002). Despite the
importance of pay to individuals, it is also a topic of conversation that many organizations prefer
their employees avoid. Although pay discussions are legally-protected as a concerted employee
activity (National Labor Relations Act, 1935; Gely & Bierman, 2003), organizations often aim to
discourage employee discussions about pay concerns by limiting employee access to vital pay
information through a variety of pay secrecy policies (Colella et al., 2007; Belogolovsky &
Bamberger, 2014).
Studies suggest that policies of pay secrecy are prevalent in organizations today.
Almost half of all workers in the U.S. are strongly discouraged or contractually forbidden from
discussing pay with coworkers (Institute for Women’s Policy Research, 2011). Managers and
organizations generally support secrecy, claiming it minimizes social comparisons and
destructive competition among employees (Burroughs, 1982). Even employees themselves may
favor secrecy. For workers in the U.S., the taboo nature of discussing pay is a deep-seated belief,
evidenced by the “squirm factor” (Lytle, 2014: 30) that often accompanies compensation
discussions. Together, these complementary forces have produced an environment in which
many organizations regularly operate under a veil of secrecy when communicating pay
information.
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Despite the widespread use and acceptance of pay secrecy, our current understanding of
both the construct and its effects remains limited. Despite lacking a generally-accepted
definition for what constitutes “pay secrecy,” both scholars and practitioners have focused
instead on uncovering its effects. These efforts have yielded perplexing results. On the one hand,
evidence suggests that when organizations choose to limit the pay information that is formally
shared, employees still discuss pay with one another (Day, 2012) but may form grossly incorrect
assumptions about the pay of others (Lawler, 1965, 1966, 1967; Milkovich & Anderson, 1972).
On the other hand, transparency in pay communication has been found to elicit strong feelings of
envy toward higher-paid others, causing lower-paid individuals to withhold helping behaviors
that could benefit the organization and its employees (Bamberger & Belogolovsky, 2017). In the
debate over the possible effects of pay secrecy, published evidence exists for both sides.
Despite the popularity of secrecy policies in organizations today, research on its effects
has produced conflicting results, and a comprehensive definition of the construct remains
elusive. In short, our understanding of pay secrecy largely remains secret. Our ability to
understand the nuances of the construct and its effects has been limited by superficial expositions
of pay secrecy in existing research. While there appears to be a growing interest in the topic,
both among academic researchers (e.g., Bamberger & Belogolovsky, 2017; Marasi, Wall, &
Bennett, 2018; Scheller & Harrison, 2018; Smit & Montag-Smit, 2018) and compensation
professionals (e.g., Lytle, 2014; Trotter, Zacur, & Stickney, 2017), theoretical development has
lagged behind empirical investigations. By taking a step back to focus on construct definition
and theory development, this dissertation represents one attempt to address these limitations.
The purpose of the current investigation is therefore two-fold.
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First, this dissertation seeks to clarify the construct of pay secrecy. Extant research
provides several disparate conceptualizations of the construct. Though there is some degree of
consensus that pay secrecy theoretically represents a continuum of information (Burroughs,
1982; Collela et al., 2007), scholars have largely circumvented more precise theoretical
development to instead focus on empirical examinations of secrecy’s effects. In order to identify
the impediments to theoretical development, the remainder of this chapter outlines some of the
major problems in existing pay communication research. In Chapter 2, organizational justice
concepts are then used to build on the prior work of Holtzen and Gupta (2014) to conceptualize
pay secrecy as the intersection of two continua of information – a distributive continuum that
communicates information about pay outcomes, and a procedural continuum containing
information about pay processes.
Second, this dissertation aims to enhance and refine our understanding of the effects of
pay secrecy on critical employee behaviors and attitudes. As a remedy to the conflation of
outcomes that occurs in many extant empirical investigations of the topic, I contend here that
distinct theoretical tracks are needed to untangle the separate influence of different forms and
degrees of pay communication. Toward this end, the incentive and sorting effects of
compensation are introduced as pertinent frameworks for separating secrecy’s distinctive effects.
By using the proposed pay secrecy matrix as a theoretical framework, this dissertation
investigates how different combinations of distributive and procedural pay information may alter
the established incentive and sorting properties of performance-based pay. Using these distinct
theoretical tracks, I then explore how different forms of secrecy may uniquely affect motivation
and performance in the context of expectancy theory (Chapter 3), and attraction, satisfaction, and
turnover using principles of equity and discrepancy theories (Chapter 4). Finally, Chapter 5

3

discusses implications and limitations of the dissertation, and presents suggested directions for
empirical testing of the stated propositions and other future research.
Statement of the Problem
A review of the literature highlights several problems currently plaguing pay
communication research. First, no consensus on a definition for the construct has been reached.
Furthermore, empirical specifications have failed to match the many theoretical
conceptualizations of pay secrecy that exist in the literature. More specifically, despite a general
agreement that pay secrecy/transparency is best represented as a continuum of shared
information (Burroughs, 1982; Colella, Paetzold, & Wesson, 2007; Marasi & Bennett, 2016;
Marasi, Wall, & Bennett, 2018), most empirical operationalizations continue to measure secrecy
as though it were binary. Experimental studies often utilize secrecy versus transparency
conditions, with transparency manipulated as nothing more than the dissemination of
participants’ pay amounts (e.g., Greiner, Ockenfels, & Werner, 2011), often by code number
alone (e.g., Bamberger & Belogolovsky, 2017; Belogolovsky & Bamberger, 2014). Such binary
distinctions oversimplify the broad range of pay information that an organization can choose to
communicate.
Survey measures of pay secrecy are similarly deficient. For example, Rosenfeld (2017)
measured pay secrecy with a single item, and classified answers into transparent (i.e., wage and
salary information is public and/or can be discussed in the workplace) and secret categories (i.e.,
discussion of wage and salary information is discouraged and/or formally prohibited). Measures
targeting the specific dimensions of pay secrecy have also been developed. Distinctions have
been made regarding employee versus organizational restriction of pay information (Marasi et
al., 2018), the separate influences of policies and rules, organizational enforcement, and norms
4

that shape perceived organizational pay secrecy (Noy, 2007), and preferences for the sharing and
seeking of information during information exchange (Smit & Montag-Smit, 2018). Despite these
efforts, consensus on the definitive dimensions of pay secrecy remains elusive.
Finally, pay secrecy research has been limited by its simultaneous consideration of
multiple outcomes. Examples of conflated outcomes found in the literature include satisfaction
with pay and motivation for promotion (Lawler, 1966, 1967), satisfaction with pay and the
perceived performance-reward relationship (Thompson & Pronsky, 1975), job performance and
job satisfaction (Futrell & Jenkins, 1978), and pay satisfaction and affective commitment (Day,
2012). Often yielding conflicting results, these conflated findings continue to be relied upon to
debate the merits of secrecy versus transparency. On one side of the debate, it is argued that pay
secrecy is a useful and beneficial practice because it prevents the dissatisfaction and destructive
competition that arises when people make unfavorable pay comparisons. On the other side, it is
argued that pay secrecy is undesirable because it obscures the motivational properties of pay
while also failing to prevent people from making pay comparisons with one another.
The pay secrecy debate has been hindered by the above limitations, producing a muddled
understanding of both how and why secrecy impacts employee attitudes and behaviors. This
practice perpetuates the contention that secrecy produces either invariably positive or negative
outcomes for organizations and their employees. Although early research examined motivation
and satisfaction dynamics simultaneously, compensation theory suggests that distinctive
mechanisms may operate independently to influence distinct outcomes. This is not a novel
concept in compensation research.
Pay exerts its influence through two unique mechanisms. The incentive effect, or the
degree to which pay influences motivation among individual employees (Milkovich, Newman, &
5

Gerhart, 2014), explains how pay influences productivity and performance in current employees
while holding attributes of the workforce constant (Rynes, Gerhart, & Parks, 2005). In contrast,
sorting effects are used to describe how pay can alter an organization’s workforce composition
by attracting and retaining the most capable employees (Gerhart & Rynes, 2003; Lazear, 1986).
Together, the incentive and sorting effects explain how performance-based pay can be used to
attract, retain, and motivate higher-performing employees.
In attempting to untangle the effects of pay secrecy on employee attitudes and behaviors,
the study of separate incentive and sorting properties arises as a suitable approach. Focusing on
the incentive effect allows for an emphasis to be placed on performance and other outcomes
driven by motivational forces. Conversely, a focus on sorting mechanisms allows for a separate
examination of turnover, attraction, and other outcomes driven by satisfaction, equity, and
perceptions of fit. Examining these two paths in isolation allows us to pinpoint the unique
mechanisms that interact with the communication of pay information to influence motivation,
satisfaction, and more distal behavioral outcomes. When effects are studied separately via these
two tracks, clearer insight into the differential effects of secrecy becomes possible.
In summary, in order to understand its effects, we must first clarify what constitutes pay
secrecy. Toward this end, this dissertation aims to illuminate the construct of pay secrecy by
building a coherent theoretical framework. In turn, this framework is then used to investigate
how different forms of secrecy may alter the incentive and sorting properties of performancebased pay, and how these effects influence employee attitudes and behaviors. By pausing to
focus on the theoretical precision of a pay secrecy matrix, this dissertation develops a testable
framework that can be used to clarify and guide future empirical work in the pay secrecy
domain.
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CHAPTER 2
ELUCIDATION OF THE PAY SECRECY CONSTRUCT
Overview
Chapter 2 aims to clarify the construct of pay secrecy by addressing some specific
shortcomings of prior research. Toward that end, pertinent pay terminology is first reviewed,
and boundary conditions for the current investigation are presented. Organizational justice
concepts are then invoked to expand the skeletal pay secrecy matrix developed by Holtzen and
Gupta (2014). In contrast to the historically binary conceptualization and measurement of pay
secrecy, the matrix produces nine distinct cells. The information content of each cell is then
individually examined to explore the distinct forms of secrecy that can arise when different
combinations of pay information are communicated to varying degrees. Next, the possibility of
secrecy in other areas of HRM is considered by exploring the construct of performance secrecy.
Finally, to begin untangling the conflated outcomes of prior empirical research, expectancy
theory and equity theory are introduced as appropriate frameworks for investigating how pay
secrecy affects the incentive and sorting properties of performance-based pay raises.
Pay Terminology
Organizations must compensate employees in exchange for their labor. While this
suggests that compensation is a relatively straightforward exchange between employer and
employee, compensation is “complex and often confusing” (Gerhart & Rynes, 2003: 1), both in
theory and in practice. This complexity and confusion arise, in part, because organizations
facing similar environmental conditions often make very different compensation decisions
regarding base pay, bonus pay, and long-term incentives (Gerhart & Milkovich, 1990). Not only
7

do compensation strategies and practices vary across organizations, research indicates that
employees may hold quite divergent perceptions of the same compensation system. For
example, employees may view compensation as a return in exchange for the work performed, a
reward for a job well done, or as an entitlement for being an organizational member (Milkovich,
Newman, & Gerhart, 2014).
Because pay varies in both form (e.g., through compensation design, administration, and
other elements dictated by business strategy; Gerhart & Rynes, 2003) and how that is perceived
by employees (Milkovich et al., 2014), a precise definition of “pay” must precede clarification of
the pay secrecy construct. Broadly defined, employee compensation represents “all forms of
financial returns and tangible services and benefits employees receive as part of an employment
relationship” (Milkovich et al., 2014: 13). As shown below in Figure 1, total compensation is
comprised of two principal components: direct cash compensation, including base pay, increases
to base pay, and other financial returns, and indirect benefits such as pensions, medical
insurance, and other tangible benefits and services (Milkovich et al., 2014).
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Total Compensation

Direct Cash

Base Pay

Indirect Benefits

Increases to Base Pay

Market-based
increases

Merit-based
increases

Seniority

Level of
Measurement
Individual

Skill

Performance

Measurement Criteria
Results
Behaviors




Individual incentives
Piece-rate
Commission

Group/Team




Group incentives
Gain sharing

Organization



Profit-sharing stock plans



“Merit pay”

Figure 1
Pay Definition Figure

9

Direct Cash Compensation versus Indirect Benefits
Despite the noted paucity of attention directed to employee benefits as a topic of
investigation in the HRM literature (Dulebohn, Molloy, Pickler, & Murray, 2009), available
evidence suggests that indirect benefits may fail to elicit the same effects on employee attitudes
and behaviors as does direct cash compensation. For example, Milkovich and colleagues (2014)
note that “no strong data exist linking benefits level and employee productivity” (p. 440).
Furthermore, no cumulative evidence suggests a relationship between benefit coverage and
turnover (Williams & MacDermid, 1994). Taken together, the available research provides no
evidence to indicate that indirect benefits have clear incentive and sorting effects.
Compared to direct cash compensation, benefits are also perceived differently by
employees. Many benefits (e.g., employer-sponsored health insurance, pensions, contributions
to retirement and health savings accounts, etc.) are not performance-contingent but are instead
awarded primarily for organizational membership and tenure (Heneman, Ledford, & Gresham,
2000). As a result, employees may view some benefits as rights or entitlements (Williams, 1993;
Weathington & Tetrick, 2000). Other benefits (e.g., social security benefits for retired workers)
are legally required and standardized (Dencker, Joshi, & Martocchio, 2007). Because employees
can view benefits as entitlements and/or legal requirements, organizations may find obscuring
benefits information through secrecy to be inefficacious.
In contrast to the dearth of benefits research (Dulebohn et al., 2009), an abundance of
empirical evidence demonstrates that financial incentives are strongly and positively related to
individual performance (for recent reviews, see Gerhart & Fang, 2014; Gupta & Shaw, 2015). In
short, there is “overwhelming meta-analytic evidence that incentives drive behavior and that the
effect is substantial” (Gerhart & Fang, 2014: 42). Additional quantitative summary studies have
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found a negative relationship between pay and turnover (Cotton & Tuttle, 1986; Griffeth, Hom,
& Gaertner, 2000). Collectively then, the available research indicates that direct cash
compensation has clear incentive and sorting properties that shape employee performance and
turnover. In contrast, benefits do not exhibit these same effects (Milkovich et al., 2014) and may
be more difficult to obscure through secrecy as a result of government regulation and
standardization (Dencker et al., 2007). The foregoing suggests that indirect benefits do not
warrant inclusion when investigating how secrecy influences the incentive and sorting properties
of pay. Direct cash compensation is instead the more appropriate focus.
Base Pay versus Increases to Base Pay
Direct cash compensation has two distinct components – base pay and the various
increases that can be made to base pay. Base pay is provided to employees in exchange for their
labor (Milkovich et al., 2014). The specific base pay amount is determined using a combination
of internal (e.g., job evaluation) and external (e.g., market survey) worth assessments of the job
or the work performed (Heneman, Ledford, & Gresham, 2000). Consequently, base pay rates are
attached to the job itself rather than to personal characteristics of individual employees (Gerhart
& Milkovich, 1990). For example, although the 2015-2016 national average base salary for new
assistant professors of engineering ($83,000) was close to one-and-a-half times that for new
assistant professors of English ($57,000), this difference is more a reflection of pay gaps between
academic disciplines rather than the personal characteristics of individuals who occupy these
jobs (Jaschik, 2016).
Despite this seemingly straightforward definition, base pay can be conceptualized and
defined in several different ways. While some define base pay as that part of an individual’s pay
that is based on the job, others view it as the prior year’s pay amount (of which performance11

based raises and other increases will be a percent). Regardless of the definition that is used, base
pay is primarily job-based. However, other features such as the individual’s prior performance
and pay negotiations may also be incorporated. Thus, these considerations are all built into an
individual’s base pay rate.
In part because base pay is job-based (Gerhart & Milkovich, 1990), it is also less likely to
be kept secret. When setting base pay, organizations can choose to match, lead, or lag the rates
paid by competitors (Klaas & McClendon, 1996). These choices are often strategic. For
example, a lead pay level policy that pays higher wages than the competition can be used to
attract higher quality applicants that require reduced training time if hired, thereby shortening
vacancy periods (Gerhart & Rynes, 2003). Benefits of these strategic choices may be lost if
organizations do not disclose base pay information. Furthermore, even if an organization prefers
this information to remain secret, several websites (e.g., Salary.com, Glassdoor.com, and
Payscale.com) allow users to publicly share base pay information for a variety of jobs and
organizations.
In contrast to the job-based nature of base pay (Gerhart & Milkovich, 1990), increases to
base pay are often more person-based and variable (Milkovich et al., 2014). Increases may be
given for market-based factors, reflecting changes in the cost of living or other geographic
differences (Milkovich et al., 2014). Increases to base pay may also be distributed based on
merit. In contrast to the more narrowly-defined, traditional “merit pay” plans (i.e., raises given
based on the individual’s rated performance in a previous time period; Heneman, 1990, 1992),
here the term “merit-based increases” is used in a broader sense to describe pay increases that are
given for a variety of merit-based reasons. For example, many Korean companies distribute
merit bonuses based on seniority to promote loyalty and commitment to the organization (Kwon,
12

Kim, Kang, & Kim, 2008). Other firms distribute merit increases for skill or knowledge
acquisition, as when teachers are given increases for demonstrating the skills and knowledge
thought to be requirements for improving student performance (Heneman, Milanowski, Kimball,
& Odden, 2006). However, my focus here is on merit increases that are distributed on the basis
of performance.
Performance-Based Pay Increases
Performance-based pay increases are common in organizations today. A 2018 survey of
public companies in the U.S. cites performance as the top reason for distributing pay raises
(PayScale Compensation Best Practices Report, 2019). Accordingly, a preponderance of the
research conducted on the incentive and sorting properties of compensation has focused on
performance-based pay (see Cadsby et al., 2007 for a summary). When pay increases are
performance-based, employees are rewarded for their performance contributions, as opposed to
seniority, need, equality, or other non-performance factors (Cappelli, 1999; Castilla & Benard,
2010). To refine this broad definition, performance-based pay increases can be further divided
along several dimensions, including performance measurement criteria (results- versus behaviorbased measures) and the level at which performance is measured and at which pay increases are
distributed (Gerhart & Rynes, 2003; Gerhart & Fang, 2014). Understanding the nuances of these
differences is imperative, as variations along these dimensions are later proposed to have
differential effects on employee attitudes and behaviors.
Performance Measurement Criteria
Performance-based pay increases can be categorized by the criterion that is used to
measure performance. Performance criteria may be linked to results, which are often based on
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objective measures requiring little to no judgment (Murphy, 2008). For example, paying tree
planters using a per-tree-planted piece rate system directly links planters’ effort with their
earnings (Paarsch & Shearer, 1999). Objectivity makes results-based measures desirable, but
they are often criticized for exhibiting criterion deficiency in failing to measure the full range of
performance-related behaviors (Austin & Villanova, 1992; Murphy, 2008).
Performance measures can also emphasize behaviors (Milkovich et al., 2014). In contrast
to results-based measures that are primarily objective (Murphy, 2008), behavior-based measures
may be either objective (e.g., number of employee absences) or subjective (e.g., supervisory
ratings of subordinate performance). Subjective measures are often criticized for relying on “the
evaluative judgment of fallible judges” (Murphy, 2008: 149), which can allow biases to affect
performance ratings (Murphy & Cleveland, 1995). Subjective measures may also capture
behaviors outside the domain of task performance, a phenomenon known as criterion
contamination (Austin & Villanova, 1992; Murphy, 2008).
Implicit in prior studies of performance measurement is that the criteria – whether
results- or behavior-based – are known to employees. When the communication of pay
information is restricted through secrecy, performance measurement criteria information may
also be obscured, altering the incentive and sorting properties of performance-based pay. For
example, if sales employees paid on the basis of sales volume are told neither the raise amount
nor the criteria used to distribute pay (i.e., distributive and procedural secrecy in the matrix
framework, detailed later in this chapter), the incentive effect may fail to motivate increased
sales if a clear link between pay and performance is not perceived.
Research indicates that different performance criteria can motivate a range of behavioral
responses (Lawler & Rhode, 1976). While some behaviors may be functional for the
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organization, others are decidedly not. For example, a study of department store employees
being paid on the basis of sales volume (a results-based, objective measure of performance)
found that while total sales initially increased, employees also ignored many unmeasured and
unrewarded functions of the job such as stocking and arranging merchandise (Babchuk & Goode,
1951). In contrast, behavior-based measures may elicit different responses, as occurs when
production workers intentionally work at a slower pace when time-study rate setters are present
(Whyte, 1955). Results- and behavior-based criteria may therefore elicit different behavioral
responses (through motivation via the incentive effect, or through affective mechanisms via the
sorting effect) depending on the combination of pay information that is communicated.
Level of Performance Measurement
In addition to performance measurement criteria, a second aspect of performance-based
pay increases that warrants discussion is the level (a) at which performance is measured and (b)
at which pay increases are distributed. Performance-based pay increases can be based on
performance measured at the level of the individual, group/team, and/or the organization. For
example, individual performance may be rewarded through commission or piece rate plans
(Gerhart & Rynes, 2003). Group, team, or unit performance may be emphasized through
gainsharing, where bonus payouts are given for performance gains at the facility level (Hollensbe
& Guthrie, 2000). Finally, organizational performance may be emphasized through profitsharing, with payouts for meeting organization-wide profitability targets such as return on assets
or net income (Gerhart, Rynes, & Fulmer, 2009).
The level at which performance is measured may not always match the level at which the
corresponding performance-based pay increase is distributed. To illustrate, consider profitsharing, a performance-based increase that is distributed on the basis of organization-wide
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profitability measures (Gerhart et al., 2009). While profitability increases may be measured at
the organizational level, actual pay increases may be distributed according to performance
differences at the level of the individual or group. The basis for this distribution depends on
established allocation rules – equity versus equality – that specify the criteria for reward
distribution (Leventhal, 1976). An equity allocation rule distributes rewards based on the
performance contribution of each individual, whereas an equality allocation rule distributes equal
shares of the reward to all (Conroy, Gupta, Shaw, & Park, 2014).
Applying allocation rules to profit-sharing, for example, means that pay increases are
determined by performance measured at the organizational level, but distributed at the individual
level. If an equity allocation rule is used, an employee with relatively higher individual
performance receives a larger share of the profit-sharing pool. In contrast, if increases are
distributed according to an equality allocation rule, each individual receives an equal share of the
profit-sharing pool, regardless of differences in individual performance. Similar issues occur at
the level of the team or group. For example, pay increases can be determined by team
performance, but may then be distributed according to differences in individual performance
(i.e., an equity allocation rule), or distributed equally to all team members regardless of
individual performance (i.e., an equality allocation rule).
Prior research indicates that secrecy alters an allocator’s behavior when distributing
rewards. Understanding levels issues of performance measurement and reward allocation is
therefore crucial for exploring the incentive and sorting properties under varying degrees of
secrecy. For example, Leventhal and colleagues found that when pay information was kept
secret, allocators tended to increase the difference between rewards distributed to high and low
performers (Leventhal, Michaels, & Sanford, 1972), indicating a preference for more equity16

based allocations under secrecy. In contrast, when information about reward distribution was
fully disclosed to study participants, allocators increased the rewards of low performers
(Leventhal et al., 1972), suggesting that transparency may prompt a more equal distribution of
rewards.
Just as transparency in pay communication can alter allocation decisions, so too may it
alter the motivation- and satisfaction-related outcomes of these decisions. For example, a
manager in an organization with a high degree of transparency (e.g., specific distributive and
specific procedural transparency, as illustrated in Cell 9 of the matrix and discussed in detail in
the following sections) may distribute rewards with the goal of motivating individual
performance. Because overrewarding the under-contributors (i.e., lower performers) may
prevent dissatisfaction and disruptive behaviors among other employees (Goode, 1967; Steiner,
1972), managers may be more likely to invoke an equality allocation rule and distribute pay
increases equally across all employees – in part, because pay information is absolutely
transparent. Nevertheless, the same equality allocation rule that pleases low performers may
have negative effects on the satisfaction and motivation of high performers, whose individual
performance contributions have gone unrewarded.
Summary
Based on the preceding arguments, the theoretical propositions presented in this
dissertation are restricted to performance-based pay raises for several reasons. First, pay-forperformance (PFP) is ubiquitous in both practice and research. PFP has received the
preponderance of scholarly attention in both the compensation literature generally (e.g., Gerhart
& Fang, 2014), and pay secrecy research specifically (e.g., Belogolovsky & Bamberger, 2014;
Greiner, Ockenfels, & Werner, 2011; Thompson & Pronsky, 1975). In many organizations
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today, salary increases are often tied to performance ratings or ranking (WorldatWork, 2016).
Understanding how secrecy alters PFP therefore has important implications, both theoretically
for management scholars, and practically for organizations and managers.
Second, performance-based pay increases are the focus here because they are more likely
to both (a) affect individual responses to the incentive and sorting properties of compensation,
and (b) be obscured through secrecy. Individuals seek and monitor information about their
progress in the workplace, and the direction and rate of change of allocation decisions such as
pay increases are often more salient with individual employees than static base pay
considerations (Hsee & Abelson, 1991). Because research also indicates considerable variability
in individual reactions to pay raises (Mitra, Gupta, & Jenkins, 1997), performance-based pay
increases therefore represent a particularly appropriate domain for studying the range of
attitudinal and behavioral outcomes that may arise when varying degrees of pay secrecy interact
with other compensation system elements to influence motivation and satisfaction. Before
turning to a detailed exposition of the pay secrecy construct, two additional boundary conditions
for this dissertation must be addressed.
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Boundary Conditions
Executive Compensation
The compensation literature makes a clear distinction between executive compensation
and the pay of rank-and-file employees, for several reasons. First, executive pay differs in
magnitude. The average CEO of the 350 largest U.S. firms in 2017 received $18.9 million in
compensation, roughly 271 times that of the $58,000 earned by the average U.S. worker (Mishel
& Schieder, 2017, 2018). Similarly, executive pay is unique in form. Executive compensation
packages, on average, are comprised of approximately 40% base pay and short-term bonuses,
with the remaining 60% taking the form of long-term incentives such as stock options (Krantz &
Hansen, 2012; Milkovich et al., 2014). The pay of rank-and-file employees relies much less on
stock-based components (National Center for Employee Ownership, 2014).
Executive compensation also receives a relatively high degree of regulatory scrutiny and
public interest, making it difficult for organizations to keep executive pay information secret.
Many organizations must now disclose the ratio of their CEO’s pay to that of their median
employee (Dodd-Frank Act, 2010), and public interest in executive compensation ensures the
topic is a near-constant presence in news headlines (e.g., Jensen and Murphy, 1990). Differences
in magnitude and form, combined with increased regulatory scrutiny and public interest suggests
that executive compensation has unique secrecy issues that fall outside the scope of this
dissertation. As such, the theorizing and propositions presented here are limited to nonexecutive, rank-and-file employees.

19

Geographic and Cultural Constraints
Many HR practices are culture specific, affecting how organizations in varied locations
choose to design and administer employee pay (Townsend, Scott, & Markham, 1990).
Organizations in the U.S. have a “pronounced incidence” of individual pay-for-performance
(Gooderham, Fenton-O’Creevy, Croucher, & Brookes, 2015: 1483), attributable in part to a
highly individualistic culture (Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 2010). In contrast, collectivist
cultures exhibit a preference for rewards being distributed equally among group members (Hui,
Triandis, & Yee, 1991). Because collectivist cultures may place less emphasis on pay-forperformance, a highly individualistic culture such as exists in the U.S. presents a more
appropriate domain for understanding how secrecy affects the incentive and sorting effects of
performance-based pay raises.
Differences in national culture also affect how employees perceive and respond to pay
generally, and pay secrecy specifically. For example, employees in highly individualistic
cultures such as the U.S. often associate personal success with financial status (Hofstede, 1980),
and may therefore exhibit a “deep seated belief that talking about pay is taboo” (Lytle, 2014: 30).
These beliefs and preferences reinforce workplace and cultural norms in the U.S. that largely
support secrecy in pay discussions (Bierman & Gely, 2004). Other cultures have different
norms, and pay secrecy may be a culturally bound construct (Colella et al., 2007).
Studying the effects of pay secrecy cross-culturally could prove a fruitful direction for
future research. However, it falls outside the scope of this dissertation’s focus on how pay
secrecy interacts with additional elements of the compensation system to influence motivation,
satisfaction, and behavioral outcomes via the incentive and sorting effects. While an
organization is capable of altering its pay communication and other compensation policies,
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cultural influences on behavior persist. As secrecy and its effects are clarified, then the influence
of culture and other individual differences can be incorporated. For the purposes of this
dissertation, propositions are restricted to rank-and-file (non-executive) U.S. employees. With
relevant terminology and boundary conditions defined, I now turn to a clarification of the pay
secrecy construct.
Development of the Pay Secrecy Matrix
“Pay secrecy” or “pay openness” have traditionally been treated as binary. However, pay
secrecy/openness may be best conceptualized as the intersection of two continua of information
that vary in complexity. Recent surveys support this perspective. In the IWPR (2011) survey,
restrictions in pay communication varied: 31% of U.S. workers reported that pay discussions
with coworkers were discouraged, and 19% reported that they were formally prohibited and
punishable (IWPR, 2011). Employees also do not view pay secrecy as binary. Lawler (1981)
reported that employees did not want individual bonus amounts publicized, but the majority
supported public disclosure of both the range (57%) and the size (60%) of bonuses. Almost all
(92%) also wanted bonus processes clarified (Lawler, 1981).
Variations in the conceptualization of pay secrecy are also evident in empirical research.
Lawler (1965, 1966) defined transparency as information on pay scales (without information on
individual pay), Futrell and Jenkins (1978) defined it as information about low and high merit
raise amounts, the overall average raise amount, and salary levels based on tenure, while
Mahoney and Weitzel (1978) defined transparency as compensation ranges and midpoints for
adjacent managerial levels. Thus, a binary view of pay secrecy does not correspond with
theoretical and empirical viewpoints; it also does not correspond with managerial practice or
employee perceptions.
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Several authors have acknowledged that pay secrecy theoretically involves some
continuum of information. Burroughs (1982), one of the first to explicitly recognize pay secrecy
as non-binary, identified four (rather than two) levels of pay secrecy, but his analysis was mostly
practitioner oriented: 1) “Type Red” organizations, in which employees receive no formal
information regarding pay (with the exception of their own pay); 2) “Type Orange”
organizations, in which pay ranges and medians for certain jobs are made available, as is
information regarding the factors that were used to determine pay; 3) “Type Yellow”
organizations, in which employees are told both the size of raises, as well as which employees
receive them; and 4) “Type Green” organizations, in which the specific pay levels for unique
individuals are made public.
Burroughs’ exposition represents some progress but is limited in capturing the
complexity of pay secrecy in two ways. First, only a most basic description of the four proposed
types of organizations is provided. This likely oversimplifies the reality of pay secrecy. A more
critical shortcoming is that the categories relate solely to the characteristics of pay and who is
receiving it, while essentially ignoring the processes through which pay is determined. Put
differently, the four categories address the “what” and the “who” of pay secrecy while essentially
ignoring the “how” and “why”. Alternatively, paralleling justice research, the categories
represent “distributive” (Adams, 1965) pay issues while ignoring “procedural” (Greenberg,
1987, 1990; Leventhal, 1980; Thibaut & Walker, 1975) ones.
Recent investigations into pay secrecy have done little to remedy this shortcoming. For
example, Colella et al. (2007) acknowledge Burroughs’ exposition while agreeing that pay
secrecy “is best understood along a continuum…conceptualized as representing the amount of
information about pay available to employees” (p. 57). Despite this recognition, Colella et al.
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(2007) offer no additional theorizing as to the specific information content of such a continuum.
Contemporary research has attempted to further refine the continuum content. For example,
Marasi and Bennett (2016) proposed a 2x2 matrix illustrating pay secrecy as the intersection of
two continua reflecting the degree to which organizations disseminate pay information
(“organizational restriction”) and the extent to which employees are allowed to discuss pay
information with one another (“employee restriction”). This conceptualization again overlooks
key parts of the secrecy construct. Here, distributive information expresses “who” is sending and
receiving pay information, but the specific type of information being shared is disregarded.
Procedural information regarding how and why pay is determined is not addressed.
Despite a lack of consensus regarding the information content of a pay secrecy
continuum, scholars have begun to develop and validate scales for measuring the construct. Noy
(2007) conceptualized pay secrecy as having two distinct forms, including pay secrecy initiated
and maintained through employees’ individual motives and intentions, and pay secrecy that is
initiated and maintained by the organization through structure, strategy, and policy decisions. In
the same study, a measure for Perceived Organizational Pay Secrecy (POPS) was developed and
validated (Noy, 2007), though a literature search fails to find the scale in any subsequent
published research. Most recently, a series of studies by Smit and Montag-Smit (2018a, 2018b)
have focused on developing scales that capture employee preferences for the communication of
pay information. In the first study, the authors conceptualize pay secrecy policy as the
interaction of two dimensions determined by the organization: pay non-disclosure (i.e.,
regulating the amount of information that can be shared about employee pay distributions) and
pay communication restriction (i.e., restricting employees’ ability to discuss pay with one
another; Smit & Montag-Smit, 2018a). In a second study, the authors investigate employee
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motives to exchange pay information by developing and validating a Pay Information Exchange
Preferences scale. Across eight samples, evidence supported the conceptualization of employee
pay communication preferences as pay information seeking preference (driven by instrumental
motives such as uncertainty reduction and justice concerns) and pay information sharing
preference (driven by social motives, including relationship management and reputation
preservation; Smit & Montag-Smit, 2018b).
The foregoing review suggests that two separate continua are necessary for a
comprehensive conceptualization of pay secrecy. Prior work has largely focused on identifying
the source or motives of who controls the dissemination of pay information (e.g., Marasi &
Bennett, 2016; Noy, 2007), or understanding employee preferences toward the communication of
pay information (e.g., Smit & Montag-Smit, 2018a, 2018b). In contrast, my focus here is on
clarifying the distinct information that can be shared (or obscured) when pay communication is
relatively more open (or secret). As originally developed by Holtzen and Gupta (2014), one
continuum is needed to address the range of information that can be communicated with respect
to “people” or distributive information (i.e., linking pay to specific individuals). Another is
needed to address the range of information that can be communicated with respect to “process”
or procedural information (i.e., the specific means through which pay is determined). Within
each continuum, the range of information can also vary, from none to general, to the most
specific. Combining the two information dimensions with varying degrees of openness, a matrix
of pay secrecy emerges as shown below in Figure 2.
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Figure 2
Pay Secrecy Matrix
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Distributive Pay Information
The proposed matrix challenges the traditional premise that pay secrecy is a
unidimensional and binary phenomenon. By conceptualizing pay secrecy as the interaction of
two continua of distributive and procedural pay information, the matrix goes beyond simply
recognizing pay secrecy as a continuum (e.g., Colella et al., 2007) to explicitly specify the
information content of the pay secrecy construct. The organizational justice literature provides
guidance in this regard. In justice research, distributive justice refers to the perceived fairness of
outcome distributions or allocations (Adams, 1965; Homans, 1961; Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson,
Porter, & Ng, 2001), while procedural justice describes the perceived fairness of the processes
used in determining outcomes (Greenberg, 1987, 1990; Leventhal, 1980; Thibaut & Walker,
1975). Paralleling this distinction, the pay information contained in the matrix consists of a
distributive continuum (communicating information about pay raise outcomes) and a procedural
continuum (with information about pay raise administration and decision-making processes
communicated). When these two continua are crossed, it produces nine unique forms of pay
secrecy.
Just as the organizational justice literature has established that fairness perceptions have
different dimensions with unique correlates (Colquitt et al., 2001), the compensation literature
must consider that the communication of pay information also has separate dimensions. For
example, research has shown that the distinction between different forms of justice “arises
naturally in people’s cognitions” (van den Bos, Vermunt, & Wilke, 1997: 95), suggesting that
people form different cognitive evaluations depending on whether the outcomes or processes of a
specific situation or event are the primary focus. Therefore, making a distinction between the
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communication of distributive versus procedural pay information aligns with this cognitive
distinction between outcome and process.
Research in organizational justice has shown that distributive and procedural justice are
distinct constructs, though not independent of one another (Ambrose & Arnaud, 2005). For
example, meta-analyses have produced correlations between measures of distributive and
procedural justice that ranged from .57 to .77 (Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001; Colquitt et al.,
2001; Hauenstein et al., 2001). One explanation for the interrelatedness of the two constructs is
the “substitutability effect” (Lind, 2001). The substitutability effect suggests that different facets
of justice can substitute for one another when individuals judge a situation, such that “if
procedural fairness information is available…and distributive fairness information is missing, the
procedural information is used” (Ambrose & Arnaud, 2005: 70). Similarly, distributive and
procedural pay information may exhibit a similar substitutability effect when individuals form
perceptions about performance-based pay raises. Before exploring the interaction between the
communication of distributive and procedural pay information, a separate description of each of
the two continua is warranted.
Secret Distributive Pay Information
Even when no distributive information about pay raise outcomes is formally
communicated by the organization, individuals still know the amount of their own pay raise.
This represents absolute distributive pay secrecy, as no formal information about the pay raise
amounts of others is shared. With formal distributive pay information secret, the accuracy of
informal information about who receives what amount of performance-based pay increases could
vary widely. Drawing on work from Smit and Montag-Smit (2018b), the exchange of pay
information in the workplace unfolds in three ways. First, individuals can search available pay
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data to the extent that the organization has made it available (Smit & Montag-Smit, 2018b).
With absolute distributive secrecy however, no information about the pay raise amounts of others
is formally available.
One alternative option for obtaining pay information is through direct conversation
between coworkers (Colella et al., 2007). However, pay is often a taboo topic (Lytle, 2014),
with discussions limited by concerns for privacy and conflict avoidance that can arise when
specific pay outcomes of unique individuals are made public (Bierman & Gely, 2004). As a
result, individuals working in organizations with absolute distributive secrecy may feel
uncomfortable directly discussing pay with coworkers. As an alternative, employees may turn to
workplace gossip, defined as informal and evaluative talk about a member of the organization
who is not present (Brady, Brown, & Liang, 2017). As Smit and Montag-Smit note (2018b),
workplace gossip allows individuals to “obtain pay information without hazarding the social
costs of probing taboo topics (Wert & Salovey, 2004)” (p.542). Taken together, even when
distributive pay information is formally secret, individuals can still turn to other sources –
including direct conversations with coworkers or indirect gossip about others – to obtain
distributive pay information. However, the possibility of receiving invalid and inaccurate
information through these informal sources is likely to be high, as research indicates that
employees are not always truthful when discussing pay (Rynes, Gerhart, & Minette, 2004).
General Distributive Pay Information
Moving down the distributive axis of the matrix, organizations may choose to disclose
general distributive pay information by sharing the ranges and medians of pay increases for
distinct job categories. This general level of distributive openness has been examined in prior
research. For example, Subbarao and deCarufel (1983) investigated fairness perceptions among
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university employees following a collective bargaining agreement requiring the minimum and
maximum salaries of university ranks to be made public. Similarly, Mahoney and Weitzel
(1978) studied manufacturing employees in a company where compensation ranges and
midpoints for immediately adjacent levels were public. In a series of experimental studies
(Bamberger & Belogolovsky, 2010; Bamberger & Belogolovsky, 2017; Belogolovsky &
Bamberger, 2014), pay openness was operationalized as sharing information about the pay of
fellow participants. Because these pay amounts were not linked to unique individuals but were
instead “listed by code numbers in order to ensure privacy” (Belogolovsky & Bamberger, 2014:
976), this experimental manipulation typifies the communication of general distributive pay
information.
In each of the above studies, sharing information about pay ranges and medians
represents general distributive transparency because it communicates broad information about
pay raise outcomes. It also provides information about the organization’s pay structure, or the
internal alignment of pay (raise) amounts for jobs of differential worth (Milkovich et al., 2014).
With general distributive information open, employees can compare their own pay raise amount
to the minimum, maximum, and median raise amount for their organizational rank (e.g.,
Subbarao & deCarufel, 1983) or adjacent levels (e.g., Mahoney & Weitzel, 1978). As a result,
individuals can clearly see if their pay raise amount is above or below the median, and near the
top or bottom of the range.
The communication of general distributive information is common in both research (e.g.,
Mahoney & Weitzel, 1978; Subbarao & deCarufel, 1983) and practice. With the proliferation of
several third-party websites, the extent to which general distributive information is publicly
available has significantly increased. For example, the popular recruiting site Glassdoor allows
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individuals to anonymously report pay-related information including “salaries, wages, tips,
bonuses, and hourly pay based upon employee reports and estimates” (www.glassdoor.com).
This self-report data is then compiled to produce a searchable database where prospective
applicants can view general distributive pay information (e.g., salary ranges arranged by job title)
across a variety of organizations. To monitor the accuracy of these anonymous self-reports, the
company uses a two-step process of both technological and human moderators to review content
(www.glassdoor.com). Even if the reported distributive information is accurate, individuals still
lack the formal procedural information needed to understand why their own pay is above or
below the reported averages.
Specific Distributive Pay Information
Finally, the most specific distributive pay information that can be shared occurs when an
organization communicates the specific raise amount and name of each recipient. Though
sharing unique raise amounts may prompt privacy and conflict concerns (Bierman & Gely,
2004), several organizations already share this information – either with the general public
and/or organizational members. For example, public universities in the U.S. are subject to a
requirement that salaries of individual faculty members be publicly accessible (Day, 2011). In
contrast, other organizations only share specific distributive information internally among
organizational members. For example, the Seattle-based Molly Moon’s Homemade Ice Cream
company circulates an internal spreadsheet with the compensation amounts received by each
individual at its seven locations (Belle, 2019). Similarly, the popular natural grocer Whole
Foods allows employees to easily look up salary and bonus information for any other employee,
up to and including the CEO (Griswold, 2014). Specific pay raise amounts, when tied to
uniquely identifying information, communicates the most explicit distributive pay information
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regarding who makes what. However, a range of procedural pay information may also be
communicated, and it is to this issue I turn next.
Procedural Pay Information
Prior pay secrecy research has focused almost exclusively on the communication of
distributive pay information, including pay scales and levels (Lawler, 1966, 1967), pay ranges
for adjacent managerial levels (Milkovich & Anderson, 1972), pay ranges and midpoints
(Mahoney & Weitzel, 1978), and salary minimum and maximums by position rank (Subbarao &
deCarufel, 1983). Similarly, organizational justice scholars first focused on distributive justice
concerns before proposing that procedural justice, or the perceived fairness of the processes used
to determine outcome distribution, had been disregarded (Greenberg, 1987, 1990; Leventhal,
1980; Thibaut & Walker, 1975). As shown on the horizontal axis of the pay secrecy matrix, the
procedural pay information continuum represents the extent to which information is shared about
how and why pay raises are determined and distributed. Again, different degrees of procedural
pay information may be communicated, ranging from no information to the most specific.
Secret Procedural Pay Information
When no procedural information is communicated, individuals lack any formal
information about pay raise processes. Research indicates this absolute procedural secrecy may
be relatively common, as “employees understand what it is they receive, but are not as sure of
the process used to make this determination” (Mulvey et al., 2002: 36). As with conditions of
absolute distributive secrecy, employees experiencing absolute procedural secrecy may turn to
direct conversations with coworkers (Colella et al., 2007), workplace gossip (Brady et al., 2017),
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or other informal sources to better understand how and why their own pay raise amounts were
determined. This informal information may be inaccurate.
General Procedural Pay Information
An organization may choose to communicate general procedural information about the
pay raise process. For example, employees may be told when to expect pay raises and how
raises are determined (Miner, 1974), which may include sharing information about the raise basis
and the measurement criteria used to determine pay increases. By communicating this general
procedural information, an organization can improve the accuracy of performance expectations
among employees. As noted earlier, when performance is the basis for pay raise distribution,
measures can be categorized as either results-based (and often objective) or behavior-based
(including objective and/or subjective measures). Communicating this general procedural
information clarifies employees’ understanding of both the basis (e.g., performance) for pay
increases and the specific type of measure (e.g., results- or behavior-based) that is used for
evaluation. When individuals do not know which criterion is used to distribute pay raises, they
may be “unable to alter behavior to meet the criterion adequately” (Gupta, 1980: 816). Sharing
general procedural information about pay raise measurement criteria can therefore clarify
performance expectations and improve role clarity, or an individual’s understanding about the
task and social interaction behaviors expected on the job (Beehr, 1976; Ritter, Matthews, Ford, &
Henderson, 2016; Rizzo et al., 1970).
Furthermore, general procedural information may be shared by the organization to
clarify, explain, and/or justify compensation decisions. This may include disclosing the
principles and rationale behind the design of pay raises, as well as explaining why certain
performance measures were selected for this variable pay component (Scott, Sperling,
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McMullen, & Bowbin, 2008). Taken together, general procedural pay information can enhance
the accuracy of employees’ performance expectations and clarify the specific results and/or
behaviors that are required for a pay raise.
Specific Procedural Pay Information
Finally, an organization may choose to communicate specific procedural information,
including the unique formulas used to determine pay raise amounts. Again, some organizations
already do this. Buffer, a tech startup company, publicly shares both salaries (i.e., specific
distributive information) and the formulas used to determine these amounts (Lytle, 2014), the
latter of which is an example of specific procedural information. The Buffer formula indicates
that all company salaries are benchmarked to a single city, and that multipliers are added for cost
of living, role, and experience (“The Next Evolution of Transparent Salaries,” 2018). This
provides employees with the most specific procedural information available – the precise
calculations used to determine pay amounts – and therefore represents absolute procedural
transparency.
Although the Buffer Benchmark provides a formula for pay levels, formulas could also be
shared to further clarify performance expectations by indicating how pay raise mounts are
determined. For example, salespeople who are told that raise amounts are determined by
multiplying the number of an individual’s annual sales by $x should have a more accurate
understanding of how performance is determined (annual sales numbers), as well as the relative
value or importance of this aspect of performance in determining the overall raise amount. In
this example, performance and subsequent raises are determined entirely by the individual’s
sales numbers, suggesting that the organization views individual sales as the most important
aspect of performance. If performance information is also openly communicated (an issue
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explored in more detail at the end of this chapter) individuals can then use open specific
procedural information to calculate the specific raise amounts received by unique others. This
example illustrates the interactive nature of the two matrix dimensions.
When specific procedural information is shared, an organization’s espoused pay policy
should be more consistent with its actual pay policy. With procedural secrecy, an organization
can make claims that it distributes performance-based raises (i.e., its espoused pay policy) when
in fact it may distribute raises for any variety of non-performance-related factors (i.e., the
organization’s enacted pay policy). Because people make inferences based on the behaviors of
others, employees may turn to the enacted or visible pay policies for confirmation that it is in
alignment with the espoused policy. For example, an employee who is told that raises are based
on performance may question the truthfulness of this formal information if coworkers receiving
raises also exhibit poor performance behaviors (e.g., arriving late, making visible mistakes, etc.).
Enacted polices therefore reflect an organization’s “ideals embodied by its actions” (OkuliczKozaryn, Holmes, & Avery, 2014: 1302), communicating important information about the
results and/or behaviors that are valued and rewarded. When specific procedural information is
open, employees can clearly see if the stated pay policy is congruent with the actual pay
increases received.
Summary
In summary, prior pay secrecy research has been limited by its near exclusive focus on
the study of pay levels and other distributive information. This narrow focus does not match the
broad scope of pay information that an organization can potentially share with its employees. To
clarify the construct, pay secrecy is conceptualized here as the communication of varying
degrees of distributive and procedural pay information. For conceptual precision, the preceding
34

sections have treated the communication of distributive and procedural pay information as if the
two constructs were orthogonal. In reality, these two dimensions of pay information interact.
Pay Secrecy Form: Content Across Cells
A principal benefit of the proposed framework is that it allows for an examination of the
interactive effects that arise from the formal communication of different combinations of
distributive and procedural pay information. When accurate distributive and procedural pay
information is formally communicated by the organization, individuals should hold more
accurate perceptions regarding both the outcomes of and procedures behind pay raise decisions.
Cell 1: No Distributive, No Procedural Information
Cell 1 represents absolute (formal) pay secrecy, or the least amount of pay information an
organization can officially provide. No distributive information regarding the pay raise amounts
of others is communicated, nor is any procedural information shared about the processes used to
determine pay raises. Employees formally know the amount of their own raise only. If
employees seek informal information from other sources (e.g., through workplace gossip; Brady
et al., 2017), the probability of obtaining inaccurate information is likely to be high. An example
of the absolute secrecy in Cell 1 can be found in the experimental laboratory simulation
conducted by Greiner and colleagues, where the communication of pay information was
manipulated to create private versus public conditions (Greiner, Ockenfels, & Werner, 2011).
Participants in the private pay condition were “told only their own wage” (Greiner et al., 2011:
237), reflecting the absolute pay secrecy described in Cell 1.
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Cell 2: No Distributive, General Procedural Information
As an alternative to absolute secrecy, an organization may choose to disclose general
procedural information while keeping distributive pay information secret. As a result of
distributive secrecy, individuals still know only the amount of their own raise. However, the
communication of general procedural information should clarify some of the processes used to
determine the individual’s own pay raise amount. For example, employees may be told when to
expect raises, as well as how raises are determined (Miner, 1974).
When pay increases are based on performance, information about the performance
measurement criteria can also be shared. In a laboratory study investigating the effects of
secrecy on individual task performance, Bamberger and Belogolovsky (2010) informed
participants in the secret pay condition that bonus pay would be awarded for earning points by
successfully turning rows into “gold” in a “magic stone” game, accomplished by matching
adjacent rows of stones according to color, shape, or both (p. 975). By clearly communicating
that pay raises are based on a specific performance measurement criterion (i.e., points awarded
for turning rows into gold) as well as how to influence the measure (i.e., matching adjacent
stones according to color and/or shape), this general procedural information clarifies how and
why pay raise amounts (known only to each individual) are determined.
Cell 3: No Distributive, Specific Procedural Information
Cell 3 represents distributive secrecy combined with specific procedural transparency.
An organization using Management by Objectives (MBO) could fall in this cell. Under MBO,
supervisors and their subordinates agree on specific objectives that are to be achieved in a certain
time period, at the end of which the two will assess the employee’s performance in relation to the
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achievement of the agreed upon objectives (Drucker, 1954; Patten, 1976). Though MBO may
not necessarily be tied to pay raise decisions, communicating this combination of information
provides specific information regarding the processes (i.e., the achievement of agreed-upon
objectives) used in determining pay. As a result of distributive secrecy however, employees still
lack formal information regarding others’ raise amounts. In Cell 3, individuals must continue to
rely on what they know they make and what they think others make (Lawler, 1967), despite
having accurate knowledge of specific pay raise processes.
Cell 4: General Distributive, No Procedural Information
In Cell 4, general distributive information such as pay raise ranges and medians is open
but procedural pay information is secret. Several examples of this form of secrecy can be found
in the literature. For example, Lawler (1965) investigated three government agencies where
“some information about management pay scales was released, but each manager’s exact salary
was kept confidential” (p. 18). Similarly, Mahoney and Weitzel (1978) surveyed managers in a
large Canadian manufacturing organization who were told only “compensation ranges and
midpoints, particularly for immediately adjacent managerial levels” (p. 246-247). Finally,
Milkovich and Anderson (1972) investigated the extent to which supervisors disclosed to
subordinates the pay range for their own level and one level above, as well as the median salary
for their current level. Each of the above examples reflects the general distributive openness
(e.g., pay range and median information) and procedural secrecy of Cell 4.
Cell 5: General Distributive, General Procedural Information
In Cell 5, general information about both people and processes is communicated. The
communication of general distributive information may include sharing pay raise ranges and
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medians for certain jobs. More detailed information tying unique individuals to specific pay
raise amounts remains secret. General procedural information illuminates the processes used to
determine raise amounts, and may include sharing information about measurement criteria and
other general features of the pay raise distribution process. For example, Beer and Gery (1972)
developed a 6-item measure to capture participants’ pay system knowledge. Three items asked
whether participants knew their salary grade classification, and the range minimum and
maximum – both reflective of general distributive pay information. Another three items assessed
participants’ knowledge of general procedural information such as the type and frequency of
merit increases (Beer & Gery, 1972).
With general information about both pay raise outcomes and the processes used to
determine those outcomes communicated, Cell 5 provides the minimum combination of
information that individuals need to form accurate pay perceptions. As a result of general
distributive transparency, individuals working under this form of pay secrecy should better
understand how their pay raise amount compares to the raise median and range. Combined with
general procedural transparency, individuals in Cell 5 also have some information with which to
evaluate why their pay raise amount is high or low. For example, individuals in the Beer and
Gery (1972) study can see if their own pay raise amount is near the top or bottom of the range for
their salary grade classification. If this information is combined with accurate procedural
information about the type of merit increases provided (e.g., clarifying pay basis and
measurement), individuals should better understand the reasoning behind the relative position of
their own raise amount. As a result, the accuracy of pay-related perceptions should improve.
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Cell 6: General Distributive, Specific Procedural Information
Although individuals in Cell 6 do not know the specific raise amounts of others, pay raise
ranges and medians for jobs are open (i.e., general distributive transparency). Specific
procedural information is also transparent, and may include the sharing of pay raise formulas or
other details of the pay raise process beyond measurement criteria information. This form of pay
secrecy appears in Thompson and Pronsky’s (1975) comparative study of two companies. In the
“partially public” company, the pay communication policy “was to reveal almost everything
about pay except the amount paid to each individual” (p. 69). Information shared included salary
ranges and averages (i.e., general distributive information), as well as the factors that constitute
performance and the performance levels necessary to attain certain raises (i.e., specific
procedural information). When all procedural information has been formally shared, as well as
“everything…except the amount paid to each individual” (Thompson & Pronsky, 1975: 69),
secrecy of the Cell 6 variety is present.
Individuals in Cell 6 have a general sense of the pay raise outcomes received by others as
a result of open raise ranges and medians for different job categories. Specific procedural
transparency means these individuals should also have accurate information about the decisionmaking processes behind these outcome determinations. For example, individuals in the
Thompson and Pronsky (1975) study who indicated they understood both the factors that
constitute performance and the performance levels necessary for raise attainment should
theoretically have an accurate understanding of the relationship between pay and performance.
Thus, individuals in Cell 6 who receive a below-average pay raise should be able to infer that the
relatively lower raise amount is the result of relatively poorer performance.
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Cell 7: Specific Distributive, No Procedural Information
In Cell 7, the exact pay raise amount given to each individual is open, reflecting specific
distributive transparency. However, the processes used to determine these raise amounts remain
secret. As a result, employees know only what raise amounts were received, but are not told
why. Cell 7 secrecy is typical of many public universities in the U.S., where there is a legal
requirement that individual salary amounts be publicly accessible (Day, 2011). Although this
legal requirement does not guarantee that employees actually view this information (Day, 2011),
individuals in this example do have access to the specific pay amounts of other individuals.
Again, the value of the matrix framework is that it allows for the exploration of the
interactive effects of different combinations of distributive and procedural pay information. In
Cell 7, the combination of information communicated may be particularly problematic. With
procedural secrecy in place, individuals may make inferences or turn to informal sources such as
workplace gossip (Brady et al., 2017) to understand why certain individuals received specific
pay raise amounts (which are known to be accurate through specific distributive transparency).
With procedural information secret, even if pay raises are distributed on the basis of
performance, individuals cannot accurately know this to be true. Instead of viewing raises as
determined by performance-driven factors such as effort, work quality, and/or productivity,
individuals may instead be inclined to attribute pay raises to non-performance factors. These
non-performance factors may be perceived as legitimate (e.g., education, training, job experience
and responsibility, etc.) or not (e.g., favoritism, politics, and nepotism).
If pay raise differentials are attributed to illegitimate factors when procedural information
is secret, individuals may assume that the dispersion of pay raise amounts is non-performancebased (Gupta et al., 2012). While performance-based dispersion (Gupta et al., 2012) is generally
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motivating for individuals and creates positive outcomes for organizations (see Downes & Choi,
2014, for a recent summary of empirical findings), illegitimate and non-performance-based
dispersion is unlikely to elicit positive behavioral responses. The communication of procedural
information may correct help correct inaccurate employee perceptions, but only if the underlying
pay system indeed has legitimate performance factors as the raise basis.
Cell 8: Specific Distributive, General Procedural Information
In Cell 8, employees know the exact pay raise amount given to each individual (i.e.,
specific distributive transparency), but only general procedural information is communicated.
Again, public universities in the U.S. can be used to illustrate. With the requirement that salaries
be made publicly accessible (Day, 2011), distributive information is open. General procedural
information is also communicated about the procedures used to determine pay raise amounts.
For instance, employees at one public university were told that all salary increases must be merit
based and distributed according to supervisory performance appraisal ratings (Day, 2011). When
combined with the legal requirement that salary amounts be public (i.e., specific distributive
information), this secrecy of the Cell 8 variety occurs. As a result of this information
combination, individuals in Day’s (2011) study, for example, can clearly see who received what
amount of pay. They also know the specific performance basis (i.e., merit) and the criteria used
to measure it (i.e., supervisory performance appraisals). In a PFP system, this combination of
specific distributive and general procedural information further clarifies the relationship between
pay and performance. As a result, the accuracy of pay-related perceptions should improve.
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Cell 9: Specific Distributive, Specific Procedural Information
Finally, Cell 9 represents absolute (formal) pay transparency. Here, employees have
access to both specific distributive and specific procedural pay information that is accurate.
Buffer, the tech start-up that posts salaries and pay formulas online (Lytle, 2014), illustrates
absolute formal transparency in pay communication. The company’s publicly accessible
“Transparency Dashboard” posts salary amounts (listed by individual name and location,
representing specific distributive information), along with the current pay formula (“The Next
Evolution of Transparent Salaries,” 2018). Absolute transparency also appears in the Thompson
and Pronsky (1975) comparative study in the “public” group of sales division employees in both
companies. Because sales employees were paid using a commission plan, and the “amount of
commission per dollar sales was known and monthly sales for each individual was published”
(Thompson & Pronsky, 1975: 69), the unique pay amount of each individual can be calculated.
In Cell 9, individuals can make direct comparisons between their own raise amount and
the raises received by unique others. As a result of specific distributive transparency, these
comparisons should be based on accurate information. The addition of specific procedural
information communicates why these amounts were received. For example, consider two
salespersons working at a commission rate of $5 per sale. Salesperson A makes 100 sales while
salesperson B makes 200 sales. With the combination of pay information found in Cell 9, it
becomes easy to calculate that salesperson A received twice as much pay when compared to
salesperson B (i.e., $1,000 versus $500). Also known is that salesperson A received twice as
much pay because his or her sales were double the sales of salesperson B (i.e., 200 versus 100).
The communication of specific, accurate information related to both the distributive and
procedural aspects of pay raise allocation should clarify the link between pay and performance.
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As a result, individuals’ pay-related perceptions should be more accurate in Cell 9 than in any
other matrix cell.
Summary
As illustrated across the nine matrix cells, pay secrecy can take many forms, depending
on the combination of distributive and procedural information that an organization chooses to
formally communicates. The matrix framework adds value to the pay secrecy literature by
reconceptualizing what was once viewed as a binary phenomenon as a multi-faceted construct.
It goes beyond simply acknowledging pay secrecy as a continuum of information to delineating
the specific information content of each continua, and – perhaps most notably – interactions
between the two.
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Secrecy in Other Areas of Human Resource Management (HRM)
The near-exclusive focus of secrecy research in the HRM literature has been the
communication of pay information. Extant research has failed to consider that secrecy may exist
in other areas of HRM, separate from, or perhaps even in addition to policies of pay secrecy. In
particular, when pay raises are distributed on the basis of performance, the stated goals of using a
pay secrecy policy may be achieved by obscuring performance information instead. The
following section addresses performance secrecy in more detail.
Performance Secrecy
Several scholars have implicitly suggested the existence of a performance secrecy
construct. For example, Miner (1974) defined pay openness, in part, by whether the organization
communicates how pay raises are determined. Similarly, Day’s (2011) study of pay
communication policies in a public U.S. university measured transparency, in part, by
determining whether written information about how pay is determined was provided to
employees. Just as secrecy in pay communication can alter perceptions of the relationship
between pay and performance (Bamberger & Belogolovsky, 2010), secrecy in the
communication of performance information may similarly cloud these perceptions. The primary
difference is that while performance secrecy obscures the performance component of the
performance-pay link, pay secrecy obscures the pay component of the relationship.
Nevertheless, the end result remains the same – the perceived link between performance and pay
may be obscured.
Secrecy in the communication of performance-related information has appeared in extant
measures of pay secrecy. For example, a 10-item “Perceived Pay Secrecy Policies” measure
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developed by Day (2012) includes two items assessing the degree to which management either
explicitly or implicitly discourages the discussion of performance appraisal ratings with other
employees. If pay is based on performance appraisals, then knowing the ratings of individual
employees becomes critical in assessing whether performance improvements lead to a pay raise
(i.e., the performance-outcome expectancy; Vroom, 1964; Lawler, 1973). One of the few
empirical studies to explicitly incorporate performance secrecy was conducted by Fossum
(1976), who explored individual reactions to pay and performance communications. For this
quasi-experimental study, subjects completed a data coding exercise to examine the effects of
both pay (public versus private) and performance feedback (public versus no feedback) on
satisfaction. Though none of the stated hypotheses were supported or statistically significant,
Fossum’s (1976) work represents one of the few attempts to explicitly consider performance
secrecy as a distinct construct.
More recent empirical work in the pay secrecy domain suggests that performance secrecy
warrants further examination. In a series of lab studies, Bamberger and Belogolovsky (2010;
Belogolovsky & Bamberger, 2014) used a binary pay communication manipulation. Individuals
in the secret condition were given information about the absolute level of their own individual
performance and bonus pay only, while individuals randomly assigned to the open condition
were also provided information about the pay of fellow experimental group members. However,
the authors chose to disseminate performance information “listed by code-numbers in order to
ensure privacy” (Bamberger & Belogolovsky, 2010: 976). This design choice is problematic, as
code numbers obscure the identifying information individuals need to make direct performancepay comparisons with others. For instance, participants in the open condition of both studies
were also told that unrestricted group e-mails could be sent to other participants. In the 2010
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study, 95% of participants in the open condition disclosed pay-related information (typically
their code number) to at least one other group member (Bamberger & Belogolovsky, 2010: 976).
Similarly, 90% of participants in the open pay condition of the 2014 study disclosed pay- and
performance-related information (again, most often their assigned study code number;
Belogolovsky & Bamberger, 2014: 1716). These results indicate that participants in the secret
condition both desired and sought out the information needed to make direct performance-pay
comparisons with others.
Taken together, the evidence indicates that performance information is capable of being
obscured. Aside from the studies noted here, management scholars have not systematically
explored the possibility of a performance secrecy construct. Similar to the pay secrecy
framework, one can imagine a matrix of performance secrecy that arises from the restriction of
distributive performance information, procedural performance information, or both. In turn,
performance secrecy may be used to achieve the benefits of asserting a policy of pay openness,
while still obscuring critical information needed to assess the true relationship between
performance and pay. As an example of how performance secrecy may be used to achieve the
same effects of pay secrecy, Cell 1 of a hypothetical performance secrecy matrix is considered
below.
Performance Secrecy as a Substitute for Pay Secrecy
Absolute performance secrecy exists when organizations formally provide no distributive
or procedural performance information to employees. While employees working under absolute
pay secrecy will still know the exact amount of their own pay raise (as a direct function of being
the recipient), employees working under absolute performance secrecy may or may not know the
specifics of their own performance. For example, even when employees are supposed to receive
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performance ratings during annual performance reviews, not all supervisors conduct such
discussions in practice (Day, 2011). Similarly, the Federal Privacy Act of 1974 requires that
federal government employees and contractors be given access to personnel records, including
performance appraisal data. However, no federal law grants all employees the right to access
their personnel files, and no law requires employers to send the complete file in its entirety
(“Access to Personnel Files: 50 State Laws,” 2016). When employees do not know who received
what performance rating, this reflects absolute distributive secrecy in the communication of
performance information.
In addition to distributive performance secrecy, Cell 1 of a performance secrecy matrix
also includes secrecy in the communication of procedural performance information. When no
information about the performance appraisal process is provided, employees may not clearly
understand how and why performance appraisal decisions are made. For example, an
organization may choose to obscure the specifics of who is in charge of conducting appraisals, or
to restrict information regarding the appeals process available for addressing performance
appraisal disputes.
Taken together, distributive and procedural secrecy in the communication of performance
information may be used to achieve the same effects of a pay secrecy policy. For example,
consider an organization that distributes pay raises to all employees receiving an “excellent”
appraisal rating. If the organization chooses to obscure procedural performance information,
employees are unlikely to understand the performance appraisal process (i.e., what behaviors or
results justify a rating of “excellent”). Combined with distributive performance secrecy,
employees in Cell 1 of the performance secrecy matrix do not know the exact rating of their own
or others’ performance. This combination of secrecy in the communication of performance
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information produces a situation that is conceptually similar to that which is illustrated in Cell 1
of the pay secrecy matrix.
Investigating the Effects of Pay Secrecy
Construct clarification is but one step towards illuminating pay secrecy. The specific
mechanisms through which secrecy affects outcomes of interest remain unclear. The pay secrecy
matrix developed here provides a framework for beginning to understand how different
combinations of pay information may alter employee behaviors and attitudes traditionally
associated with the incentive and sorting effects of performance-based pay. In general, as we
move from left to right or top to bottom in the pay secrecy matrix (Figure 2), the “line of sight”
(Gerhart & Rynes, 2003; Lawler & Jenkins, 1992) between performance and individual pay
raises should strengthen, and motivation should improve. Beyond this observation, many
questions remain unanswered. For example, what are the specific behavioral outcomes
associated with sharing different types and degrees of pay information? Are employees
motivated to perform, even when pay information is secret? Are employees more or less
satisfied when different combinations of pay information are communicated?
To explore these questions, the subsequent chapters of this dissertation invoke two
theories – expectancy theory and equity theory – to isolate and explore the incentive and sorting
properties of performance-based pay raises in the context of secrecy. First, expectancy theory
(Vroom, 1964; Lawler, 1973) is used in Chapter 3 to investigate how motivation, performance,
and other behaviors associated with the incentive effect may be altered when different forms of
secrecy are present. Next, equity theory (Adams, 1963, 1965) and discrepancy theory (Lawler,
1971, 1981) are adopted in Chapter 4 to explore how satisfaction and equity perceptions are
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influenced by the communication of pay information to alter the attraction and retention
mechanisms of the sorting effect.
Motivation and Behavior via the Incentive Effect
When an organization’s goal is to improve performance, pay-for-performance (PFP) is
often adopted as a compensation strategy. Improvements in organizational performance stem
from the incentive and sorting properties of PFP that operate at the individual level. The
incentive effect describes how PFP affects productivity and performance in current employees
while holding attributes of the workforce constant (Rynes, Gerhart, & Parks, 2005; Gerhart &
Fang, 2014). Evidence supporting the incentive effect of PFP is well-documented, with positive
effects on performance and productivity reported. For example, a 10-study meta-analysis
conducted by Locke and colleagues found that productivity increased an average of 30%
following the introduction of individual pay incentives (Locke, Feren, McCaleb, Shaw, &
Denny, 1980). Similar results were also found in a qualitative summary analysis indicating that
financial incentives have a positive effect on performance quantity, with similar effect sizes
across studies conducted in the laboratory, field, and simulations (Jenkins, 1986). One of the
dominant theories used to explain the positive incentive effect of PFP on performance and
productivity is expectancy theory.
Expectancy Theory
Expectancy theory (Lawler, 1973, 1981; Vroom, 1964) is an individual-level, choicebased theory of motivation. In short, it argues that an individual’s motivation to choose to exert
effort toward a certain course of action is influenced by the multiplicative combination of three
factors: 1) the effort-performance (EP) expectancy (i.e., the subjective probability that a
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particular level of effort will lead to a particular level of performance), 2) the performanceoutcome (PO) expectancy, also referred to as “instrumentality” (i.e., the subjective probability
that a particular behavior will lead to a particular outcome), and 3) the perceived attractiveness
(or “valence”) of the outcome. Taken together, these components form an equation where
motivational force (MF) is determined by the multiplicative association among the three factors:
MF = [EP * ∑ (PO * V)].
All three factors are critical, but in the context of pay secrecy, PO beliefs (i.e., PPay
expectancies) are especially germane. Although the theory allows for the incorporation of
several outcomes (as indicated by the summation in the equation), the current investigation is
restricted to the specific outcome of performance-based pay raises. As such, only PPay
expectancies are relevant. Because this dissertation is focused on the singular outcome of
performance-based pay raises, the inclusion of valence as a theoretical mechanism of motivation
becomes redundant. This is because pay raises are almost always desirable (i.e., relatively
attractive, motivating, satisfying, etc.). For example, while we know that a $1,000 raise has a
higher valence (i.e., is more motivating, satisfying, etc.) than a $100 raise, there are no real
differences to contrast – except magnitude – when considering performance-based pay raises as
the only outcome of interest. If multiple outcomes were considered here, valence would be
expected to vary across different outcomes and would therefore be a sensible component to
include.
Pay secrecy obscures pay-related perceptions by restricting the communication of
distributive and procedural pay information. As a result, the accuracy of two determinants of
PPay expectancies – the objective situation and communication from others (Lawler, 1973) –
may be affected. It should be noted that while PPay expectancies have additional
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determinants, these are not relevant to the current discussion. For example, PPay expectancies
are also determined by an individual’s past experience in similar situations (Lawler, 1973).
However, an individual’s past experience with pay received in previous jobs is unlikely to have
any bearing on pay perceptions in the current employment arrangement. PPay expectancies
are also influenced by beliefs about internal versus external locus of control (i.e., beliefs about
the responsiveness or controllability of one’s environment; Rotter, 1966; Lawler, 1973). Locus
of control is an individual difference. Because this dissertation focuses on system characteristics
related to secrecy, emphasis is placed on the objective situation and communication from others
as the primary determinants of PPay expectancies.
First, pay secrecy affects PPay expectancies by clouding a person’s perception of the
objective situation. As Lawler (1973) notes, “Sometimes…a person’s perception of the situation
is not accurate, and as a result the objective situation may not completely determine a
person’s…expectancies” (p. 68). As the matrix illustrates, pay secrecy may be used to restrict
the amount of distributive and/or procedural pay information that an individual receives. When
this information is restricted, it should influence how an individual perceives (and ultimately
responds to) the objective situation.
Empirical evidence supports this contention. It also suggests that when individuals
misperceive the objective situation when pay information is restricted, these misperceptions may
exhibit a predictable pattern of perceived wage compression. Early studies found that
individuals tended to overestimate the pay of peers and subordinates while also underestimating
the pay of their superiors (Lawler, 1965, 1966, 1967). In a later study of exempt employees in a
Canadian manufacturing organization, Mahoney and Weitzel (1978) also found that the majority
of respondents overestimated the pay of their peers and subordinates, but that respondents were
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equally split between over-and under-estimation of superiors’ pay. While the specific direction
of these perceptions (i.e., over- versus under-estimation) may vary depending on the referent
other that is selected for comparison (e.g., subordinate/peer versus superior), the available
evidence indicates that secrecy can alter an individual’s perception of the objective situation.
Second, pay secrecy may also affect PPay expectancies by influencing communication
from others (Lawler, 1973). Research on incentives indicates that communication from others
helps employees develop beliefs about the consequences of high productivity (e.g., that an
individual’s high productivity may cause other workers to resent and reject the high producer;
Whyte, 1955). When pay information is secret, individuals may rely more heavily on informal
information obtained from communications with others. For example, a study of employees in
an organization that discouraged any discussion of salary except between supervisor and
subordinate found that these individuals were significantly less likely to make pay comparisons
exclusively within the company (Thompson & Pronsky, 1975). One possible explanation for this
behavior is that secrecy influences communication with others within the organization, forcing
individuals in more secretive organizations to turn to outside sources for pay information.
When secrecy clouds perceptions of PPay expectancies, motivational force should be
affected. This theoretical contention has received some empirical support. For example,
employees in an organization with both merit pay and pay secrecy perceived a moderate
relationship between pay and performance until the organization became more open about pay, at
which time employees’ perceptions of the PPay relationship increased significantly (Lawler,
1971). Because employees are likely to be more committed to tasks for which a clear PO
contingency is perceived (Naylor, Pritchard, & Ilgen, 1980; Vroom, 1964), pay secrecy may
have negative effects on individual motivation by obscuring the relationship between
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performance and pay. The Bamberger and Belogolovsky studies (2010, 2014) suggest a negative
effect of pay secrecy on task performance that is mediated by perceived instrumentality (i.e., the
PPay expectancy), though the relationship may be moderated by individual differences (e.g.,
tolerance for inequity; Bamberger & Belogolovsky, 2010). These effects may be further
influenced by additional elements of the compensation system.
Compensation System Characteristics
Pay communication is only one characteristic of an organization’s compensation system.
As with any system, it is doubtful that the different components operate in isolation. For
example, Belogolovsky and Bamberger’s laboratory study (2014) found that while secrecy had a
negative effect on individual task performance (mediated by performance-pay instrumentality
perceptions), this negative effect was amplified with relative (versus absolute) pay determination
criteria and attenuated with objective (versus subjective) performance assessment. These results
indicate that other aspects of the compensation system (i.e., pay determination criteria,
performance assessment measures, etc.) may interact with secrecy to alter motivation and
performance
The matrix framework presented here allows for the incorporation of neglected system
elements into the study of secrecy and motivation. Turning to the expectancy calculation for
motivational force, [EP * ∑ (PO * V)], pertinent compensation system characteristics
emerge. For example, because “P” or performance is included as a component of both
expectancy (EP) and instrumentality (PPay), performance characteristics are relevant.
Influenceable performance measures are those that an individual believes he or she can
alter or influence through action. All else equal, measures that are perceived as being more
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influenceable should strengthen the EP expectancy, or the belief that a specific amount of
effort will result in a certain level of performance (Vroom, 1964; Lawler, 1973, 1981). For
example, consider a factory worker whose organization awards a $1 raise if 1,000 units are
produced annually. If a worker feels capable of producing 1,000 units annually, the EP
expectancy strengthens, increasing the overall motivational force to exert effort toward
producing 1,000 units. However, the communication of varying degrees of distributive and
procedural pay information may obscure the perceived influenceability of the performance
measure, producing inaccurate EP perceptions. For example, if procedural pay information is
secret, it is less likely that individuals have the needed information to determine if the
measurement criteria are influenceable. When procedural secrecy combines with transparent
specific distributive information (i.e., Cell 7 of the matrix), individuals can see others’ pay raise
amounts but lack the accurate information to know why these amounts were awarded. In the
absence of accurate procedural information, individuals may attribute high raise amounts to nonperformance factors such as nepotism or organizational politics. The inaccurate inferences may
later motivational force and subsequent behavior.
Summary
The restricted communication of pay information can alter employee perceptions,
including (a) PPay expectancies, by altering how the objective situation is perceived, as well
as communication from others; and (b) EP expectancies, by influencing the perceived
influenceability of the performance measure. Taken together, these perceptions drive an
individual’s overall motivational force to follow a certain course of action (Vroom, 1964;
Lawler, 1973, 1981) and can be used to predict behavioral choice. Just as expectancy theory can
be used to highlight the psychological mechanisms that drive motivation, so too can equity
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theory (Adams, 1965) and discrepancy theory (Lawler, 1971) be used to explore an individual’s
affective responses when secrecy alters equity perceptions and satisfaction.
Satisfaction and Behavior via the Sorting Effect
In addition to its incentive effect, PFP also functions as a sorting device that identifies
and attracts the most capable employees (Gerhart & Rynes, 2003). Through this sorting effect,
PFP “improves performance not by changing the behavior of current employees, but rather by
changing who the current employees are (and what attributes they bring to the organization)”
(Gerhart & Fang, 2014: 45). For example, in a study of automobile glass installation workers, a
44% increase in productivity was noted following the switch from salary to an individual piece
rate pay system (Lazear, 1999, 2000). Approximately half of this productivity improvement was
the result of less productive workers leaving the organization and being replaced by new, more
productive individuals (Lazear, 1999, 2000). This illustrates the complementary forces of
attraction and retention that drive the sorting effect. Similarly, a multi-wave survey study of key
informants in a sample of independent grocery stores found that quit rates of poor performers
(those whose job performance was in the lowest 20%) were higher when pay was dispersed and
explained by the use of a pay-for-performance system (Shaw, 2015). In turn, the quit rates of
these poor performers were associated with increased organizational performance. For high
performers (those with job performance in the top 20%), quite rates were highest when pay was
compressed and a PFP system was not used. Although quit rates of these high performers were
unrelated to organizational performance, Shaw (2015) suggests that this may be a feature of the
grocery store industry used for sampling. This industry is typically viewed as low-skill (Shaw,
2015), lacking the outlying “star performers” whose individual performance has a
disproportionate influence on organizational performance (Aquinis & O’Boyle, 2014).
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In short, research on the sorting effect indicates that employees are uniquely attracted to,
and retained by, different compensation systems. When a compensation system links pay to
employee inputs (i.e., through the use of PFP), human capital advantages can increase “by
attracting and retaining higher-ability, better-performing employees” (Trevor, Reily, & Gerhart,
2012: 586). PFP not only attracts high performers. As the Shaw (2015) study illustrates, PFP
also encourages low performers to voluntarily turnover (Cadsby, Song, & Tapon, 2007). Studies
indicate that employees who choose to leave an organization are generally poorer performers
than their counterparts who remain (Harrison, Virick & William, 1996), especially when pay is
based on individual performance (Milkovich et al., 2014). To understand how the
communication of pay information alters the attraction and retention mechanisms as the sorting
effect, equity theory and discrepancy theory arise as complementary theoretical frameworks.
Equity Theory
Equity theory is primarily concerned with fairness in reward allocations (Adams, 1963,
1965), while discrepancy theory has been used to make specific predictions about the
determinants of pay satisfaction (Lawler, 1971). Together, the two theories are appropriate for
investigating how secrecy - through its effect on individual perceptions of fairness or feelings of
pay raise satisfaction – may influence the sorting mechanism of PFP. According to Adams
(1963, 1965), equity theory is a theory of social exchange that suggests individuals assess their
outcomes (including pay) in relation to their inputs, which can include education, experience,
training, and effort. Next, individuals compare their own outcome/input or O/I ratio to that of a
referent other, chosen for the purpose of making salient comparisons because they are
“comparable to the comparer on one or more attributes” (Adams, 1965: 280). Because of this
comparison process, fairness and equity judgments are relative rather than absolute. During this
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relative assessment, if an individual perceives his or her O/I ratio as being equal to that of the
selected referent, then equity is said to exist. Conversely, if the ratios are viewed as unequal,
perceptions of inequity result and the individual experiences emotional distress.
The specific type of emotional distress that is experienced depends on the unique type of
inequity that is perceived. First, positive inequity or overreward occurs when an individual’s O/I
ratio is perceived as being greater than that of the comparison other (Adams, 1965). The
affective response to positive inequity is often guilt for failing to pull one’s weight, or
unworthiness for the disproportionate amount of outcomes received (Perry, 1993; Scheer,
Kumar, & Steenkamp, 2003). The distress caused by these feelings of guilt or unworthiness then
motivates the individual to restore balance through a variety of behavioral and/or psychological
techniques (Adams, 1965). For example, an individual experiencing positive inequity may
distort perceptions of inputs and outcomes to restore balance and remove feelings of guilt.
Second, negative inequity occurs when an individual’s O/I ratio is perceived as being less
than that of the referent other. Here, the individual perceives he or she is being underrewarded
and experiences feelings of deprivation or being cheated (Adams, 1965; Perry, 1993), or perhaps
even hostility from being “shortchanged” (Scheer et al., 2003: 304). The negative feelings
associated with perceived underreward again motivate the individual to restore balance towards
equity. For example, an individual who feels underrewarded may reduce the amount of effort
put into the job to alter self inputs and restore equity (Adams, 1965). Conversely, underrewarded
individuals may also choose to remove themselves from the situation by exiting the organization
through voluntary turnover.
In short, inequity perceptions create dissatisfaction and prompt cognitive dissonance
(Heneman & Judge, 2000). Cognitive dissonance, or the psychological discomfort that is
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experienced when expectations or normative rules are violated, in turn motivates the individual
to restore balance by invoking certain behavioral or cognitive tools (Festinger, 1954, 1957). To
restore equity, individuals may alter the inputs and outcomes of the self and/or the referent other,
distort perceptions of inputs and outcomes, choose a different referent other for comparison, or
leave the situation entirely (Adams, 1965). While leaving the situation entirely often manifests
as turnover, organizational performance only improves if low performers are leaving and
simultaneously being replaced by more productive workers. Several questions remain
unanswered. For example, under what pay communication conditions are poor performers likely
to leave and better performers likely to stay? When dissatisfied workers remain, what other
behavioral responses may arise when attempting to restore equity? Chapter 4 explores these
questions in detail.
Exploration of Outcomes
Research indicates that pay communication practices have behavioral implications
beyond individual task performance and employee attraction and retention (e.g., employees’
tendency to offer help; Bamberger & Belogolovsky, 2017). By isolating the psychological
mechanisms of motivation from the affective responses driven by perceived inequity and pay
raise satisfaction, distal behavioral outcomes beyond performance and turnover can be
considered. Behavioral outcomes can be broadly categorized as functional or dysfunctional – a
seemingly straightforward distinction. Functional outcomes arise from “good” behaviors, or
actions that are desirable from the organization’s point of view (e.g., task performance,
organizational citizenship behaviors). In contrast, dysfunctional outcomes result from “bad”
behaviors, or actions that are undesirable from the perspective of the organization (e.g.,
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counterproductive work behaviors). In the context of motivation, dysfunctional outcomes also
occur when the system motivates no behavior at all.
This binary distinction may oversimplify the range of behaviors that can result when pay
secrecy clouds individual perception. To conduct a more nuanced examination of these
behavioral responses, a comprehensive understanding of functional versus dysfunctional effects
is warranted. Toward this end, behavioral outcomes are conceptualized here as comprising two
separate continua. One continuum illustrates the range of desirable behaviors that can occur,
while a separate continuum illustrates the range of undesirable behaviors that may result. Taken
together, these continua can be used to delineate functional versus dysfunctional effects.
Functional effects occur in two instances: both when desirable behaviors are promoted, and when
undesirable behaviors are hindered. Conversely, dysfunctional effects manifest when desirable
behaviors are hindered, and undesirable behaviors are promoted.
The benefits of this conceptualization of outcomes or effects are two-fold. First, it
facilitates a thorough exploration and categorization of behaviors that arise, in part, in response
to the varying types of secrecy illustrated by the matrix. As such, it provides a starting point for
developing a typology of behavioral outcomes that result when inaccurate pay information
distorts employee perceptions. It has long been recognized that pay can have unintended
consequences (e.g., Kerr, 1975; Lawler & Rhode, 1976), though empirical evidence on the topic
has been “less systematic and organized” (Gerhart, Rynes, & Fulmer, 2009: 276). The proposed
outcome conceptualization is a useful step toward remedying this deficiency. It can easily be
extended into the broader compensation literature to systematically explore and organize the
many unintended, dysfunctional consequences of pay.
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A second benefit of this conceptualization is that it allows for perspective to be
considered when determining if a given behavior is functional. Simply put, the same behavior
that is dysfunctional for the organization may be largely functional when viewed from the
perspective of the individual actor. For example, consider an organization with a known policy
of awarding only the top-ranking performer in each work team with a pay raise. This policy of
“one raise per team” may motivate individuals to engage in destructive competition with team
members, in the hopes of becoming the top performer and sole recipient of the pay raise. At the
individual level, this behavior may be viewed as having functional ends (i.e., increasing
motivation and performance), albeit achieved through dysfunctional means (i.e., encouraging
undermining and other behaviors associated with destructive competition). The
conceptualization of effects presented here makes it is possible to explore when certain behaviors
are functional or dysfunctional, and for whom they are so. Before exploring these outcomes in
the following chapters, undesirable behavior must first be defined.
Defining Undesirable Behavior
Deviance, counterproductive work behavior (CWB), and a host of other “bad behaviors”
in organizations (Griffin & Lopez, 2005: 988) can be encompassed under the category of
undesirable behavior. CWB and other bad behaviors refer to intentional (versus accidental)
behaviors that are possibly injurious to the organization and/or organizational members (Griffin
& Lopez, 2005; Spector & Fox, 2005). CWB has traditionally been conceptualized as a reactive,
emotion-driven response to workplace events (Spector & Fox, 2010). For example, the stressoremotion model (Spector & Fox, 2005) views CWB as arising from negative emotions
experienced when environmental conditions known as job stressors are perceived by the
individual (Spector, 1998). It is now recognized that some CWB may be motivated by more
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instrumental concerns, arising from “cold cognitions, plans, and personal or professional
strategies” (Fox & Spector, 2010: 94). This distinction between reactive versus instrumental
CWB can be aligned with the incentive and sorting properties of PFP, to refine the range of
behaviors that an organization may view as undesirable.
Both perspectives of CWB share perceptual processes as a common factor (Fox &
Spector, 2010). Using the incentive effect, employee perceptions can be framed around the
components of motivation using expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964; Lawler, 1973). Undesirable
behaviors that are triggered by cognitive mechanisms of motivation can therefore be viewed as
instrumentally motivated. This is because perceptions of instrumentality (PPay), expectancy
(EP), and valence (Vroom, 1964; Lawler, 1973) require some level of cognitive evaluation on
the individual’s part. The individual must take time to cognitively consider if they are capable of
performing at the desired level (i.e., EP), if performing at a certain level will be followed by a
pay raise (i.e., PPay), and if the expected pay raise is a relatively desirable outcome (i.e.,
valence).
In contrast to the cognitive mechanisms and instrumental outcomes associated with the
incentive path, the sorting path illustrates how perceptions of inequity can trigger affective
responses such as anger or guilt (Adams, 1963, 1965). Undesirable behaviors that are triggered
by affective responses are therefore more likely to be reactive in nature. In contrast to the “cold
cognitive” approach of the incentive path, this “hot affective” (Fox & Spector, 2010: 93)
response to inequity is likely to be more emotion-based and reactionary. When individuals
engage in comparison processes with referent others, affective responses such as hostility
(following perceived underreward; Scheer et al., 2003) or guilt (following perceived overreward;
Scheer et al., 2003; Perry, 1993) may result. Because the key to reactive CWB is the trigger of
61

negative workplace emotions (Neuman & Baron, 2005), undesirable behaviors that are triggered
by these affective mechanisms are more likely to be immediate and impulsive as opposed to the
more calculated, instrumental forms of behavior that arise when cognitive mechanisms dominate
(Fox & Spector, 2010). Taken together, undesirable behavior can be defined here as behavior
that is intentional and causes harm to an organization and/or its members, with either
instrumental motives (when motivation is the driving force), or reactive motives (when different
combinations of (in)equity and (dis)satisfaction are perceived). In contrast, desirable behavior
can be conceptualized as intentional behaviors that benefit the organization and/or its members.
Summary
Chapter 2 clarifies the construct of pay secrecy and sets the stage for an exploration of its
effects on employee behaviors and attitudes. Conceptualizing secrecy as a matrix of distributive
and procedural information restriction can help direct the field away from the historically binary
conceptualization that has plagued past research. Furthermore, empirical studies have focused
on investigating how secrecy influences performance (e.g., Bamberger & Belogolovsky, 2010,
2014), satisfaction (e.g., Mahoney & Weitzel, 1978), or some combination of the two (e.g.,
Futrell & Jenkins, 1978). By instead conceptualizing behavioral outcomes as either broadly
functional (i.e., promoting desirable behaviors and hindering undesirable ones) or dysfunctional
(i.e., hindering desirable actions and promoting undesirable behaviors), the range of potential
responses to pay secrecy can be thoroughly investigated. Finally, integrating instrumental and
reactive motives from the CWB literature (e.g., Spector & Fox, 2010) aligns these behaviors with
the incentive and sorting properties of PFP that frame the remainder of this dissertation.
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CHAPTER 3
PAY COMMUNICATION AND THE INCENTIVE EFFECT
Overview
With construct clarification addressed, this manuscript now turns to an exploration of the
effects of pay secrecy on employee behaviors and attitudes. Historically, the simultaneous
examination of multiple outcomes has been an impediment to the development of pay secrecy
research. Conflicting findings have left academics and practitioners with an incomplete
understanding of how pay communication impacts outcomes of interest. Distinct theoretical
mechanisms may facilitate clarification. To untangle the convoluted effects of prior research, the
incentive and sorting properties of PFP have been selected as suitable tracks for examining the
discrete dynamics of motivation and satisfaction.
Toward this end, Chapter 3 uses the incentive effect to emphasize performance and other
behavioral outcomes driven by motivation. Extant empirical investigations of the relationship
between pay secrecy and performance are first reviewed, and findings from both macro and
micro levels of analysis are discussed. Expectancy theory is then invoked to explore how
specific motivational mechanisms may be differentially affected when varied forms of secrecy
are present. By examining how pay communication combines with additional elements of the
compensation system to influence the distinct perceptual components of motivational force (i.e.,
EP expectancy, PO expectancy, and valence; Lawler, 1973, 1981; Vroom, 1964), a range of
functional and dysfunctional effects can be examined. Taken together, Chapter 3 investigates
how secrecy in pay communication influences individual perceptions, and how these altered
perceptions can in turn alter the established incentive effect of PFP.
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Pay Communication and Performance: Empirical Evidence
A substantial amount of empirical evidence indicates that PFP can have a positive impact
on individual performance and productivity via the incentive effect (for recent reviews see
Gerhart & Fang, 2014; Shaw & Gupta, 2015). Because “individual motivation theories
presuppose that accurate information is critical” (Shaw & Gupta, 2002: 909), an implicit
assumption underlying studies of the incentive effect is that accurate pay information is known.
This assumption disregards the reality that the communication of pay information may be
obscured. As a result, several questions remain unanswered. For example, is the communication
of accurate distributive and procedural pay information a necessary condition for the incentive
effect to motivate performance? Through what mechanisms does pay communication influence
employee motivation? What types of behaviors are likely to result when different characteristics
of compensation systems are present? Before exploring how the communication of pay
information can alter the motivational properties of PFP, a review of performance-focused
studies from the pay secrecy literature is prudent.
Pay secrecy research has been plagued by a noted dearth of empirical studies. A review
of the extant literature yields only five studies (i.e., Bamberger & Belogolovsky, 2010;
Belogolovsky & Bamberger, 2014; Futrell & Jenkins, 1978; Greiner et al., 2011; Tremblay &
Chênevert, 2008) that explicitly measure performance and some degree of secrecy or
transparency in the communication of pay information. This paucity of empirical work has
produced contradictory findings that provide little insight into the performance implications of
pay communication policies. Furthermore, investigations aimed at uncovering the mediating
psychological mechanisms behind these effects have been neglected. To begin remedying these
shortcomings, a review of the empirical findings associated with the pay secrecy-performance
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relationship is provided below. Because both the level of measurement and level of analysis
have implications for organizational theory and research (Rousseau, 1989), findings are
categorized by the level at which performance is measured (i.e., macro or micro).
Macro-Level Studies
Studies investigating the relationship between pay secrecy and organizational
performance are rare. One exception comes from a survey study of Canadian private sector
industries that examined the effects of transparency of information on two measures of
organizational performance (i.e., productivity, and a perceptual measure of market performance)
and three indicators of HR performance (i.e., turnover, and two perceptual measures of work
climate and discretionary effort; Tremblay and Chênevert, 2008). Transparency of information
was measured by asking HR executives to rate six items, including the extent to which the
organization discloses administrative procedures on how pay levels and pay raises are fixed,
whether employees are discouraged from disclosing their pay to colleagues, and if managers are
well-informed of pay policies (p. 280). Results indicate that greater transparency of information
is negatively associated with market performance and positively related to work climate, though
only for sampled firms with high technological intensity. However, neither relationship was
statistically significant, and transparency was not significantly related to any of the three
indicators of HR performance. Tremblay and Chênevert (2008) suggest these findings emerged
because information transparency may reduce the discretion that managers have in allocating
rewards, such that they lack “the freedom to recognize the most productive employees and
contributors” (p. 295) when pay information is public. Although employees working in
technology-intensive firms are more likely to paid on the basis of individual performance (Balkin
& Gomez-Mejia, 1984), differentials between individual performance and subsequent rewards
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may be minimized to reduce potential employee conflict when pay information is transparent
(Tremblay & Chênevert, 2008).
While these findings suggest that transparency of information may have both positive and
negative effects for organizational-level performance indicators, the outcome measures selected
by Tremblay and Chênevert (2008) impede a clear interpretation of effects. Instead of using a
direct measure of market performance (e.g., comparing ROI or other objective measures of
organizational performance to industry standards), respondents were instead asked to compare
the performance of their own firm (based on indicators including growth in sales, profitability,
market share, and marketing) to that of the industry. This subjective measure may not
accurately reflect a firm’s objective market performance. Furthermore, the questionnaire design
of the study does not permit causal inferences, and reverse causality is possible (Shadish, Cook,
& Campbell, 2002). For example, while transparency of information could have negative effects
on perceived market performance, it may also be that firms with lower market performance are
simply more inclined to be transparent in the sharing of information. Furthermore, there is no
theoretical reason to expect a direct effect of transparency on organizational performance. It is
therefore more plausible to suspect that transparency moderates additional elements of the pay
system, rather than having a direct influence on organizational performance. For example, pay
communication may alter individuals’ perceptions of motivational antecedents, including the
perceived relationship between performance and subsequent pay, and the relative size of pay
raise amounts. Any individual performance detriments resulting from these altered pay
perceptions may carry over into negative effects for organizational performance.
The pay dispersion literature also contains several studies exploring how the
communication of pay information may affect the performance of organizations. Pay dispersion
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refers to the degree of variation in pay that exists in a collective (Gupta, Conroy, & Delery, 2012;
Downes & Choi, 2014). Some scholars contend that professional sports teams – with their
public pay and performance information – are an appropriate arena for investigating the effects
of transparent pay information on organizational performance. With performance information
public, both the individual and organizational performance of professional athletes and their
teams can be determined (e.g., by operationalizing team performance as the percentage of games
each team wins in a given year; Bloom, 1999; Sirmon, Gove, & Hitt, 2008). Using the proposed
matrix framework, the public salaries of professional athletes represent specific distributive pay
transparency, accurately communicating who makes what in terms of individual compensation.
However, procedural information as to how these pay amounts were determined remains secret
(i.e., Cell 7 in the matrix).
Extant pay dispersion research has produced conflicting findings about the effect of
transparency on organizational performance. For example, Bloom’s (1999) study of MLB
players found that horizontal pay dispersion (i.e., differences in pay among people performing
similar jobs; Gupta, Conroy, & Delery, 2012; Shaw, 2015) was associated with winning a lower
percentage of games in the previous season. This suggests a negative effect of transparent pay
dispersion on organizational performance. However, a recent study of MLB players found the
opposite effect (Hill, Aime, & Ridge, 2017). Specifically, MLB teams with a high degree of pay
dispersion saw an increase in the percentage of games won in the previous season, but this
positive effect on organizational performance only occurred when pay and resource dispersion
were both congruent and visible. The findings therefore suggest that “pay transparency must go
hand-in-hand with performance transparency” (Hill et al., 2017: 3), providing further evidence of
the performance secrecy construct discussed in Chapter 2.
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While public pay and performance data make sports teams an attractive domain for pay
communication research, transparency is a constant in these studies. To provide insight into how
the communication of different types and degrees of pay information may influence
organizational performance, the results from these transparent sports team studies can be
contrasted with research conducted in organizational settings that traditionally have more secrecy
in the communication of pay information. For example, a survey study of organizations in two
industries (i.e., motor carrier and concrete pipe organizations) found that pay dispersion had a
positive effect on organizational performance when individual incentives were used, though this
positive effect was attenuated in more interdependent work settings (i.e., the concrete pipe
industry, which requires sequential interdependence for performance; Shaw, Gupta, & Delery,
2002). Thus, Bloom’s (1999) study of MLB players suggests a negative effect of transparent
dispersion on organizational performance. In contrast, Shaw and colleagues’ results suggest that
in more secretive settings, pay dispersion has a positive effect on organizational performance
when individual incentives are used in a work setting with less interdependence (e.g., truck
drivers in the motor carrier industry; Shaw et al., 2002).
In summary, macro-level studies of the relationship between pay transparency and
organizational performance have produced conflicting findings. While sports teams have been
used to investigate the effects of transparency on organizational performance indicators, this may
be problematic because transparency is a constant in sports samples. Though research conducted
in work settings with less pay and performance transparency can be contrasted with the findings
from sports team samples, the “black box” explaining how the communication of pay
information influences organizational performance remains unclear. Evidence suggests that
transparency moderates other pay system elements – such as pay dispersion, the use of individual
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incentives, and task interdependence (e.g., Shaw et al., 2002) – to influence organizational
performance. To begin untangling these interrelated phenomena, a review of micro-level studies
of pay secrecy and individual performance may clarify the transparency-performance
relationship as it exists at higher levels of analysis.
Micro-Level Studies
A preponderance of the empirical research on pay secrecy – both in the economics and
management literatures – has been conducted at the individual level. In economics, the
efficiency wage model has been used to investigate how workers may withhold effort when they
perceive their wages as unfair (Akerlof & Yellen, 1990). Because perceived fairness is based in
part on perceptions of coworkers’ wages (Frank, 1984), the efficiency wage model suggests that
transparency in the communication of pay information may clarify these perceptions. For
example, business students in an experimental laboratory simulation were assigned to either a
private pay condition (and told only their own wage) or to a public pay condition, wherein
subjects were told not only their own wages, but also the wages of other participants (though it
should be noted that the authors did not disclose if this information was shared using nonidentifying information such as pay ranges or participant code numbers; Greiner, Ockenfels, &
Werner, 2011). Participants in both conditions were paid identical wages in the first round, and
then given either a 60% wage increase (“high wage” condition), or a 60% wage decrease (“low
wage” condition) in the following round. This increase or decrease was applied either to the pay
rate per number of forms completed during the simulation exercise (i.e., piece rate pay) or to a
flat payoff amount (i.e., flat wage condition, with a pay amount equal to the average payoff from
the piece rate condition). In the public wage condition, individuals receiving a 60% increase
with piece rate payment had higher performance quality, while those receiving a 60% decrease in
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piece rate pay exhibited more shirking (i.e., improving performance quantity at the expense of
quality). In the private wage condition, there were no significant performance differences
between any of the conditions (high/low wages, or piece rate versus flat rate).
Greiner and colleagues (2011) suggest that the findings provide “evidence that the
transparency of wage dispersion strongly affects performance: with public information,
increasing wages promotes effort of high earners, and lowering wages leads to more shirking”
(Greiner et al., 2011: 238). However, this interpretation is problematic. Assigned wage change
conditions (i.e., the 60% increase or decrease in wages following round one) were arbitrarily
administered. Furthermore, the authors note that “subjects could not assess their own
performance relative to others” (p. 236), making direct pay-performance comparisons with
another participant impossible. As a result, the observed effects of transparency on performance
quality and quantity may be attributable to the arbitrary introduction and removal of wages,
rather than the transparency of pay information itself. While this would not be an issue if the
experimental design controlled for this, Greiner and colleagues indicate that the only control was
for subjects’ ability (measured as performance in the first round). Based on the available
information provided by the study authors, interpretation of the results is limited.
In the management literature, Lawler’s (1965, 1966, 1967) survey work in several
organizations has heavily influenced investigations into the relationship between pay secrecy and
individual performance. Notably, none of the original studies include an actual measure of
performance; only satisfaction and the accuracy of pay-related perceptions were directly
measured. The now widely cited performance findings are based largely on inferences and
theoretical conjecture posed by Lawler. For example, in a study of four organizations with a
policy of keeping management compensation information secret, personnel managers provided
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incorrect estimates when asked to guess the pay of others (Lawler, 1965, 1966). More
specifically, managers in these organizations with more restrictive pay communication policies
tended to systematically overestimate the pay of peers and subordinates, while simultaneously
underestimating the pay of their superiors.
In contrast to managers in more secretive organizations, managers in three government
agencies with published pay scale information made more accurate comparisons (Lawler, 1965,
1966). Based on these findings, Lawler suggests that the systematic over- and underestimation
of others’ pay may have negative motivation effects for two desirable behaviors. First,
promotion-seeking may be negatively affected because underestimating the pay of superiors
makes those positions appear less desirable. Second, task performance may be negatively
affected because overestimating the pay of peers and subordinates creates the perception that
one’s own pay is comparatively lower, which may be interpreted as negative performance
feedback (Lawler, 1965, 1966). In a later study, the proposed negative effect of pay secrecy on
motivation was directly tested (Lawler, 1967). In an organization with “a policy of strict secrecy
with respect to pay levels” (Lawler, 1967: 184), manufacturing employees who overestimated
the pay of superiors self-reported that promotion was relatively unimportant. These employees
also indicated that they believed job performance (measured as effort, productivity, and quality
of performance) was relatively unimportant in determining pay (Lawler, 1967), suggesting that
secrecy may influence perceptions of the relationship between performance and subsequent pay
(i.e., the PPay expectancy; Lawler, 1973, 1981; Vroom, 1964).
Taken together, these findings suggest that pay secrecy may negatively impact
motivation, and ultimately, individual performance. Viewed in the context of expectancy theory,
if individuals do not believe that performance is important in determining pay (which can occur
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when pay-related information is restricted; Lawler, 1967), the belief that performance will lead
to pay as an outcome (i.e., the PPay expectancy; Lawler, 1973, 1981; Vroom, 1964) is unclear.
As a result, the perceived PPay expectancy may fail to accurately reflect the true strength of
the relationship between performance and pay. All else equal, when the perceived link between
performance and pay is perceived as relatively weak or unimportant, motivation for performance
should decrease.
To test this theoretical proposition, Futrell and Jenkins (1978) conducted a field
experiment among pharmaceutical salespersons. The experimental manipulation consisted of the
introduction of a new pay policy, whereby salespersons were given the individual low and high
merit raise amounts, as well as the overall average merit raise amount for the previous year.
Each salesperson’s performance evaluation was also made available for review by other
salespersons (again, highlighting the importance of considering the extent to which performance
information is also communicated). In the experimental (open) condition, salespersons had both
higher job performance (based on supervisory ratings of five items), and were also more satisfied
with their pay, promotion policies, and work than salespersons in the control group. While this
suggests that open pay and performance information are positively related to job performance
ratings and satisfaction, the specific mechanisms that drive these effects were not considered.
Recent empirical work has started to investigate the psychological mechanisms that
mediate the effects of pay communication on individual performance. In two separate
experimental studies (Bamberger & Belogolovsky, 2010; Belogolovsky & Bamberger, 2014),
participants were invited to play a “magic stones” game as part of a lab-based simulation to earn
money. In both studies, pay communication was manipulated to create a secret condition
(wherein individuals received information about their own performance and bonus pay only) and
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a partially open condition (where the pay – but not performance – of other participants was
shared by code number). In each study, perceived instrumentality (i.e., PPay expectancy) was
also measured as the “percentage of total pay that an individual perceives to be contingent on
performance” (Bamberger & Belogolovsky, 2010: 977). Participants were first asked to estimate
the likely bonus associated with both a low and a high level of performance. The difference
between the estimated bonus amounts of the two conditions was then calculated as a proportion
of total pay to capture perceived instrumentality, or the relationship between performance and
pay (Bamberger & Belogolovsky, 2010: 977).
Results from these two studies provide insight into the cognitive mechanisms that may
explain the relationship between pay communication, motivation, and performance. In the first
study (Bamberger & Belogolovsky, 2010), individual task performance was significantly lower
in the secret pay condition than in the (partially) open pay condition, and this negative effect was
partially mediated by perceived instrumentality. However, this negative effect on task
performance only occurred among individuals who were less tolerant of inequity (measured via
equity sensitivity, a dispositional construct reflecting individual sensitivity to the presence or
absence of equity in social exchange; Bamberger & Belogolovsky, 2010: 965). While the
authors also tested perceived fairness (both informational and procedural) as potential mediators,
the hypothesized relationships were not supported. The non-significance of fairness as a
potential mediator of the secrecy-performance relationship suggests that equity and fairness
considerations may operate through separate mechanisms distinct from motivation. This issue is
explored in detail in the following chapter.
A second laboratory study using the same protocol (Belogolovsky & Bamberger, 2014)
also found that individual task performance was lower in the secret pay condition. Again, this
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negative effect was mediated by perceived instrumentality. Moderating effects revealed that the
negative effect of secrecy on individual task performance was amplified when pay determination
criteria were relative, and attenuated when performance assessment was objective. While this
provides evidence that other system elements may moderate the secrecy-performance
relationship, the impact of these elements on specific components of motivation remain unclear.
Taken together, a negative relationship between pay secrecy and individual performance
has been theoretically postulated (e.g., Lawler, 1965, 1966, 1967), and empirical evidence
provides tentative support for this contention (e.g., Bamberger & Belogolovsky, 2010;
Belogolovsky & Bamberger, 2014; Futrell & Jenkins, 1978). Although instrumentality
perceptions (i.e., the relationship between pay and performance) may partially explain secrecy’s
negative influence on motivation (e.g., Bamberger & Belogolovsky, 2010; Belogolovsky &
Bamberger, 2014), the PPay instrumentality represents just one piece of motivational force.
This narrow focus on instrumentality perceptions has ignored how pay communication may
influence additional motivational mechanisms, including the EP expectancy (Lawler, 1973,
1981; Vroom, 1964). By incorporating the full expectancy model into an investigation of the
secrecy-performance relationship, we can begin to understand how specific psychological
mechanisms of motivation are impacted by the communication of pay information.
Summary
While the incentive effect of PFP can motivate performance and productivity among
employees (Rynes et al., 2005; Gerhart & Fang, 2014), studies often assume that accurate pay
information is known. In the pay secrecy domain, scholars have investigated how variations in
the communication of pay information may impact motivation and individual performance.
While extant studies provide a starting point, several issues have impeded further theoretical
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development. For example, causal inferences regarding the relationship between pay secrecy
and performance have been limited to a handful of experimental studies (e.g., Greiner et al.,
2011; Bamberger & Belogolovsky, 2010; Belogolovsky & Bamberger, 2014), with most studies
in the literature utilizing survey methodology instead. While extant work provides tentative
guidance for theory development, the exact nature of pay secrecy’s influence on motivation and
performance remains unclear.
A second and more serious impediment to theoretical development is that mediating
mechanisms of the pay communication-performance relationship have only recently been
considered (e.g., Bamberger & Belogolovsky, 2010; Belogolovsky & Bamberger, 2014). In the
few instances where these psychological mechanisms have been investigated, it has often been in
isolation (e.g., the inclusion of instrumentality perceptions but no other motivational mechanisms
in the Bamberger and Belogolovsky studies). Theory has neglected to consider how secrecy may
impact other elements of motivation (besides the PPay expectancy) to alter individual
performance. Potential behavioral outcomes beyond performance have largely been ignored (for
an exception, see Bamberger and Belogolovsky, 2017). These empirical deficiencies may be
attributed in large part to the absence of a cohesive theoretical framework that is well-suited to
investigating how the communication of pay information alters PFP’s incentive effect. To begin
exploring how the incentive effect operates when the communication of pay information is
restricted, expectancy theory is used to examine the perceptual and cognitive components that
drive motivational force.
Exploration of Incentive Effects
Individuals in organizations “are often forced to choose among a number of behaviors
that are relatively attractive” (Lawler, 1973: 66). Expectancy theory is an individual-level theory
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of motivation that can be used to predict the specific type of behavior an individual is likely to
choose. Generally, the most probable course of action is that with the highest motivational force
(that is, the highest [EP * ∑ (PPay * V)]; Lawler, 1973; Vroom, 1964). In the context of
performance-based pay raises, individuals should be more motivated to choose performance if
they believe effort will lead to the desired level of performance (i.e., high EP expectancy), if
they believe that performance is likely to be followed by a pay raise (i.e., high PPay
expectancy), and if that raise is perceived as relatively desirable (i.e., high valence). Conversely,
if individuals feel less capable of performing at the desired level (i.e., low EP), are unsure if
performance will be followed by a raise (i.e., low PPay), and if the raise is seen as relatively
less desirable (i.e., low valence), motivational force to exert effort toward performing should
decrease, and performance becomes a less likely course of action. It is important to note that
given the multiplicative nature of the expectancy formula, if either of the two components –
(EP) or the sum of (PPay * V) – are not present to some degree, there will be no
motivational force (Lawler, 1973). That is, if an individual does not believe that any amount of
effort will lead to performance (i.e., EP is zero), and/or does not believe that at least some
desirable raise will follow performance (i.e., the sum of [PPay * V] is zero), then motivational
force will also be zero.
It is also important to highlight the distinction between theoretical and actual
motivational force. As noted above, the theoretical motivational force of expectancy theory
states that the motivation to choose to exert effort toward a certain course of action will be
highest when individuals feel relatively capable of achieving a desired level of performance
(EP), and when they believe that performing at that level will be followed by a desirable pay
raise (PPay * V). This can be contrasted with actual motivational force (i.e., an individual’s
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choice to exert effort toward a certain course of action). Because the different components of
theoretical motivational force are perceptual in nature, one would expect that as perceptions of a
particular compensation system increase in accuracy, so too would the accuracy of predictions
about actual motivational force also increase. This means that across the nine cells of the
proposed matrix framework, actual motivational force could be the same or vary widely – it
depends on the interaction of perceptual accuracy with the expectancy theory components of
theoretical motivational force.
The communication of pay information can influence the accuracy of the perceptual
antecedents of theoretical motivational force. Using the pay secrecy matrix developed in
Chapter 2, the remaining sections of this chapter explore how different combinations of
distributive and procedural pay information can alter perceptions of expectancy (EP) and
instrumentality (PPay) to influence motivation dynamics and performance outcomes. In short,
the interactive effects of communicating different combinations of distributive and procedural
pay information are proposed to alter the accuracy of PPay perceptions by influencing its two
antecedents (i.e., perceptions of the objective situation and communications from others). The
following sections first explore the separate influences of distributive and procedural pay
information on PPay perceptions. Next, a cell-by-cell analysis of the matrix framework is
conducted to understand how the nine distinct combinations of pay information may
differentially alter motivation and the incentive effect.
PPay Expectancies and the Communication of Pay Information
The PPay expectancy is the motivational mechanism most likely to be influenced by
the interaction of distributive and procedural pay information. Transparency in the
communication of pay information should enhance the accuracy of the PPay expectancy.
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While distributive information clarifies pay raise outcomes, procedural pay information
communicates details about performance and the standards to which pay raises are tied.
Depending on the type (distributive v. procedural) and degree (none, general, specific) of pay
information that is shared, the accuracy of the PPay expectancy may vary. Before exploring
the interactive effects of the matrix framework, the separate effects of distributive and procedural
pay information on PPay accuracy are first considered.
Distributive Pay Information
The PPay expectancy encompasses an individual’s subjective probability assessment of
the consequences of a course of action (Lawler, 1973). For example, if a factory worker believes
that producing 1,000 units annually will be followed by a $1/hour raise, the PPay expectancy
will be relatively strong and motivational force to produce 1,000 units should increase.
Conversely, if an individual is unsure if the organization will distribute a $1/hour raise if 1,000
units are produced, the PPay expectancy weakens, and – all else equal – the motivational force
to produce 1,000 units decreases.
Distributive pay information communicates particulars about pay raise outcomes, or who
makes what raise amount. When distributive pay information is absolutely secret, individuals
know only the amount of their own pay raise. With this absolute distributive secrecy,
information about the pay raise amounts of others remains unknown, and individuals are
therefore only capable of accurately assessing the link between their own pay raise and own level
of performance.
As described in Chapter 2, the communication of distributive pay information influences
two determinants of the PPay expectancy – the objective situation and communication from
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others (Lawler, 1973). When an organization formally shares no distributive pay information,
individuals may turn to other sources to obtain the information needed to form PPay
expectancies. For example, individuals may make inferences about the objective situation (i.e.,
the true relationship between performance and pay) by estimating the distributive pay
information of others. This is problematic, as research indicates that individuals can be
inaccurate when estimating others’ pay in the absence of formally communicated pay
information (Lawler, 1965, 1966, 1967). As a result of these “inaccurate guesses” (Lawler,
1965: 18), individuals’ perceptions of the objective situation and subsequent inferences about the
relationship between their own performance and pay raise may be inaccurate as well.
Communication from others may further exacerbate these inaccurate perceptions.
For example, suppose a recently hired factory worker is often seen by coworkers arriving
late and leaving early, and has been found napping in the office on several occasions. Although
the worker did not receive a raise last year (the objective situation), the individual continues to
brag about receiving a $3/hour raise. In the absence of accurate distributive information to the
contrary, other employees may be inclined to believe this informal communication. The
inaccurate information suggests that the focal individual – despite appearing to be a low
performer – received a higher pay raise. Even though this information is objectively untrue, with
distributive secrecy, employees lack the accurate information needed to challenge informal
sources.
Furthermore, if it is believed that a low-performing employee received a high pay raise,
this inaccurate information may weaken the PPay expectancy of an otherwise strong PFP
system. All else equal, a weaker PPay expectancy lowers motivational force, reducing the
likelihood that the factory workers will be motivated to exert the effort of producing 1,000 units
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to receive a raise. In this example, motivational force for the desirable behavior of productivity
is hindered by absolute distributive secrecy. This outcome is dysfunctional for both the
individual and the organization. For the individual, lower motivational force to produce 1,000
units reduces the likelihood that effort will be exerted toward productivity, and receiving a raise
becomes less likely. Similarly, it is dysfunctional for the organization to have employees who
are less motivated to perform.
Transparency in the communication of accurate distributive pay information could be
used to clarify the link between performance and pay, improving the accuracy of PPay
expectancies. First, organizations may choose to communicate general distributive information
about pay raises by sharing pay raise ranges and medians for different jobs. In the preceding
example, perhaps factory workers actually received pay raises ranging from $.50 to $2 per hour,
with a median increase of $1. Sharing this general distributive information would make it
readily apparent that the employee claiming to have received a $3/hour raise is being untruthful
(as it is now known that the highest raise received was $2/hour). When accurate information is
formally communicated, employees are better equipped to challenge perceptual inaccuracies.
Second, organizations may choose to communicate specific distributive information by
sharing the exact raise amounts given to unique individuals. If our hypothetical factory made
specific distributive information transparent, workers could clearly see that the employee in
question received no raise. This accurate information should strengthen the belief that pay raises
are indeed based on performance (i.e., high PPay expectancy), since it becomes clear that the
employee who is believed to be a low performer received no pay raise. All else equal then,
motivational force for productivity should increase.
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When pay raise amounts are listed individually by name, this reflects specific distributive
transparency. However, if no procedural information is also communicated, the reasons as to
why these amounts were given remain unknown (i.e., Cell 7 of the matrix). Specific distributive
transparency without corresponding procedural transparency creates a precarious situation.
Here, individuals can clearly see who made what, but it is unclear if raises were distributed on
the basis of performance. To some extent, individuals may be able to infer the performance level
of others (e.g., noticing that an employee leaves early and arrives late). Without accurate
procedural information however, these inferences may again be based on informal information
that is inaccurate.
Returning to the hypothetical employee in question, perhaps the worker’s individual
performance last year was not sub-par, and instead a newly instituted policy mandating a oneyear pay freeze for all new hires is the true reason a pay raise was not given. If specific
distributive information is communicated, individuals could easily see that the employee in
question received no pay increase. However, without any procedural information to indicate
why no raise was given, individuals may continue making inaccurate attributions. For example,
perhaps the employee has been working extra hours and performing at a very high level, but this
has negatively affected the employee’s sleep patterns. When procedural information is not
formally communicated, individuals may be disgruntled that a seemingly low-performing
coworker has not been terminated. To further enhance the accuracy of PPay assessments, the
communication of specific distributive information should be accompanied with the
communication of at least general procedural pay information. Together, this provides
employees with the information needed to make more accurate assessments of the relationship
between both their own pay and performance as well as the performance-pay relationship of
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other organizational members. When specific distributive information and general procedural
information are both communicated, individuals can clearly see not only who made what, but
they also have general insight as to why these raise amounts were given. Based on the preceding
arguments it is proposed that:
Proposition 1: When pay raises are based on performance, the communication of general
distributive pay information improves the accuracy of the PPay expectancy for performance.
Proposition 2: When pay raises are based on performance, the communication of specific
distributive pay information improves the accuracy of the PPay expectancy for performance,
so long as general procedural pay information is also communicated.
Procedural Pay Information
Procedural pay information communicates how and why distributive pay raise decisions
are made. With absolute procedural secrecy, individuals lack any accurate information about the
processes used to distribute pay increases. To illustrate how secrecy in the communication of
procedural pay information can impact PPay expectancies, consider the following scenario
involving employees in a medical research facility. Assume employees are told that individual
performance-based pay raises will be distributed, but no additional information is provided. This
situation represents absolute procedural secrecy. While individuals may feel capable of
conducting medical research (i.e., high EP), they lack the information needed to form accurate
assessments of the probability that conducting research will be followed by a raise (i.e., PPay).
In the absence of accurate procedural information, individuals may seek informal information
from other sources, including communication with others.
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When no procedural pay information is communicated, individuals lack accurate
information about the processes used to determine pay raise amounts. For example, although the
medical researchers have been told that performance-based pay raises will be disbursed, they
have no information about the specifics of performance measurement. Without knowing how
performance is measured (e.g., via results- or behavior-based criteria) individuals may find it
difficult to alter their behavior to influence the measures to which the pay raise is tied. For
example, one of the researchers may believe that “performance” means the publication of
research in top-tier outlets (reflective of performance quality). Another researcher may believe
that the total number of publications in a given year determines performance (reflective of
performance quantity). In contrast to what the researchers believe constitutes performance, pay
raises are actually distributed based on supervisory performance ratings. In the absence of this
procedural pay information, the researchers are motivated to exert effort toward courses of action
(i.e., those associated with performance quality v. quantity) that do not influence the true
performance measure (i.e., subjective supervisory ratings) used to distribute raises.
For pay raises to motivate performance, general procedural information must be
communicated to clarify performance expectations. For example, the medical researchers may
be told that pay raises are distributed based on supervisory ratings of two behaviors: observed
collaboration and attendance. By sharing measurement criteria information, individuals should
have a clearer understanding of how to perform, improving the accuracy of the PPay
expectancy. With general procedural information transparent, the medical researchers should
understand that collaboration and attendance – as rated by supervisors – are the measures used to
determine pay raise distribution. As a result, individuals can direct their effort toward engaging
in these exact behaviors, increasing the likelihood of receiving a performance-based pay raise.
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In this instance, the outcome is functional for both the individual and the organization. For the
individual researcher, focusing on the desirable behaviors of collaboration and attendance should
increase the likelihood of successfully influencing the performance measure to receive a raise (a
functional outcome). For the organization, this outcome is also functional because employees
should be more motivated to engage in the specific performance behaviors that the organization
values. Based on the preceding arguments it is proposed that:
Proposition 3: When pay raises are based on performance, the communication of general
procedural pay information improves the accuracy of the PPay expectancy for performance.
Finally, an organization may communicate specific procedural pay information. Here,
pay raise formulas may be shared, further clarifying the link between performance and pay. For
example, medical researchers may be told that supervisory ratings of collaboration account for
80 percent of the subsequent raise amount, while attendance comprises the remaining 20 percent.
This sends a signal to employees that collaboration is the more valued component of
performance. All else equal, with specific procedural information communicated, individuals
should be more motivated to engage in behaviors that are weighted heavier in the pay raise
formula. Again, this desirable behavior is functional for both the individual (whose behaviors
are focused on influencing the measure of performance that carries a higher weight in the
determination of pay raises) and the organization (that should have employees who are motivated
to perform well on the performance measures most valued by the organization). It is therefore
proposed that:
Proposition 4: When pay raises are based on performance, the communication of specific
procedural pay information improves the accuracy of the PPay expectancy for performance
further.
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The communication of both distributive and procedural pay information clarifies the link
between performance and pay raise amounts. Whereas distributive information provides
information about the pay raise as an outcome of performance, procedural information
communicates details about performance measurement and other processes that underlie the
distribution of pay raises. The strength of the PPay expectancy depends on the underlying pay
system. For example, procedural transparency will have no benefits for motivation and
performance if supervisors actually give the highest raises to their favorite employees instead of
the highest performers. Transparency is not a substitute for a well-designed PFP system. The
propositions presented here assume that the underlying pay system indeed distributes pay raises
based on performance.
Pay Communication & the Incentive Effect Across Cells
In addition to affecting the accuracy of PPay expectancies, the communication of
different combinations of distributive and procedural pay information are expected to have
different incentive effects across each of the matrix cells. Generally speaking, perceptual
accuracy of the expectancy components for motivation (i.e., EP and PPay) should improve
as one moves from left to right, or from top to bottom in the matrix framework. The following
sections explore each cell in detail.
Cell 1: No Distributive Information, No Procedural Information
With absolute secrecy in Cell 1, individuals formally know only the amount of their own
pay raise, though they lack the procedural information needed to understand how or why this
amount was received. Given this combination of pay information, each perceptual component of
motivational force has a high probability of being inaccurate. EP is likely to be inaccurate due
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to procedural secrecy, as individuals will have a difficult time accurately assessing if they can
perform if no information about what constitutes “performance” is communicated. Distributive
secrecy in Cell 1 means that individuals have no accurate distributive information to which they
can compare their own raise amount. As a result, individuals will be unable to accurately
determine if their own raise is relatively large or small.
PPay perceptions in Cell 1 are also likely to be inaccurate. Although individuals in
Cell 1 know the amount of their own pay raise, procedural secrecy means that no formal
information about the raise determination process (e.g., pay raise basis, measurement criteria,
etc.) has been formally shared. As a result, individuals will have an accurate perception of the
amount of their own raise, but they will not understand why this amount was received. Any
perceptions of performance criteria characteristics (e.g., influenceability, results- v. behaviorbased criteria) are likely to be inaccurate. Communication from others may further distort the
accuracy of PPay expectancies. Due to distributive secrecy, individuals can claim to have
received a larger (or smaller) raise than was actually received. With procedural secrecy, they can
also attribute the stated raise amount to any number of factors, legitimate (e.g., performance,
effort, attendance) or not (e.g., politics).
To summarize, all components of motivational force are likely to be inaccurate with the
absolute pay secrecy found in Cell 1. With both distributive and procedural secrecy, individuals
are incapable of accurately assessing the situation to determine if a course of action is something
of which they are capable (EP), and if it will be followed by a pay raise (PPay). In Cell 1,
motivation for performance (and any other course of action) depends entirely on the accuracy of
informal information obtained. Because the accuracy of this information may vary, specific
predictions about behavioral choice in Cell 1 cannot be inferred. Any potential benefits of using
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PFP to motivate performance are likely to be lost. Distributive secrecy allows individuals to
claim they received any raise amount, while procedural secrecy provides the opportunity to
attribute the stated raise amount to any number of factors. In short, with absolute pay secrecy in
Cell 1, all perceptions of motivational force are expected to be more inaccurate than in any other
cell of the matrix. It is therefore proposed that:
Proposition 5: When distributive secrecy and procedural secrecy occur in conjunction (Cell 1),
perceptions of (a) EP and (b) PPay will be more inaccurate than in any other cell of the
matrix.
Cell 2: No Distributive Information, General Procedural Information
In Cell 2, individuals still formally know the amount of their own raise only. However,
the addition of general procedural information means that individuals should have an accurate
understanding of the pay raise basis and how it is measured. If performance is the basis, general
procedural transparency enhances the accuracy of perceptions about performance criteria,
including whether the criteria are believed to be influenceable, and based on results and/or
behaviors. Though individuals still do not have accurate information about the raise amounts
received by others, general procedural transparency should ensure they have a more accurate
understanding as to why their own raise amount was received (e.g., performance, and how that
performance is measured).
The combination of information communicated in Cell 2 should improve the accuracy of
some perceptions associated with motivational force. Distributive secrecy means that
perceptions of others’ raise amounts may still be inaccurate, as individuals cannot accurately see
if their own raise is relatively high or low in comparison to the raise amounts received by others.
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However, the addition of general procedural pay information should improve the accuracy of
EP perceptions. When accurate information about performance criteria is communicated,
individuals should have more accurate perceptions of whether they will be able to perform at the
desired level. The accuracy of PPay perceptions should also improve in Cell 2. The objective
situation can be perceived more accurately, as individuals have accurate information as to how
their own raise amount was determined. Nevertheless, communications from others are likely to
be just as inaccurate as in Cell 1. Again, distributive secrecy means that individuals can still
claim to have received a larger or smaller raise than was received. General procedural
transparency, however, means that individuals can no longer claim to have received the stated
raise amount for any reason (because information about both pay raise basis and measurement
criteria is formally communicated).
Taken together, perceptions of motivational force in Cell 2 are more accurate than those
found in Cell 1. General procedural transparency should permit individuals to make relatively
accurate assessments of the situation to determine if a course of action is something of which
they are capable (EP). Finally, the combination of pay information communicated in Cell 2
means that PPay perceptions of one’s own objective situation should be relatively accurate.
Communications from others are still likely to be inaccurate, as individuals can lie about their
own pay raise amounts, and the accuracy of this communication from others cannot be verified
due to distributive secrecy. If PFP is used, the incentive effect is more likely to motivate
performance than in Cell 1. However, distributive secrecy makes it likely that the full
motivational benefits of PFP will still go unrealized because individuals are unable to determine
if higher levels of performance are indeed rewarded with a higher pay raise. Based on the
preceding, it is proposed that:
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Proposition 6: When distributive secrecy occurs in conjunction with general procedural
transparency (Cell 2), perceptions of (a) EP and (b) the relationship between one’s own
performance and pay raise (PPay) will be more accurate than those in Cell 1.
Cell 3: No Distributive Information, Specific Procedural Information
In Cell 3, distributive secrecy combines with specific procedural transparency. Pay raise
formulas are open, as is information about the basis for pay raise determination and measurement
criteria. Though individuals still do not have accurate information about the raise amounts
received by others, they have the most accurate understanding as to why their own raise amount
was received. Specific procedural information communicates how performance is defined and
measured, and pay raise formulas indicate how the different facets of performance combine to
determine the total pay raise amount.
Because of distributive secrecy, PPay expectancies based on communications from
others may remain inaccurate. Similarly, communications from others may be inaccurate, as
distributive secrecy means that individuals can still claim to have received larger or smaller raise
amounts. The addition of specific procedural information, however, means that individuals can
no longer claim to have received the stated raise for any reason. Pay raise formulas clearly show
the degree to which different facets of performance account for the total raise amount.
The communication of specific procedural information should therefore improve the
accuracy of motivation-related perceptions. Because pay formulas and performance criteria
characteristics are communicated through specific procedural transparency, individuals can now
accurately perceive if a measure is influenceable and based on results or behaviors. As a result,
EP perceptions should remain accurate. PPay expectancies determined by perceptions of
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the objective situation should be the most accurate. In contrast to the general procedural
information communicated in Cell 2, specific procedural information clarifies – to the greatest
extent possible – the relationship between pay and performance.
Together, perceptions of motivational force in Cell 3 are slightly more accurate than in
Cell 2. Specific procedural transparency means that individuals can make accurate assessments
of the situation to determine if a course of action is something of which they are capable (EP)
and that will be followed by a pay raise (PPay). While individuals in Cell 3 can accurately
assess their own PPay expectancies, they lack any formal distributive information to
corroborate the accuracy of these perceptions unless performance information is also made
available (i.e., performance transparency, introduced in Chapter 2).
In Cell 3, the incentive effect of PFP should motivate performance. Although distributive
secrecy allows others to still provide false information about their own pay raise amounts, the
addition of specific procedural transparency may allow for the unique raise amounts of others to
be calculated, but only if performance information is also communicated by the
organization(e.g., making individual sales numbers public if the commission rate per sales is
already known through specific procedural transparency). Based on this information, PPay
perceptions should be more accurate in Cell 3 than in Cell 2. The preceding arguments lead to
the following propositions:
Proposition 7: When distributive secrecy occurs in conjunction with specific procedural
transparency (Cell 3), perceptions of (a) EP and (b) the relationship between one’s own
performance and pay raise (PPay for the self) will be more accurate than in Cells 1 or 2.
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Cell 4: General Distributive Information, No Procedural Information
Individuals in Cell 4 know not only their own raise amount, they also know how this
amount compares to the raise range and median communicated through general distributive
transparency. Procedural secrecy prevents individuals from understanding how or why these
amounts were determined. Together, the combination of pay information communicated in Cell
4 means that individuals will understand if their own raise amount is high or low compared to the
raise range and median, but they may not accurately understand why.
The components of motivational force are likely to be inaccurate in Cell 4. Procedural
secrecy makes it difficult for individuals to accurately assess whether they can perform at a
desired level (i.e., EP). Procedural secrecy increases the likelihood that PPay perceptions of
both the self and others will be inaccurate. Furthermore, this combination of general distributive
transparency and procedural secrecy creates a dangerous situation in Cell 4. Individuals can see
if their own raise amount is relatively high or low, but they lack the procedural information
needed to accurately understand why. Even if PFP is used, high performers may attribute their
high raise to any number of factors. For example, perhaps a salesperson believes that raises are
distributed based on objective sales numbers. With procedural secrecy, the salesperson may be
motivated to improve sales numbers even though in reality – and unbeknownst to the salesperson
– raises are determined by subjective supervisory ratings of customer service behaviors. As a
result, the combination of pay information found in Cell 4 may motivate individuals to engage in
alternative behaviors beyond the performance that is being measured (e.g., focusing on sales
numbers, while the organization actually rewards customer service behaviors). This outcome is
dysfunctional for both the individual (who is redirecting effort towards a facet of performance

91

that is not measured nor rewarded), and for the organization (that must now contend with
employees who may not be motivated to perform the desired behaviors).
Taken together, individuals in Cell 4 cannot accurately determine if a course of action is
something of which they are capable (EP). They also cannot accurately assess if the course of
action is likely to be followed by a raise (PPay). The probability for dysfunctional outcomes is
high in Cell 4 due to the combination of distributive transparency and procedural secrecy. With
PFP, individuals who receive higher raises in Cell 4 will not understand why a higher raise was
received. As a result, they may be motivated to continue pursing whatever course of action they
believe is being rewarded. In contrast, individuals who receive lower raises may be unmotivated
to alter their behavior because they lack the procedural information needed to understand that
their low raise was the result of poor performance. Alternatively, the recipients of lower raises
may also be motivated to engage in whatever course of action they believe is associated with a
larger raise. They may also engage in reciprocal deviance (Kemper, 1966) if they believe their
psychological contract – the terms and conditions of the reciprocal employment relationship
(Rousseau, 1989, 1995) – has been violated or breached (Robinson, 1996).
In summary, the incentive effect is unlikely to motivate performance when pay
information of the Cell 4 variety is communicated. EP and PPay perceptions will be just as
inaccurate as they were in Cell 1 under absolute pay secrecy. While individuals can see if their
own raise amount is relatively high or low, they lack the procedural information to understand
why. Even if PFP is used, recipients of higher raises will not know this is the result of high
performance, and a higher raise may fail to motivate continued high performance. Individuals
who receive lower raises will not understand this is due to poor performance and may be
unmotivated, motivated to engage alternative performance behaviors that are not rewarded by the
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organization (i.e., hindering desirable behaviors), or motivated to engage in reciprocal deviance
to retaliate against an unexplained low raise (i.e., promoting undesirable behaviors). Taken
together, it is proposed that:
Proposition 8: When general distributive transparency occurs in conjunction with procedural
secrecy (Cell 4), perceptions of (a) EP and (b) PPay will be less accurate than in Cells 2
and 3.
Proposition 9: The combination of distributive transparency and procedural secrecy increases
the likelihood that dysfunctional outcomes will be motivated.
Cell 5: General Distributive Information, General Procedural Information
In Cell 5, general information about both pay raise amounts and processes are formally
communicated. Together, this means that individuals will know if their own raise amount is
relatively high or low in comparison to the raise range and median (due to general distributive
transparency, and they will also have an accurate understanding as to why (due to general
procedural transparency). Cell 5 represents the first instance in the matrix framework where
some degree of both distributive and procedural pay information are communicated.
Perceptions related to motivation should be relatively accurate in Cell 5. General
procedural transparency means that individuals should have more accurate perceptions of
whether they will be able to perform at the desired level (EP). Finally, PPay perceptions
determined by the objective situation are more accurate than in Cell 4, as individuals have the
procedural information needed to understand why a relatively high or low raise amount was
received. However, communication from others may still produce inaccurate PPay
perceptions when individuals turn to other organizational members to make inferences about the
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relationship between performance and pay within the organization. Without specific distributive
transparency, individuals can still be untruthful about their own raise amount that was received.
With this combination of information, individuals in Cell 5 can make relatively accurate
assessments of whether a course of action is something of which they are capable (EP) and
that will be followed by a pay raise (PPay). Individuals can make accurate self-assessments of
the relationship between performance and pay. However, they lack the specific distributive
information needed to make more accurate assessments of the relationship between performance
and pay. Taken together, the components of motivational force in Cell 5 should be more
accurate than in Cells 1 through 4, leading to the following proposition:
Proposition 10: When general distributive transparency occurs in conjunction with general
procedural transparency (Cell 5), perceptions of (a) EP, and (b) the relationship between
one’s own performance and pay raise (PPay for the self) will be more accurate than in Cells 1
through 4.
Cell 6: General Distributive Information, Specific Procedural Information
Many of the perceptual determinants of motivation are just as accurate in Cell 6 as in Cell
5. General distributive transparency allows individuals to accurately determine the relative size
of their raise in comparison to the raise range and median. Similarly, the sharing of pay raise
formulas should allow individuals to accurately determine if they can perform at the desired level
(EP). PPay perceptions in Cell 6 should be more accurate than in previous cells, as open
pay raise formulas allow individuals to see how the different performance facets contribute to the
total pay raise amount. This allows individuals to make more specific PPay assessments of the
relationship between different facets of performance and subsequent raises.
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While assessments of the performance-pay relationship of the self should be the most
accurate, communications from others are likely to remain inaccurate given the pay information
that is communicated in Cell 6. While individuals still do not know the unique raise amounts
received by others, they do have general information about the range and median of pay raises
that were distributed. The addition of specific procedural transparency means that individuals
can no longer claim to have received a raise for any reason – pay raise formulas clearly show the
degree to which different facets of performance account for the total raise amount. Depending
on the type of performance measure that is used and whether performance information is also
communicated, individuals in Cell 6 may be able to make relatively accurate calculations of
others’ pay raise amounts. For example, factory workers in a Cell 6 organization may have
specific procedural information that a $1/hour raise is given for every 1,000 units produced. If
production numbers are also made public (i.e., specific distributive performance transparency),
then the raise amounts received by unique individuals can be calculated.
In summary, individuals in Cell 6 should have accurate perceptions of whether a certain
course of action is something of which they are capable (EP) and if it will be followed by a
pay raise (PPay). While individuals can make accurate self-assessments of the relationship
between performance and pay, they still lack the specific distributive information needed to
make accurate assessments of the relationship between others’ performance and others’ pay
raises. As a result of the combination of information found in Cell 6, the components of
motivational force are more accurate than in Cells 1 through 5. Based on the preceding, it is
therefore proposed that:
Proposition 11: When general distributive transparency occurs in conjunction with specific
procedural transparency (Cell 6), perceptions of (a) EP and (b) the relationship between
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one’s own performance and pay raise (PPay for the self) will be more accurate than those in
Cells 1 through 5.
Cell 7: Specific Distributive Information, No Procedural Information
In Cell 7, individuals know the exact raise amounts received by others, but they lack the
procedural information needed to accurately understand why these amounts were received.
Individuals are able to see if their own raise amount is higher or lower than the raises received by
distinct individuals. However, just as in Cell 4, procedural secrecy prevents individuals from
accurately understanding how or why these raise amounts were determined.
The perceptions that drive motivational force and behavioral choice are likely to be based
on inaccurate information in Cell 7. Without any procedural information, individuals will have a
difficult time accurately determining if they can perform at a desired level, making EP
expectancies inaccurate. Despite the addition of specific distributive information, perceptions of
the relationship between one’s own performance and subsequent pay (PPay) should be
relatively inaccurate. Procedural secrecy ensures that they do not accurately understand why
their raise amount was received, or why it is relatively high or low when compared to the raises
of others (e.g., performance or some other factor).
The second determinant of PPay perceptions – communication from others – is also
likely to be inaccurate given the combination of pay information communicated in Cell 7.
Individuals may attribute a high or low raise to any number of factors, and share these
attributions through communications with others. Unlike Cell 4, the communication of specific
distributive information in Cell 7 means that individuals can now direct reciprocal deviance
(Kemper, 1966) toward unique individuals. For example, if employee A receives a raise that is
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twice the amount of employee B’s raise, employee B can make a broad range of attributions for
employee A’s higher raise (known to be accurate in Cell 7, due to specific distributive
transparency). If employee B believes that A’s higher raise was due to illegitimate factors such
as favoritism, employee B may retaliate against employee A directly. This outcome is
dysfunctional for both the organization (that would prefer retaliation and other counterproductive
behaviors be minimized) and for the individual employees. For employee B, this situation
hinders desirable performance behaviors while also promoting undesirable behaviors such as
retaliation. For employee A, desirable performance behaviors may be hindered while attempting
to manage the repercussions of employee B’s retaliatory behavior.
In summary, though distributive transparency in Cell 7 means that individuals can see the
unique raise amounts received by others, procedural secrecy means that they lack the information
needed to accurately understand why any of these raise amounts were received. Individuals may
make false attributions as to why raises were received. Because uniquely identifying distributive
pay information has been shared, individuals in Cell 7 may be motivated to target other
employees who they believe have received higher pay for illegitimate reasons. Individuals who
receive lower raise amounts will not understand why a low raise was received. As a result, they
may be unmotivated, motivated to engage in non-performance behaviors, or perhaps even be
motivated to engage in reciprocal deviance targeting the unique individuals who have received
higher raises. Based on the preceding arguments, it is proposed that:
Proposition 12: When specific distributive transparency occurs in conjunction with procedural
secrecy (Cell 7), perceptions of (a) EP and (b) PPay will be more inaccurate than in Cells 1
through 6.
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Cell 8: Specific Distributive Information, General Procedural Information
In Cell 8, the unique raise amounts of all individuals are known, as is information about
pay raise basis and measurement criteria. Together, this means that individuals in Cell 8 can
compare their own raise amount to that received by unique others; however, the addition of
general procedural information means that individuals now have a more accurate understanding
as to why this amount was received (e.g., performance, and the measurement criteria used).
Perceptions that drive motivational force and behavioral choice in Cell 8 should be more
accurate than in Cells 1 through 7. With performance criteria information communicated
through general procedural transparency, individuals should have more accurate perceptions of
whether they will be able to perform at a desired level (EP). Similarly, general procedural
transparency also means that PPay perceptions should be accurate. Perceptions of the
objective situation will be more accurate than in Cell 7, as individuals now have the formal
information needed to understand why their own raise amount is high or low compared to the
unique raise amounts of others. Communications from others should also produce more accurate
PPay expectancies. In Cell 8, individuals know the exact raise amounts received by others,
and the sharing of general procedural information means that individuals will be able to see if
pay is based on performance, and if so, how that performance is measured. With this
information open, communications from others are more likely to be accurate – individuals can
no longer claimed to have received any raise amount, for any reason.
Together, the perceptual components of motivational force in Cell 8 are accurate in Cell
8. General procedural information about pay raise basis and measurement criteria allows
individuals to more accurately assess if a certain course of action is something of which they are
capable (EP). Specific distributive transparency means that individuals should have accurate
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assessments of whether performance will indeed be followed by a pay raise (PPay). In
contrast to Cell 5, individuals in Cell 8 have the specific distributive transparency needed to
make accurate assessments of the relationship between their own performance and pay
(influencing perceptions of the objective situation that drive PPay expectancies), as well as
between the performance of others and others’ raises.
In summary, Cell 8 is the first cell to combine specific distributive transparency with the
sharing of general procedural information. As a result, not only can individuals see if their raise
amount is high or low when compared to the unique raise amounts of others, they also have the
general procedural information needed to understand why these amounts were received.
Because individuals know the unique raise amounts of others, they can make more accurate
assessments of the relationship between performance and pay within the organization. Together,
the perceptions that drive motivational force in Cell 8 should be more accurate than in Cells 1
through 7. Only the addition of specific procedural information (i.e., Cell 9, or absolute pay
transparency) can further improve perceptual accuracy.
Proposition 13: When specific distributive transparency occurs in conjunction with
general procedural transparency (Cell 8), perceptions of (a) EP, and (b) PPay will be more
accurate than in Cells 1 through 7.
Cell 9: Specific Distributive Information, Specific Procedural Information
Cell 9 illustrates absolute pay transparency, wherein both specific distributive and
specific procedural pay information are formally communicated by the organization. As a result,
individuals know the exact raise amounts received by all other employees, and open pay raise
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formulas mean they now have the most specific understanding as to why they these raise
amounts were received.
With absolute pay transparency, all perceptual determinants of motivational force are the
most accurate. Because the exact raise amounts of all employees are public, individuals can
make the most specific comparisons of the raise amounts received. With specific procedural
transparency, individuals should have accurate perceptions of whether they can perform at the
desired level (EP), as determined by perceptions of the performance criteria such as the
perceived influenceability of the measure. Finally, PPay perceptions should be more accurate
than in any other cell of the matrix. In addition to accurate perceptions of the objective situation,
individuals should also have accurate perceptions based on communication from others. The
combination of pay information communicated in Cell 9 means that individuals can no longer lie
about the raise amount received, nor can they lie about why the amount was received. All pay
information is open and available.
Taken together, the perceptual components of motivational force will be the most
accurate when transparency of the Cell 9 variety is present. Individuals can make the most
accurate assessments of whether a certain course of action is something of which they are
capable (EP) and if it will be followed by a pay raise (PPay). When specific information
about raise amounts are communicated in conjunction with the specific calculations used to
determine these amounts, individuals should have the most accurate perceptions. If raises are
indeed based on performance, high performers should see that they are highly paid in relation to
others, and will understand how different facets of performance contribute to the total raise
amount. As a result, they should be motivated to continue performing at a high level to receive
high raises in the future. Similarly, low performers will see that they receive smaller raises and
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will understand how the different facets of performance contribute to their total raise amount.
Individuals who receive smaller raises should be motivated to improve performance, as this
combination of pay information improves the accuracy of PPay perceptions of both the self
and others. When employees can accurately see how performance is measured, have accurate
information about the unique raise amounts of others, and can see how different facets of
performance contribute to the total raise amount, the incentive effect of PFP is able to motivate
performance. Taken together, it is therefore proposed that:
Proposition 14: When specific distributive transparency and specific procedural transparency
occur in conjunction (Cell 9), perceptions of (a) EP, and (b) PPay will be more accurate
than in any other cell of the matrix.
Summary
The matrix framework is useful for understanding how the communication of distinct
combinations of pay information influence the incentive effect. As illustrated in the preceding
sections, perceptual accuracy of the motivational determinants for performance are most accurate
when both specific distributive and specific procedural pay information are transparent. To the
extent that less pay information is formally communicated, individuals can be expected to hold
more inaccurate perceptions of EP and PPay expectancies. The different incentive effects
proposed for the nine matrix cells are summarized in Figure 3 below.
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Figure 3
The Expectancy Matrix
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Pay Communication & Performance Going Forward
Pay systems communicate information. Understanding the effects of different pay
communication polices on motivation and performance are imperative if we are to fully
understand the “informational value of compensation” (Bartol & Locke, 2000: 135). Using the
components of motivational force outlined by expectancy theory, a series of propositions have
been posited to suggest that transparency in the communication of pay information can have
positive effects on performance and other desirable behaviors, primarily by clarifying the
accuracy of PPay expectancies. However, the proposed benefits of transparency will only be
realized if the underlying pay system has been appropriately designed. First, for pay to motivate
performance in a PFP system, pay raises must indeed be distributed on the basis of performance.
Research suggests this is less common than one may think. For example, a survey of 335
employees in an organization that claims to use PFP found that only 35% agreed with the
following statement: “If my performance improves, I will receive better compensation”
(HayGroup, 2002, as cited in Gerhart et al., 2009). Another 38% of the respondents disagreed
with the statement. This indicates that the perceived relationship between performance and pay
(PPay) may not be as strong as many organizations using PFP believe.
A second factor likely to influence the relationship between pay communication and
performance is the degree to which transparency is accepted by individuals. In a survey of
several organizations both with and without transparency in the communication of pay
information, 77% of the managers surveyed supported secrecy (Lawler, 1967). However, this
preference toward secrecy may be changing, as a more recent study found that 55% of managers
favored some form of transparency in the communication of pay information (Patton, 2015).
With few exceptions (e.g., Lawler, 1965; Schuster & Coletti, 1973), scholars have yet to
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investigate how individual preferences for or against transparency in the communication of pay
information can influence motivation, performance, and other behaviors through the incentive
effect.
Individual preferences are likely to be an important moderator of the degree to which
individuals accept the open sharing of pay information, and the extent to which transparency can
facilitate positive effects for motivation and performance. If individuals are more tolerant of pay
information being freely communicated, then more open pay systems may become more readily
accepted. Individual acceptance of open pay communication can also be an indicator of the
strength of the underlying PFP system. For example, an organization may want to consider how
high and low performers would react if pay information was made more open. If high
performers (who should receive higher performance-based pay raise amounts) are predicted to
react favorably, this could be interpreted as a sign that the underlying pay system has established
a strong connection between performance and pay. Alternatively, if low performers (who should
receive lower performance-based pay raises) are instead predicted to react favorably, this would
suggest that the PFP system has fundamental design issues. Transparency with a weak PFP
system may have disastrous consequences. It could amplify the negative motivational effects of
a PFP system with an already weak relationship between performance and pay.
Finally, moving forward, it would be beneficial if the effects of pay communication on
performance continue to be studied in conjunction with other elements of the compensation
system. As illustrated here, these different system components do not operate in isolation and
instead combine to influence motivational force. The effects of different pay communication
policies are likely to be contingent on other aspects of the system including characteristics of the
performance measure used to distribute raises. Individual performance may not be easily
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measurable in many modern organizations, as even “individual” performance is often to some
extent a joint product reflecting both individual effort and “that of many others” (Zenger, 2016:
3). If the communication of pay information is intended to enhance the accuracy of perceived
PPay expectancies, organizations must also ensure that performance is clearly and accurately
measured.
Chapter 3 Summary
In summary, Chapter 3 investigates how pay communication influences motivation and
performance through the incentive effect. By openly sharing a combination of distributive and
procedural pay information, organizations may be able to improve the accuracy of individual
PPay expectancies. If the underlying pay system is indeed based on performance,
transparency can be used to strengthen the degree to which individuals believe that pay is
distributed on the basis of performance. However, transparency in the communication of pay
information may also make compensation inequities more salient (Zenger, 2016). To explore the
potential affective reactions to pay inequities and how pay communication affects these
perceptions, Chapter 4 turns to an exploration of how pay raise satisfaction and pay raise equity
perceptions interact with the communication of pay information to influence turnover and other
behaviors associated with the sorting effect.

CHAPTER 4
PAY COMMUNICATION AND THE SORTING EFFECT
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Overview
Chapter 4 investigates how the communication of different combinations of pay
information may alter the attraction and retention forces of PFP’s sorting effect. First, the
influence of pay information on attraction via perceptions of fit or congruence are explored using
the attraction-selection-attrition or ASA framework (Schneider, 1987). Next, a brief review of
the empirical studies investigating the relationship between pay communication and satisfaction
is provided. Finally, principles of equity theory (Adams, 1965) and discrepancy theory (Lawler,
1971, 1981) are used to investigate how pay communication influences perceptions of equity and
satisfaction to alter the behavioral responses of turnover and retention.
The Sorting Effect of PFP
Before exploring how the communication of pay information influences applicant
attraction and employee retention, a brief discussion of how the sorting effect should function is
prudent. The sorting effect describes how compensation can alter an organization’s workforce
composition by influencing the type of individuals who are attracted to and choose to remain
with the organization (Gerhart & Rynes, 2003). When pay is based on individual performance,
individuals with “higher performance motivation/aspiration/ability or higher actual performance”
are more likely to be attracted to and remain with the organization (Fang & Gerhart, 2012: 1181).
Accordingly, organizations can use PFP to help attract and retain higher-performing individuals.
Implicit in the use of PFP as a sorting device is the assumption that applicants and
employees have both accurate and complete information about the organization’s compensation
system. The sorting benefits of using PFP may go unrealized if individuals lack the information
needed to determine if pay is indeed based on performance, and to what degree it is so. In the
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following sections, the pay secrecy matrix is used as a framework for investigating how the
communication of pay information can influence the attraction and retention forces of the sorting
effect.
Attraction & Self-Selection
During the recruitment and selection process, organizations aim to attract high-quality
applicants, or individuals with the ability and disposition to produce more than a lower-quality
applicant (Cadsby, Song, & Tapon, 2007). Though an organization’s open pay system is
unlikely to be the deciding factor in job choice decisions, research suggests that compensation
does play an important role in applicant perceptions of job attractiveness and job search choice
(Rynes, 1987; Cable & Judge, 1994). Compensation can therefore be used as a recruitment tool
(Rynes, 1987), with different pay systems likely to attract different types of applicants. Studies
suggest that performance-based pay in particular may be more attractive to individuals who
possess certain traits indicative of high-performance capability, including need for achievement
(Bretz, Ash, & Dreher, 1989) and cognitive ability (Trank Rynes, & Bretz, 2002). Similarly, an
experiment by Dohmen and Falk (2011) found that university students who self-selected into a
variable performance-based pay condition correctly solved multiplication problems faster (i.e.,
productivity) and had a higher GPA in high school (i.e., ability) than individuals who selfselected into the fixed pay condition. Collectively, empirical evidence suggests that
performance-based pay can be used to attract applicants who are capable of high levels of
performance.
Compensation attracts potential applicants during the recruitment process through two
complementary forces. First, pay acts as an “important signaling device” (Gomez-Mejia,
Berrone, & Franco-Santos, 2010: 104) indicating the type of applicant an organization seeks to
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recruit and retain. For example, a non-profit organization that aims to recruit cooperative team
members may choose a team-based reward system, while a for-profit financial firm may use
individual performance incentives to attract competitive applicants who can achieve high levels
of individual performance. These different pay systems send unique signals to applicants about
the results and/or behaviors that are desired and rewarded. While team-based pay may signal
that cooperation and team performance are valued, the use of individual incentives instead
communicates that individual performance is prioritized. Because pay can “communicate so
much about an organization’s philosophy, values, and practices” (Rynes, 1987: 190), the open
communication of accurate pay information should enhance the accuracy of the signals it is
intended to transmit.
Next, applicants receive and interpret these signals, influencing the individual’s attraction
to an organization. According to the attraction-selection-attrition or ASA model (Schneider,
1987), individuals are differentially attracted to organizations based on “implicit judgments of
the congruence between those organizations’ goals…and their own personalities” (Schneider,
Goldstein, & Smith, 1995: 749). Generally, applicants prefer organizations with attributes and
values that align with their own personal characteristics and preferences (Cable & Judge, 1994;
Judge & Bretz, 1992). When assessing this alignment, individuals form subjective assessments
of the degree of perceived fit between their own personal characteristics and those of the
organization (Kristof, 1996; Chapman, Uggerslev, Carroll, Piasentin, & Jones, 2005). This
person-environment or P-E fit can be broadly defined as “the compatibility between an
individual and a work environment that occurs when their characteristics are well matched”
(Kristof-Brown, Zimmerman, & Johnson, 2005: 281). Perceptions of P-E fit are important in
predicting applicant attraction, with a meta-analysis of 71 studies indicating that subjective
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perceptions of fit were one of the strongest predictors of attitudinal attraction outcomes including
job pursuit intentions, job-organization attraction, and acceptance intentions (Chapman et al.,
2005).
Consequently, perceptions of fit are one of the primary psychological mechanisms that
can be used to explain the relationship between the signals pay that information communicates
and an individual’s degree of attraction to the organization. However, when the communication
of distributive and procedural pay information is restricted, both the intended signals and
subsequent perceptions of P-E fit or congruence may be inaccurate. In the following sections,
the pay secrecy matrix provides a framework for understanding how the communication of pay
information affects the perceptual accuracy of two components of P-E fit.
Distributive Pay Information & Needs-Supply (N-S) Fit
One component of P-E fit is needs-supply (N-S) fit, or “judgments of congruence
between employees’ needs and the rewards they receive in return for their service and
contributions on a job” (Cable & DeRue, 2002: 875). Because distributive pay information
clarifies perceptions of who receives what pay raise amounts, the communication of accurate
distributive pay information should enhance the accuracy of applicants’ N-S fit perceptions. For
example, a firm with secrecy of the Cell 4 variety communicates only general distributive
information including pay raise ranges and medians for jobs (e.g., current salespersons receive
average raises between $1,000 and $3,000 annually). This general distributive information
provides accurate information about the potential pay raise amounts that could be received. The
communication of specific distributive information provides even more detailed information
about raise amounts currently received by employees. When distributive pay information is
communicated, assessments of N-S fit should be more accurate. When applicants have accurate
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information about pay raise outcomes they should be able to more accurately infer if known raise
ranges (or specific raise amounts) could potentially satisfy their financial needs. As a result,
perceptions of N-S fit should more accurately reflect reality. The preceding arguments lead to
the following proposition:
Proposition 1a: The communication of distributive pay information improves the
accuracy of N-S fit perceptions.
Procedural Pay Information & Demands-Ability (D-A) Fit
Demands-ability or D-A fit describes the extent to which an individual’s knowledge,
skills, and abilities are commensurate with those required of the job (Kristof-Brown,
Zimmerman, & Johnson, 2005). When accurate procedural pay information is communicated,
applicants should have a better understanding of the specific knowledge, skills, and abilities that
are rewarded by the organization through performance-based pay increases, thereby improving
the perceptual accuracy of D-A fit. For example, a sales organization may communicate general
procedural information to indicate that a pay raise is awarded for every 100 sales (i.e., Cell 5,
when combined with the above general distributive pay information that indicates a pay raise
range between $1,000 and $3,000). Given the combination of pay information that is
communicated in Cell 5, applicants now accurately know that the results-based, objective
criterion of number of sales is used to determine pay raise amounts that average between $1,000
and $3,000 per year. With procedural information communicated, applicants should be capable
of more accurately assessing whether the rewarded demands of the job are congruent with their
own knowledge, skills, and abilities (i.e., “Do I have the requisite knowledge, skills, and abilities
to make 100 sales?”). Taken together, it is therefore proposed that:
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Proposition 1b: The communication of procedural pay information improves the
accuracy of D-A fit perceptions.
Summary
The communication of distributive and procedural pay information can enhance the
accuracy of individuals’ fit perceptions, a critical psychological mechanism involved in the
attraction process. When distributive pay information is communicated, the accuracy of N-S fit
perceptions should improve, because applicants can more accurately determine if the potential
pay raise amounts will satisfy their financial needs. Returning again to the importance of
considering the interactive effects that occur when combinations of pay information are
communicated, the addition of procedural pay information should enhance perceptual accuracy
of D-A fit. In short, the ability of PFP to attract high-quality applicants is contingent upon the
communication of accurate distributive and procedural pay information. Nevertheless, attracting
high-quality applicants is only half of the sorting equation – PFP and the communication of pay
information also influences an individual’s intent to stay with an organization or to leave. It is to
this issue I turn next.
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Pay Communication and Pay Satisfaction
Most published studies investigating the effects of pay secrecy on individual-level
outcomes related to turnover and retention have focused on the mediating mechanism of pay
satisfaction, or the overall positive or negative affect individuals feel regarding their pay (Miceli
& Lane, 1991). When these feelings are positive, pay satisfaction is experienced as a
“pleasurable or positive emotional state resulting from the appraisal of one’s pay situation”
(Locke, 1976: 1304). Though individuals can have different affective reactions to the various
dimensions of pay (including pay level, pay raises, pay structure and administration, and
benefits; Heneman & Schwab, 1985), this dissertation focuses on reactions to the communication
of information about performance-based pay raises. Accordingly, emphasis here is placed on
pay raise satisfaction, or the positive or negative affect that individuals have toward their own
pay raise. Research concerning the pay communication-satisfaction relationship can be divided
into three distinct phases, each emphasizing different mediating mechanisms and outcomes.
Phase 1: Pay Satisfaction and Perceptual Accuracy. Early research concerning
individuals’ affective reactions to pay secrecy focused on understanding how secrecy affects
satisfaction, specifically by altering the accuracy of individuals’ pay-related perceptions. In a
series of surveys with personnel managers, Lawler (1965, 1966) found that managers in
organizations with a “policy of keeping management compensation secret” (1965: 18) and who
believed their pay was too close to the pay of those above and below them, were more
dissatisfied with their own pay (Lawler, 1965, 1966). In a follow-up study conducted in a
manufacturing company with “a policy of strict secrecy with respect to pay levels” (Lawler,
1967: 184), only the incorrect estimation of peers’ pay was associated with increased
dissatisfaction.
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Subsequent studies reported both positive and negative effects of transparency on pay
satisfaction. For example, in a field experiment of pharmaceutical salesmen, Futrell and Jenkins
(1978) found that satisfaction with pay was higher following the introduction of a new pay
policy that shared information on both raises (i.e., individual low and high merit raise amounts,
along with the overall average for the previous year) and base pay (i.e., salary levels). In
contrast, Mahoney and Weitzel (1978) found that satisfaction with compensation amount,
comparison, and administration was unrelated to the accuracy of pay perceptions, even when
compensation ranges and midpoints were shared.
Other studies found a negative relationship between transparency and pay satisfaction.
When Lawler’s study design (1965, 1966) was replicated in an organization with a relative
degree of transparency (including open pay ranges and medians), results indicated that managers
who correctly estimated the salaries of their peers were also the most dissatisfied (Milkovich &
Anderson, 1972). Building on this work, research in the second phase began to incorporate pay
equity perceptions, or the extent to which employees believe their pay is fair (Martin & Peterson,
1987).
Phase 2: Pay Equity Perceptions. Empirical research indicates that equity perceptions
may be one of the primary mechanisms linking the communication of pay information and
affective responses to pay. For example, Manning and Avolio (1985) studied university
employees’ reactions following the open publication of salary information in the campus
newspaper. Although correlational analyses found a negative relationship between pay
disclosure and salary equity perceptions (r = -.28, p < .01), equity perceptions are likely more
dependent on the underlying pay system rather than the mere disclosure of pay information.
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In contrast, more recent work suggests a positive relationship between open pay
communication and equity perceptions. For example, Day (2011) investigated the relationship
between pay communication policy (both stated and perceived), four justice dimensions (i.e.,
distributive, procedural, informational, and interactional justice; Colquitt et al., 2001), and pay
satisfaction in a sample of public university employees. Structural equation modeling results
suggest that when employees believe they receive more pay information (e.g., how pay levels are
determined, minimum and maximum pay levels for one’s pay grade), they feel more fairly
treated on all four justice dimensions. In turn, perceptions of both distributive and procedural
justice mediated the relationship between pay communication and pay satisfaction, suggesting
that satisfaction with one’s own pay depends largely on equity or fairness perceptions of pay
outcomes and processes (Day, 2011, 2012). In addition to influencing satisfaction, pay equity
perceptions can also impact voluntary turnover (e.g., Summers & Hendrix, 1991) – the primary
focus of the third wave of pay communication-satisfaction research.
Phase 3: Satisfaction and Turnover. Research suggests that pay satisfaction is
negatively related to both voluntary turnover and its cognitive and behavioral antecedents. For
example, a study of public-school teachers found that satisfaction with pay level, pay structure,
and pay raise were negatively associated with district-level average teacher turnover intentions to
find employment in a setting besides public education (Currall, Towler, Judge, & Kohn, 2005).
At the individual level, pay satisfaction was a significant predictor of withdrawal cognitions
(including intent to leave and intent to search) across two samples of advertising managers
(DeConinck & Stilwell, 2004).
While these results suggest a negative effect of pay satisfaction on turnover intentions
and withdrawal cognitions, the availability of accurate pay information may alter this
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relationship. For instance, in the laboratory study conducted by Belogolovsky and Bamberger
(2014), the secrecy manipulation (i.e., participants given information only about their own pay
and performance) had a negative effect on individuals’ continuation intentions to participate in
additional rounds of the experimental task. Similarly, a field experiment by Card and colleagues
investigated how the disclosure of peers’ salaries may influence individuals’ pay satisfaction and
job search intentions (Card, Mas, Moretti, & Saez, 2012). Following the online publication of
individual salary amounts for all university employees, those with below-median salaries for
their pay unit and occupation reported lower pay satisfaction. Individuals in the lowest pay
quartile were also 20% more likely to report searching for a job than their peers working under
pay secrecy. For employees paid at or above the unit occupational median, no effect of pay
communication on either pay satisfaction or job search intentions was found (Card et al., 2012).
These results suggest that while the communication of pay information can influence voluntary
turnover and its antecedents, the nature of this relationship may vary depending on the
individual’s position in the pay structure. Specifically, lower-paid employees may be less
satisfied and therefore more likely to leave the organization when pay information is transparent.
Retention & Turnover Intentions
If the organizational performance benefits of selecting high-quality applicants are to be
realized, less productive employees must exit the organization to be replaced by these new
entrants. Making a distinction between the performance levels of leavers versus stayers allows
for a consideration of turnover functionality (Hollenbeck & Williams, 1986), a key feature of the
sorting effect. Functional turnover occurs when low performers exit the organization, while
dysfunctional turnover occurs when high performers leave (Dalton & Todor, 1979). When PFP
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correctly sorts employees, high performers should want to stay, and low performers should want
to leave – a situation of functional turnover and retention.
Implicit in the sorting effect’s ability to retain high performers is that pay signals the type
of employee the organization seeks to retain (Belogolovsky & Bamberger, 2014). When
different combinations of distributive and procedural pay information are communicated, the
intended signal of PFP (i.e., that the organization rewards performance) may be obscured.
Empirical studies suggest a curvilinear performance-turnover relationship, such that turnover is
more likely for both high and low performers than for average performers (Trevor, Gerhart, &
Boudreau, 1997). However, pay policy features – including pay communication – can influence
this relationship. For example, Trevor and colleagues (1997) found that salary growth among a
sample of exempt employees moderated the relationship for high performers such that low salary
growth predicted extremely high turnover among employees with the highest average supervisor
performance ratings.
The primary affective mechanism used to explain the relationship between pay,
performance, and turnover is satisfaction (e.g., Dreher, 1982). In short, when pay is contingent
on performance (i.e., high reward contingency), poor performers receive less pay and are less
satisfied (Podsakoff & Williams, 1986), and should therefore quit at a higher rate than their
higher-performing counterparts who receive more pay (Williams & Livingstone, 1994). Implicit
in these findings, however, is the assumption that employees know that rewards are based on
performance. For example, Shaw and Gupta (2007) found that organizational-level quit rates
among high-performing truck drivers were lowest when pay was more dispersed, based on
performance, and well-communicated (measured through four items including: “Drivers know
exactly what they have to do to get pay raises”; “The pay system is clearly communicated”; “Our
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drivers have a clear understanding of how their pay is set”; “and “We provide drivers with
extensive information any time we make changes to the pay system,” p. 914). When pay system
communication was low, pay dispersion was not consistently related to quit patterns.
The Evaluation of Pay Information
Drawing on equity theory (Adams, 1963, 1965) and discrepancy theory (Lawler, 1971),
Figure 4 (based on the works of Heneman, 1985; Lawler, 1971; Miceli & Lane, 1991; as
compiled by Williams, McDaniel, & Ford, 2007) illustrates how the communication of pay
information can influence perceptual accuracy when individuals evaluate pay raise information.
It should be noted that the model shown in Figure 4 is not intended to be a complete model of
retention and turnover. Instead, Figure 4 illustrates how the communication of pay raise
information may influence retention and turnover cognitions (i.e., intent to stay versus intent to
turnover).
In short, the communication of pay information has a direct influence on the accuracy of
individuals’ perceptions at two points in the model. First, the communication of pay information
influences the three antecedents of the perceived pay raise amount that an individual believes he
or she should receive. Regardless of accuracy, this information is then used as an evaluative
standard for developing perceptions about the pay raise amount individuals believe they should
receive (“a”). This is then compared to the actual pay raise amount that was received (“b”).
When individuals compare their standard (“a”) to the actual raise received (“b”), they form pay
raise equity perceptions about the fairness of their pay raise (Martin & Peterson, 1987). Second,
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the communication of pay information also influences the relationship between pay raise
satisfaction and an individual’s intent to remain with the organization.

Communication of Pay
Information

Communication of Pay
Information

Perceived pay
raise amount
that should be
received (a)

Perceived position
in pay raise range
(high/low)

Pay Raise
Equity
Perceptions

Perceived pay raise amount
of referent

Pay Raise
Satisfaction

Behavioral
Outcomes

Perceived referent inputs
Perceived self inputs

Actual pay
raise amount
received (b)

Figure 4
The Communication of Pay Information and the Sorting Effect

The Effect of Pay Information on Pay Raise Equity Antecedents
The communication of pay information affects the accuracy of three antecedents of the
pay raise amount that individuals believe they should receive. First, distributive pay information
can influence the accuracy of employees’ perceptions of the raise amounts received by referents.
Research suggests that when distributive pay information is not openly shared, individuals’
estimations of the raise amounts of others can be inaccurate. For example, personnel managers
working in organizations with a “policy of keeping management compensation secret” reported
more inaccurate guesses of others’ salaries than managers working in an organization with some
open information about pay scales, but with “each managers’ exact salary…kept confidential”
(i.e., general distributive transparency; Lawler, 1965: 18). In contrast, when specific distributive
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pay information is communicated, individuals know the exact raise amounts of unique
individuals.
Second, the communication of procedural pay information can alter the accuracy of the
two remaining antecedents of pay raise equity perceptions – the perceived inputs of the self, and
the perceived inputs of the referent other. Inputs describe the different “investments” or
perceived contributions that an individual brings to the job (Homans, 1961), and can include the
employee’s skill, education, experience, and training, as well as effort and job performance
(Adams, 1963; Lawler, 1981). The communication of procedural pay information may improve
the accuracy of perceptions regarding the perceived raise input requirements – both the inputs
required of the self, and the perceived inputs of others. For example, sales representatives may
be told that raise amounts are determined by the number of individual subscriptions sold. This
general procedural information clarifies input requirements by specifying the pay raise basis and
measurement criteria. Specific procedural information and the communication of pay raise
formulas further clarify the different weights of these performance inputs required for a raise.
Both equity theory and discrepancy theory posit that pay satisfaction results when pay
equity is perceived (Adams, 1965; Lawler, 1971, 1981). When pay raise equity is perceived,
individuals believe their raise amount is fair (i.e., the raise amount that should be received is
equal to the actual raise amount received, a = b). If an equitable raise is also recognized as
relatively large in comparison to the raise amounts received by others, pay raise satisfaction
should result. However, when an individual lacks the distributive information needed to
accurately determine if a raise is relatively high or low, pay raise satisfaction may be based on
inaccurate information. It is therefore proposed that:
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Proposition 2: The communication of distributive pay information has a positive effect on the
accuracy of individuals’ perceptions of (a) the pay raise amounts of others and (b) pay raise
satisfaction.
Proposition 3: The communication of procedural pay information has a positive effect on the
accuracy of individuals’ perceptions of (a) inputs of the self and (b) inputs of referent others.

Pay Raise
Satisfaction

Pay Raise
Dissatisfaction

Pay Raise Equity
High raise + (a = b)
 Satisfied + fair
 Retention

Low raise + (a = b)
 Dissatisfied + fair
 Turnover intentions

Pay Raise Inequity
High raise + (a < b)
 Satisfied + fair  guilt
 Functional inequity reduction
o Increase inputs
o Decrease outcomes
Low raise + (a > b)
 Dissatisfied + unfair  anger
 Dysfunctional inequity reduction
o Decrease inputs
o Increase outcomes

Figure 5
Responses to Perceived (In)Equity and (Dis)Satisfaction

Pay Communication and The Sorting Effect Across Cells
As shown in Figure 5, different combinations of perceived pay raise (in)equity and pay
raise (dis)satisfaction produce different cognitions (i.e., intent to stay versus intent to turnover)
and alternative behavioral responses (i.e., altering inputs and outcomes in accordance with equity
theory; Adams, 1965). The following sections investigate the matrix cell-by-cell to explore how
the communication of pay information may alter perceptions of pay raise equity and pay raise
satisfaction to influence retention and turnover intentions associated with the sorting effect.
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Cell 1: No Distributive Information, No Procedural Information
Absolute pay secrecy in Cell 1 means that individuals know only the amount of their own
raise. As a result of this absolute secrecy, all three antecedents of pay raise equity perceptions
may be inaccurate. Distributive secrecy suggests that individuals will have inaccurate
perceptions of the raise amounts received by referents, while procedural secrecy alters the
accuracy of perceptions about the performance inputs required for a raise. Together, inaccurate
antecedents increase the likelihood that individuals may form inaccurate assessments of the raise
amount they believe should be received (“a” in Figure 5). In turn, perceptions of pay raise equity
are also likely to be inaccurate. For example, an employee who receives a $1,000 performancebased pay raise may inaccurately believe the raise was received for obtaining additional
education in the past year. Given the absolute secrecy in Cell 1, the individual cannot know that
education is not the true basis for pay raise decisions. This produces inaccurate perceptions of
the inputs required of the both the self and others needed to receive a pay raise.
In Cell 1, even if PFP is used, high performers will be unable to see that they received a
higher raise due to better performance, and may experience pay raise dissatisfaction and
contemplate leaving. At the same time, low performers cannot see their raise is low and due to
poor performance. If these low-performing individuals are satisfied with their raise amount, they
may remain with the organization – a functional outcome for the individual (who is still getting
paid despite being a low performer) that becomes dysfunctional when viewed from the
organization’s perspective. With the absolute secrecy in Cell 1, PFP may be unable to retain
high performers while also encouraging poor performers to exit. Taken together, it is therefore
proposed that:
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Proposition 4: When distributive secrecy occurs in conjunction with procedural secrecy (Cell
1), perceptions of (a) all pay raise equity antecedents and (b) pay raise satisfaction is more
inaccurate than in any other matrix cell.
Cell 2: No Distributive Information, General Procedural Information
In Cell 2, the addition of general procedural pay information means that individuals now
know the pay raise basis and measurement criteria. While this enhances the accuracy of
perceived inputs of both the self and others, the final antecedent of pay equity perceptions – the
perceived pay raise amount of the referent – remains inaccurate due to distributive secrecy.
Similarly, perceptions of pay raise satisfaction may also be inaccurate, as distributive secrecy
means that individuals will be unable to accurately determine if their own raise amount is
relatively high or low. The preceding arguments lead to the following proposition:
Proposition 5: When distributive secrecy occurs in conjunction with general procedural
transparency (Cell 2), perceptions of inputs of (a) the referent and (b) of the self are more
accurate than in Cell 1. Perceptions of both (c) the referent raise amount and (d) pay raise
satisfaction remain as inaccurate as in Cell 1.
Cell 3: No Distributive Information, Specific Procedural Information
In Cell 3, with pay raise formulas open, individuals should have more accurate
perceptions of their own inputs and the inputs of others. At the same time, distributive secrecy
ensures that individuals in Cell 3 cannot accurately infer their position in the pay raise range.
Pay raise satisfaction is therefore likely to be based on inaccurate information. Even if PFP is
used to distribute raises, individuals only know the procedural formula used to determine raise
amounts. High performers who receive high raises may be dissatisfied because they do not know
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their raise is high, and may form intentions to turnover. Similarly, poor performers may be
satisfied and intend to stay. This outcome is functional only for the poor performer, who remains
satisfied and earning pay. For high performers and the organization as a whole, the outcome is
dysfunctional because desired behaviors (e.g., the performance and retention of high performers)
are hindered. Taken together, it is proposed that:
Proposition 6: When distributive secrecy occurs in conjunction with specific procedural
transparency (Cell 3), perceptions of (a) inputs of the referent and (b) inputs of the self are more
accurate than in Cells 1 and 2; perceptions of (c) the referent raise amount and (d) pay raise
satisfaction remain as inaccurate as in Cells 1 and 2.
Cell 4: General Distributive Information, No Procedural Information
In Cell 4, individuals know the amount of their own raise as well as the raise range and
median, but they lack any procedural information to understand why or how these amounts were
determined. Cell 4 is notable as it represents the first instance in the matrix framework where
individuals can accurately compare their own raise amount against the raise range to see if it is
relatively high or low. While this should improve the accuracy of the information on which pay
raise satisfaction is based, perceptions of pay raise equity are likely to be just as inaccurate as
with the absolute secrecy found in Cell 1. Despite the general distributive transparency in Cell 4,
research suggests that perceptions of others’ raise amounts are likely to remain inaccurate (e.g.,
Lawler, 1965, 1966). Similarly, procedural secrecy obscures any information as to how these
amounts were determined, and perceptions of self and referent inputs are likely to be inaccurate.
Given the combination of pay information in Cell 4, dysfunctional outcomes are likely to
result for both the individual and the organization. Individuals who receive higher raises may
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intend to remain with the organization, though they will not understand the inputs required to
receive future performance-based pay raises. Conversely, lower-paid individuals will have no
information as to why they received a smaller raise, and may seek to restore equity by engaging
in reciprocal deviance (e.g., Kemper, 1966) or other undesirable behaviors. The following
proposition summarizes the preceding arguments:
Proposition 7: When general distributive transparency occurs in conjunction with procedural
secrecy (Cell 4), perceptions of (a) all pay raise equity antecedents are as inaccurate as in Cell
1; and (b) pay raise satisfaction is more accurate than in Cells 1 through 3.
Cell 5: General Distributive Information, General Procedural Information
Cell 5 is a unique cell in the matrix, as it represents the first time that employees have
access to some degree of transparency in the communication of both distributive and procedural
pay information. With the addition of general procedural information in Cell 5, individuals
should have a more accurate understanding as to why their own raise amount is relatively high or
low. If performance is the basis for raise determination, individuals now have accurate
information as to how performance is measured. This clarifies perceptions of the inputs of both
the self and others, improving the accuracy of pay raise equity perceptions.
Cell 5 is also the first instance in the matrix framework where the sorting effect begins to
function as intended. Highly-paid individuals can see they received a higher raise and will
accurately understand why the raise amount was received. If performance is the basis, these
highly paid individuals should be the best performers, and intent to stay becomes the likely
response. At the same time, individuals who receive low raises will understand that this was the
result of poor performance, and may begin thinking about leaving the organization, perhaps for
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another job with higher pay and/or lower performance requirements. In each instance, the
outcome is functional for both the individual and the organization – high performers are satisfied
and should intend to stay, while low performers are dissatisfied and should therefore consider
turning over. Taken together, the sorting effect should largely function as intended in Cell 5, as
suggested by the following propositions:
Proposition 8: When general distributive transparency occurs in conjunction with general
procedural transparency (Cell 5), perceptions of (a) inputs of the referent and (b) of the self are
more accurate than in Cells 1, 2, and 4; (c) perceptions of the referent raise amount remain as
inaccurate as in Cells 1 through 4; and (d) perceptions of pay raise satisfaction are more
accurate than in Cells 1 through 4.
Proposition 9: Cell 5 represents the minimum distributive and procedural pay information that
must be communicated for the sorting effect to retain high performers and encourage the
turnover of low performers.
Cell 6: General Distributive Information, Specific Procedural Information
In Cell 6, individuals know how their own raise amount compares to the raise range and
median. Because pay raise formulas are open, individuals should have the most accurate
understanding of the inputs of both the self and others that are required for a raise. High
performers can see not only that they receive higher raises due to higher performance, but the
addition of pay raise formulas means that these employees should have the most accurate
understanding of how their higher performance inputs result in higher raise outcomes. At the
same time, individuals who receive lower raises can use the pay raise formula to make more
accurate determinations of whether performance improvements are possible, or if choosing to
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turnover and seeking employment elsewhere is the more appropriate response. Based on the
preceding arguments, it is therefore proposed that:
Proposition 10: When general distributive transparency occurs in conjunction with specific
procedural transparency (Cell 6), perceptions of (a) inputs of the referent and (b) inputs of the
self are more accurate than in all previous cells except Cell 3; (c) perceptions of the referent
raise amount remain as inaccurate as in Cells 1 through 5; and (d) pay raise satisfaction is more
accurate than in Cells 1 through 5.
Cell 7: Specific Distributive Information, No Procedural Information
Cell 7 represents the first matrix cell wherein individuals can directly compare their own
raise amount to the raise amounts received by unique others. At the same time, procedural
secrecy means that individuals lack the accurate information needed to understand the processes
used to determine the known pay raise amounts. If individuals do not understand how raises are
determined, they are unlikely to accurately comprehend the inputs required of the self and others
for a pay raise. Taken together, the sorting effect of PFP is unlikely to function as intended in
Cell 7. Individuals who receive higher raises can clearly see that their raise is higher than the
unique raise amounts of others, but they lack any procedural information to understand why.
Similarly, employees receiving lower raises will fail to understand why a lower amount was
received. Dysfunctional outcomes similar to those predicted in Cell 4 are also predicted here,
leading to the following proposition:
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Proposition 11: When specific distributive transparency occurs in conjunction with procedural
secrecy (Cell 7), perceptions of (a) inputs of the referent and (b) inputs of the self are as
inaccurate as in Cells 1 and 4; (c) referent raise amounts and (d) pay raise satisfaction are more
accurate than in Cells 1 through 6.
Cell 8: Specific Distributive Information, General Procedural Information
In Cell 8, individuals know not only how their own raise amount compares to the unique
raise amounts of others, they should also have a more accurate understanding as to how and why
these raise amounts were determined. This makes Cell 8 unique, as this is the first cell in the
matrix where all perceptual determinants of pay raise equity and pay raise satisfaction should be
accurate. The communication of pay raise basis and measurement criteria information should
produce accurate perceptions of both self and referent inputs, as individuals have more accurate
information about the pay raise basis and how it is measured. Similarly, specific distributive
transparency promotes the most accurate perceptions of referent raises.
Taken together, the combination of pay information that is communicated in Cell 8
allows the sorting effect to function as intended. Not only will high and low performers each
recognize their raise amounts as high or low, they can now make direct comparisons with unique
others. Furthermore, the addition of general procedural transparency ensures that employees
should have a more accurate understanding of the reasoning behind these pay raise amounts. If
performance is indeed the basis for raise determination, those individuals who accurately
perceive their raise as higher should also be better performers. Assuming these individuals are
satisfied with their raise amount, and believe it is equitable in comparison to the amount they
should have received, intent to stay should be the most likely sorting response. Conversely,
individuals who receive lower raises should also be the poorest performers. If these low
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performers find their raise amount to be dissatisfying – yet still believe it is equitably determined
– intent to turnover is the most likely response. These arguments lead to the following
proposition:
Proposition 12: When specific distributive transparency occurs in conjunction with general
procedural transparency (Cell 8), perceptions of (a) all pay raise equity antecedents and (b) pay
raise satisfaction will be more accurate than in any other cell of the matrix except Cell 9.
Cell 9: Specific Distributive Information, Specific Procedural Information
The combination of pay information communicated in Cell 9 represents absolute pay
transparency. All three antecedents of pay equity perceptions are more accurate here than in any
other cell of the matrix. With specific distributive transparency, perceptions of others’ raise
amounts should be the most accurate, allowing individuals to make direct comparisons with
others’ raises. Similarly, the communication of specific procedural information includes the
sharing of pay raise formulas, allowing individuals to make the most accurate assessments of the
inputs of both the self and of others that are required for a raise.
Together, the absolute distributive transparency combined with absolute procedural
transparency in Cell 9 provides the best theoretical situation in which the sorting effect can
function as intended. When all pay information is transparent – including the unique raise
amounts of others – there remains no pay information to be obscured. As a result, individuals
who receive relatively higher raise amounts can see that these raise amounts are high. If
performance is the basis, these individuals also have the procedural information needed to
accurately understand that a higher raise was the result of better performance, should therefore
intend to stay with the organization. On the other hand, individuals who receive lower raises can
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see their raises are relatively lower and should be dissatisfied. If these low performers believe
the raise amount was equitably determined, then intent to turnover is the likely response.
However, if inequity is perceived – whether based on accurate information or not – these low
performers may be motivated to retaliate through various forms of reciprocal deviance (Kemper,
1966) – an issue addressed in the closing sections of this chapter. It is therefore proposed that:
Proposition 13: When specific distributive transparency occurs in conjunction with specific
procedural transparency (Cell 9), perceptions of (a) all pay raise equity antecedents and (b) pay
raise satisfaction will more accurate than in any other cell of the matrix.
Summary
In short, both accurate distributive and procedural pay information are required for the
formation of accurate perceptions of equity and satisfaction associated with performance-based
pay raises. High performers are most likely to be retained when they can see that they received a
higher raise because they are better performers. Similarly, low performers have the greatest
likelihood of voluntary turnover when they can see that a lower raise was received due to poorer
performance. However, the unique behavioral response that emerges from individuals’
perceptions depends on the specific combination of perceived pay raise (in)equity and
(dis)satisfaction .
Sorting Responses & Equity
It is proposed that when perceptions of pay raise equity combine with either pay raise
satisfaction or pay raise dissatisfaction, individuals will experience retention or turnover
intentions associated with the sorting effect. To promote the functional retention of high
performers and turnover of low performers, accurate procedural pay information about the
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performance-based pay system must be communicated. In contrast, perceptions of inequity can
combine with pay raise satisfaction or dissatisfaction to prompt a range of behaviors aimed at
reducing the perceived inequity. Here, the specific behavioral outcome that is likely to emerge
depends on the type of inequity that is perceived. While perceived overreward or positive
inequity is likely to produce largely functional outcomes driven by feelings of guilt, negative
inequity or underreward may result in reciprocal deviance (Kemper, 1966) and other
dysfunctional outcomes driven by feelings of anger or hostility. Before exploring the possible
behavioral responses to perceived inequity, the outcomes of pay raise equity perceptions are first
discussed.
Pay Raise Equity + Pay Raise Satisfaction  Intent to Stay
When individuals believe they are fairly paid (i.e., pay raise equity is perceived) and also
hold positive feelings about their pay raise (i.e., pay raise satisfaction), it is unlikely that they
will have a desire to leave a compensation arrangement that is viewed as both fair and satisfying.
When no distributive pay information is communicated however, individuals will be unable to
accurately infer if their own pay raise is relatively large or small in comparison to others.
When general distributive information is open, individuals should be able to clearly see if
their own pay raise amount is above or below the median, and near the top or bottom of the
range. Similarly, the addition of specific distributive pay information means that individuals can
now see their exact position in relation to the unique pay raise amounts of other employees.
When distributive information is open, individuals who receive high raise amounts should
understand their raise to be high and should be more satisfied. Similarly, individuals who
receive relatively low raises should understand their raise to be comparatively low, and should be
relatively less satisfied.
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Unless procedural pay information is also communicated, there is no guarantee that
satisfied individuals will also be the best performers. Without procedural information,
individuals may assume that an above-average raise is attributable to a variety of factors (e.g.,
legitimate factors such as education or job experience, or illegitimate ones including favoritism
or politics). When both general distributive and general procedural information are
communicated, individuals can clearly see if a raise amount is high or low and can see if that
raise is attributable to performance, seniority, or some other factor. If pay is indeed based on
performance, individuals who receive the highest raises and are the most satisfied should also be
the best performers. Because they perceive their pay raise as fair and are also satisfied, these
individuals should intend to stay with the organization and the sorting effect of PFP functions as
intended to retain the best performers. Based on the preceding arguments it is proposed that:

Proposition 14: When distributive transparency occurs in conjunction with procedural
transparency (Cell 5, 6, 8, or 9) pay raise satisfaction perceptions are accurate. If pay is based
on performance, and both pay raise equity and pay raise satisfaction are perceived, highperforming individuals are retained.
Pay Raise Equity + Pay Raise Dissatisfaction  Intent to Turnover
Individuals who believe they are equitably rewarded tend to experience more satisfaction
than those who believe they are inequitably rewarded (e.g., Hegtvedt, 1987). And yet,
individuals who feel their raise is equitable or fair can still experience dissatisfaction. For
example, an individual may believe his or her raise amount is fairly determined, but may still be
dissatisfied with the raise amount that was received.
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Pay raise satisfaction has been empirically identified as an antecedent of voluntary
turnover (Griffeth, Hom, & Gaertner, 2000; Griffeth & Hom, 1995), and is significantly and
negatively related to both turnover intentions and actual turnover (Tekleab, Bartol, & Liu, 2005).
If general distributive information is communicated, individuals receiving smaller raise amounts
have the information needed to see that their raise is relatively low and should be less satisfied.
If raises are distributed on the basis of performance – and if this procedural information is also
communicated – individuals who receive lower raise amounts should understand this is due to
sub-par performance and may consider leaving the organization. The preceding arguments lead
to the following proposition:
Proposition 15: When distributive transparency occurs in conjunction with procedural
transparency (Cell 5, 6, 8, or 9), pay raise satisfaction perceptions are accurate. If pay is based
on performance, and both pay raise equity and pay raise dissatisfaction are perceived, lowperforming individuals form turnover intentions.
Summary
In summary, for the sorting effect to function as intended, the communication of both
distributive pay information and procedural pay information is needed. At a minimum, this
occurs in Cell 5, with general information about both pay outcomes and pay processes
communicated. However, perceptual accuracy improves as this information becomes specific.
For example, in Cell 9, individuals who receive higher raises should be more satisfied and should
also be better performers, and intent to stay is the likely sorting response. At the same time,
individuals who receive relatively smaller raises should be less satisfied (and if PFP is used,
should also be poorer performers) and may turnover.
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Alternative Sorting Responses & Inequity
The above section considered the behavioral sorting outcomes (i.e., turnover intentions)
that occur when pay raise equity is perceived. Of course, not every individual will feel that his
or her pay raise is fair. The final sections of this chapter explore the behavioral outcomes that
occur when positive or negative inequity interact with feelings of pay raise satisfaction or pay
raise dissatisfaction about the raise amount received.
Positive Pay Raise Inequity + Pay Raise Satisfaction  Functional Inequity Reduction
Positive inequity or overreward results when the actual raise amount is greater than the
amount an individual believes should have been received (i.e., a < b). Research suggests that the
threshold for experiencing inequity may be higher in situations of overreward (versus
underreward), as individuals may “rationalize their overreward as ‘good fortune’ without the
attendant distress” (Huseman, Hatfield & Miles, 1987: 228). When distributive pay information
is communicated, individuals can see if their own raise amount is relatively high or low in
comparison to the raise range and median (i.e., general distributive) or the unique raise amounts
received by others (i.e., specific distributive).
Despite the pay raise satisfaction that should be associated with a high raise amount,
perceptions of positive inequity or overreward can trigger feelings of guilt for failing to pull
one’s own weight, or unworthiness at the disproportionate amount of outcomes received (Scheer,
Kumar, & Steenkamp, 2003; Homans, 1974; Perry, 1993). Despite these feelings of guilt, it is
difficult to imagine an overrewarded employee feeling guilty to the extent that they are
motivated to leave the organization through voluntary turnover. Equity theory instead suggests
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that those who experience overreward will be motivated to reduce the perceived inequity by
altering the inputs and outcomes of the self and others (Adams, 1965).
As one option, overrewarded employees may increase their own self inputs to restore
balance (i.e., moving from a perception of a < b to a = b, in Figure 4). For example, an early
experiment by Adams and Rosenbaum (1962) recruited subjects to conduct hypothetical
employment interviews. Subjects in the overreward condition were given information to suggest
that they were not actually qualified for the interviewing task, and conducted more interviews
than subjects in the equitable condition. In this case, individuals experiencing overreward
increased their own inputs by conducting more interviews to increase performance quantity.
This response is not a viable option under all performance-based pay plans. As noted by
Pritchard and colleagues (1972), increasing one’s quantity of performance will not reduce the
perceived overreward when a piece-rate pay system is in place (Pritchard, Dunnette, &
Gorgenson, 1972). With piece rate pay, pay increases as individual production or performance
quantity also increases – this only exacerbates the perceived positive inequity the individual is
attempting to balance.
If specific procedural information is communicated, individuals have the accurate
information needed to select an appropriate inequity reduction response. To increase inputs,
overrewarded individuals may also improve their performance quality. For example, the
salesperson experiencing positive inequity may attempt to make deeper connections with
customers and take more time making the sale to ensure that customers are satisfied. Other
behaviors can be used to increase an individual’s inputs or contributions to the organization. For
instance, organizational citizenship behaviors (OCBs) are discretionary, work-related behaviors
that promote effective organizational functioning but that are not related to the formal reward
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system (Organ, 1989). Because OCBs are not tied to the reward system, individuals do not
receive additional compensation for performing these behaviors. Furthermore, pay equity
perceptions are often significantly correlated with OCBs and other extra role behaviors (e.g.,
Dittrich & Carroll, 1979; Scholl, Cooper, & McKenna, 1987). Accordingly, increasing OCBs
and other desirable discretionary behaviors is a viable option for individuals aiming to increase
their inputs and reduce perceptions of overreward.
Finally, equity theory also posits that a second behavioral strategy available for reducing
positive inequity is to decrease outcomes of the self. However, when the outcome of interest is a
pay raise, requesting an outcome reduction becomes unlikely, and individuals should choose
behaviors aimed at increasing self inputs to alleviate feelings of guilt. Because individuals feel
they are receiving a higher raise than is deserved, any behaviors aimed at increasing inputs
should be largely desirable and functional for both the individual and the organization. For
example, performing more OCBs is functional for the individual, who should alleviate some
feelings of inequity associated with the perceived overreward. This behavior is also functional
for the organization, as meta-analytic evidence suggests that OCBs are negatively related to unitlevel turnover and costs, while being positively related to many measures of organizational
effectiveness (e.g., productivity, efficiency, and profitability; Podsakoff, Whiting, Podsakoff, &
Blume, 2009). The preceding arguments lead to the following proposition:
Proposition 16: When individuals feel overrewarded, the communication of distributive
transparency in conjunction with procedural transparency (Cell 5, 6, 8, or 9), pay raise
satisfaction perceptions are accurate and behavioral attempts to reduce positive inequity are the
most likely to be functional for both the individual and the organization.
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Negative Pay Raise Inequity + Pay Raise Dissatisfaction  Dysfunctional Inequity Reduction
Individuals may experience a second form of inequity known as negative inequity or
underreward, occurring when individuals believe they should have received a larger pay raise
(i.e., a < b; Lawler, 1971, 1981). When individuals feel underrewarded, dissatisfaction and other
negative affective reactions such as feelings of deprivation or being cheated (Adams, 1965;
Perry, 1993), or even hostility from being “shortchanged” may occur (Scheer et al., 2003: 304).
Research suggests that individuals who feel underrewarded experience more cognitive
dissonance and distress than those who feel overrewarded (Lane & Messe, 1971), and this
distress may increase as the size of the perceived inequity increases (Leventhal, et al., 1969).
Higher amounts of perceived underreward may therefore trigger more intense feelings of distress
that necessitate more extreme behavioral action to restore equity.
As with situations of perceived positive inequity, the type of pay information that is
communicated impacts perceptual accuracy and influences an individual’s ability to choose an
appropriate course of action. Without the communication of distributive pay information,
individuals who receive a low pay raise will be unable to verify that their raise was low in
comparison to the raise range and median (i.e., general distributive) or the unique raise amounts
of others (i.e., specific distributive). When individuals perceive an inequitable situation of
underreward, they are more likely to be dissatisfied – regardless of their actual position in the
raise range. While individuals experiencing overreward feel inequitably compensated to their
own advantage, individuals experiencing underreward feel as though they are being
shortchanged (Scheer et al., 2003) or inequitably compensated at their own expense. With
situations of perceived underreward, it is unlikely that the communication of any degree of
distributive pay information will mitigate the negative affective reactions of hostility and anger.
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When individuals experience a situation of both perceived underreward and pay raise
dissatisfaction, feelings of deprivation or hostility are likely (Adams, 1965; Perry, 1993; Scheer
et al., 2003). In their attempts to restore balance toward equity, individuals may engage in
several forms of so-called “reciprocal deviance” (Kemper, 1966). As originally conceptualized,
reciprocal deviance has the primary goal of punishing the target, suggesting that individuals can
use deviant behavior to “harm a target that has harmed them, regardless of whether or not the
behavior redistributes resources” (Ambrose, Seabright, & Schminke, 2002: 952). One reason
that individuals may be motivated to reciprocate harm is because the employment relationship
between an individual and an organization is governed by social exchange rules (Bordia,
Restubog, & Tang, 2008). More specifically, compensation administration is often included as a
transactional component of psychological contracts, or an individual’s beliefs regarding the
terms of exchange between themself and the organization (Rousseau, 1989, 1995). When this
transactional psychological contract is breached, individuals believe the organization has failed
to fulfill that which has been promised (Rousseau, 1995). For example, an individual expecting
a high raise may cognitively appraise the receipt of a lower raise as a psychological contract
breach (e.g., Bordia et al., 2008). In the context of employee compensation, engaging in
reciprocal deviance may serve an additional function beyond causing harm to the organization.
Drawing on equity theory, reciprocal deviance may be an appropriate course of action for
alleviating perceived underreward by altering one’s inputs and outcomes toward a situation that
is perceived as more equitable.
As one option of reducing perceived negative inequity, individuals may choose to reduce
their own inputs. For example, an individual who feels as though they are being underrewarded
may choose to exert less effort toward task performance. Though this response is not functional
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for the organization, it may be functional for the individual, who is able to alleviate feelings of
anger and hostility by restoring the input/outcome ratio perceptions to a more equitable situation.
Because negative inequity causes more cognitive dissonance and distress than overreward (Lane
& Messe, 1971), individuals may be motivated to reduce their inputs by engaging in reciprocal
deviance that causes harm to the organization. For instance, employees may engage in time theft
by performing non-work activities while at work (Robinson & Bennett, 1995). By putting less
time into their work and instead engaging in non-work activities, time theft may help restore
perceptions of equity by reducing the individuals’ work-related contributions (i.e., inputs). This
behavior is largely dysfunctional from the perspective of both the individual and the organization
as spending time on non-work activities is likely to have negative performance implications at
both the individual and organizational level of analysis.
Alternatively, individuals may increase their own outcomes to reduce the feelings of
anger and hostility associated with perceived underreward. In the context of pay raises, one
option to increase self-outcomes is to ask for a larger raise. For this to be a viable solution, open
and accurate distributive and procedural pay information must be communicated. Distributive
information such as the raise range and median (i.e., general distributive) or the unique raise
amounts of others (i.e., specific distributive) should improve the accuracy of individuals’
perceptions about how much of a raise increase to request. Similarly, procedural pay
information improves an individual’s understanding of how the pay raise was determined. For
example, if individuals understand the raise basis (i.e., general procedural), they may be able to
better justify their raise increase request by providing evidence of above-average performance (if
performance is the basis) or differences in education or experience (if these factors are the basis
for pay raise distribution). Sharing specific procedural information such as the pay raise formula
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allows individuals to make increasingly accurate requests and justifications for a pay raise
increase. All else equal, requests that are grounded in reality and justifiable with open pay
information are more likely to be viewed as legitimate and to be accepted. Taken together, the
communication of both distributive and procedural pay information may decrease the chances
that reciprocal deviance (Kemper, 1966) may be used for inequity reduction.
Proposition 17: When individuals feel underrewarded, the communication of specific
distributive transparency in conjunction with specific procedural transparency (Cell 5, 6, 8, or
9), pay raise satisfaction perceptions are accurate and behavioral attempts to reduce negative
inequity are less likely to be dysfunctional for both the individual and the organization.
Chapter 4 Summary
In summary, Chapter 4 uses the matrix framework to explore how the communication of
different combinations of pay information impact the different perceptual mechanisms that drive
the sorting effect of PFP. Taken together, the propositions illustrate that the sorting effect
requires – at a minimum – the communication of both general distributive and general procedural
pay information (occurring in Cells 5, 6, 8, and 9 of the matrix framework). For the most
accurate perceptions, both specific distributive and specific procedural pay information (Cell 9)
should be communicated. If these combinations of pay information are communicated in
conjunction with the use of performance-based pay raises, then the sorting effect of PFP should
largely function as intended to retain high performers and promote the turnover of low
performers. Because sorting responses are driven by affective responses such as perceptions of
pay raise equity and satisfaction, it is imperative that individual employee perceptions be based
on accurate pay information.
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Taken together, Chapters 3 and 4 have applied the matrix framework developed in
Chapter 2 to enhance our understanding of how the communication of different types of pay
information can influence the established incentive and sorting properties of PFP. In the final
chapter of this dissertation, Chapter 5 next provides conclusions and suggested directions for
future research utilizing the pay secrecy matrix framework.
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CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
A lack of pay secrecy research has helped ensure that the effects of secrecy are not wellunderstood. This dissertation serves as a small advance toward clarifying the construct and its
effects on employee attitudes and behaviors. It is therefore a requisite first step toward moving
the topic from being viewed as the “scanty compensation literature addressing pay secrecy”
(Colella et al., 2007: 56), to a lively discussion driven by scholarly investigation. Research has
been hindered, in part, by a proliferation of construct definitions and measurement
operationalizations. Conflicting findings have done little to settle the debate regarding the merits
of pay secrecy as a pay communication practice. My goal in this dissertation has been to take a
step back and focus on clarifying the construct itself, before next exploring its theoretical effects
on performance and turnover outcomes. By conceptualizing pay secrecy as the intersection of
two continua of information – one communicating distributive pay information, and the other
communicating procedural pay information – the pay secrecy construct can be more clearly
mapped. The skeletal matrix (Holtzen & Gupta, 2014) that has been fleshed out here provides a
framework for understanding the various definitions and conceptualizations of pay secrecy that
have clouded the literature for some time now.
Contributions
The most general contributions of this dissertation are three-fold. First, it elucidates the
construct of pay secrecy to produce a comprehensive matrix framework for organizing and
extending the literature. Second, the latter part of this manuscript aims to enhance our
knowledge of the effects of pay secrecy. Finally, conceptualizing functional versus
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dysfunctional effects as two distinct continua invites further exploration and classification of
how secrecy may alter perceptions to change behavior. In making this distinction among
outcomes, one can simultaneously examine the more HR-focused outcomes of performance and
turnover, while also incorporating additional behavioral responses from the organizational
behavior domain. In addition to these more general implications, several distinct contributions
are outlined below.
Implications for Research
The conceptual models developed in this dissertation have several implications for HRM
research generally, and compensation and secrecy research morespecifically. First and foremost,
this dissertation indicates that it is not only information content – but also the extent to which
that information is communicated – that influences how employees perceive pay. Other scholars
have noted that many theories of individual motivation “presuppose that accurate information is
critical” (Shaw & Gupta, 2002: 909). This means that there is an implicit assumption in many
compensation studies such that information about the pay system is known to employees.
Furthermore, one could argue that the logical extension of this assumption is that the
communication of pay information is also assumed to be an accurate reflection of the actual pay
system. As the research cited throughout this manuscript illustrates, this is often not the case.
Pay communication has already been identified as a “critical contextual factor” (Shaw & Gupta,
2007: 904) in other areas of compensation research, such as the pay dispersion literature. If
scholars are to gain a more complete understanding of how pay secrecy affects employee
outcomes, we must move past our collective tendency to view the communication of pay
information as a constant.
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Second, this dissertation illustrates that pay secrecy, while variable, also has predictable
forms when viewed through the matrix framework. By conceptualizing pay secrecy as the
intersection of two continua of distributive and procedural pay information, we can begin to
categorically explore the proposed effects of the nine matrix cells in future investigations of the
topic. The matrix framework can therefore guide our conversation on pay secrecy research by
providing a specific definition of the information content of a previously unspecified construct.
If scholars can begin to agree on a definition for the construct of pay secrecy, we can continue
moving forward with investigations into the proposed effects on employee attitudes and
behaviors.
Third, the model presented here also informs our conversation on compensation and the
strategic human resource management, by viewing pay system communication as one piece of a
larger HRM system that is linked to the organization’s strategic goals. This holistic view of pay
communication aligns with the configurational approach to strategic human resource
management, that is generally concerned with “how the pattern of multiple independent variables
is related to a dependent variable” (Delery & Doty, 1996: 804). As future work explores how
different forms of secrecy affect strategically-relevant outcomes such as performance and
turnover, scholars must remember that these different pay communication policies cannot be
viewed in isolation from the other HRM system elements. An organization’s pay
communication policy is but one piece of the larger compensation system, and it should be
designed to promote horizontal fit, or the internal consistency of the organization’s selected
HRM practices. An organization is unlikely to realize any improvements in performance and
other outcomes from openly sharing its pay information if the underlying compensation system
is not carefully administered and equitably designed. Moving forward, scholars must begin to
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consider the strategic implications of sharing different combinations of pay information to
differing degrees.
Implications for Practice
The models developed in this dissertation also have implications for compensation
specialists and other practitioners of HRM. First, this dissertation suggests that new terminology
is needed to describe pay secrecy and its different forms. In short, the verbiage we use to
describe pay secrecy must match its reality – namely, that secrecy is not a binary phenomenon.
Practitioners should make a conscious effort to begin using terminology that appropriately
conveys the different shades of secrecy that exist in organizations today. While a
“secret/transparent” dichotomy may be preferred by managers and organizations for simplicity,
the vocabulary of pay secrecy must continue to evolve as the construct continues to be mapped.
A second and more critical implication of this dissertation for compensation practice is
that organizations should abandon the “all-or-nothing” approach used historically to decide if
pay secrecy is a beneficial practice. As illustrated throughout this dissertation, the
communication of different combinations and degrees of distributive and procedural pay
information have unique effects of the different theoretical components of motivation, equity,
and other elements that shape the formation of employee behaviors and attitudes. Pay secrecy is
not invariably desirable and good. It is also not always harmful and undesirable. Instead,
different shades of secrecy are capable of producing a range of outcomes, some of which are
likely to be functional for the individual actor but simultaneously dysfunctional when viewed
from the perspective of the organization. Compensation specialists and other practitioners of
HRM should not fear transparency in the communication of pay. Rather, managers should be
cognizant of the different ways in which various forms of secrecy can alter employee outcomes.
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Limitations
As with any research endeavor, this dissertation is limited in certain respects. First, while
a comprehensive matrix of pay secrecy is articulated in detail, development of a testable pay
secrecy measure was beyond the scope of this project. However, the development of a pay
secrecy scale could be a logical next step. We must first have a clear understanding of the
constructs involved in a phenomenon before attempting to assess the validity of its measures.
The matrix developed here clearly outlines what is and is not included in the domain of pay
secrecy (distributive and procedural pay information, varying across three levels of transparency
that range from none, to general, to the most specific). The handful of scales for measuring pay
secrecy that are currently available in the literature – for example, Day’s (2007) 5-item pay
communication measure, and Noy’s (2007) Perceived Organizational Pay Secrecy (POPS) scale
– could prove useful in assessing the convergent validity of any newly developed scales.
While there certainly remains much methodological work to be conducted in the pay
communication realm, the conceptual groundings of this dissertation should provide a framework
for future empirical investigations. Future empirical testing of the propositions developed here
will be needed to continue illuminating the pay secrecy construct, for “it is the gathering of data
that provides the grist for debating and refuting the proliferation of conceptualization” (Reichers
& Schneider, 1990: 26). Put differently, data will be needed to settle the pay secrecy debate.
A second limitation of this manuscript stems from its intentional focus on understanding
how system characteristics interact with secrecy to affect employee behaviors and attitudes. The
influence of individual differences such as personality, tolerance for inequity, and ability have
been excluded from this dissertation. Though theoretically relevant, individual differences are
not included here simply because these differences largely fall outside the organization’s control.
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Although an organization can influence the ultimate composition of its workforce through
selection procedures (e.g., using an ability test as a selection tool if high-ability applicants are
desired), the company’s control over the individual differences of its employees ends with
selection. The decision in this dissertation to focus on compensation system characteristics and
not individual differences is therefore largely pragmatic. Once we understand how system
characteristics interact with secrecy, an organization can then choose to (a) restructure its
compensation system by altering certain elements, (b) change its pay communication policy by
sharing different combinations of distributive and/or procedural pay information, or (c) alter
both. We must first understand the basics of secrecy and how it operates generally as a piece of
the total compensation system. Only then can we begin to investigate how specific individuals
may uniquely respond to varying combinations of pay information.
Directions for Future Research
Using the pay secrecy matrix as a theoretical framework, two primary directions for
future research arise. First, this dissertation utilized a systems-based perspective to analyze pay
communication policies from the perspective of the organization and the chosen elements of the
compensation system (e.g., pay raise basis, measurement criteria, etc.). While investigating
these system-based components is a useful starting point, it is also likely that additional
contextual factors may moderate many of the proposed effects. At the individual level,
personality and other individual differences may explain a significant portion of the variance in
the same employee outcomes that are influenced by the communication of pay information.
Drawing on expectancy theory and equity theory for variable selection, individual differences
such as ability (e.g., Lawler, 1971) and tolerance for inequity (e.g., Bamberger & Belogolovsky,
2010) could be investigated. In line with the incentive effect, one would expect that an
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individual high in ability may be capable of forming a stronger assessment of the relationship
between effort and performance (EP). As a result, a more accurate assessment of total
motivational force may result for individuals high in ability – even if the accuracy of the PPay
expectancy has been altered through the restricted communication of distributive and procedural
pay information. In contrast, tolerance for inequity may be an important contextual factor for the
sorting effect. Equity sensitivity describes an individual’s sensitivity to either the presence or
absence of equity in exchange relationships (Huseman, Hatfield, & Miles, 1985, 1987). In the
context of the sorting effect, it is possible that individuals high in equity sensitivity may require
the communication of less specific distributive and procedural pay information in order to
determine if the amount of their own pay raise (and that of others) is considered equitable or fair.
For individuals low in equity sensitivity, more specific pay information may be required in order
to trigger the comparative process that occurs when individuals evaluate pay information in
relation to the pay received by others.
At the organizational level, additional moderators emerge that may influence the
behavioral outcomes associated with each of the nine cells. For example, an organization’s
culture may moderate some of the proposed effects. If the organizational culture contains values
(i.e., social principles, goals, philosophies, and standards; Schein, 1985) and/or assumptions (i.e.,
the taken-for-granted beliefs held by organizational members about reality and basic human
nature; Schein, 1985) that hold secrecy in high regard, the open communication of pay
information may not be well-received, and the proposed effects may be altered. This dissertation
has proposed that the open communication of pay information may improve perceptual accuracy
of individual employees as they evaluate their pay, thereby allowing the incentive and sorting
properties of performance-based pay to motivate performance and promote the functional sorting
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of high and low performers. If the organization’s values and/or assumptions do not align with
this openness, even the most well-communicated pay system may do little to alter employee
attitudes and behaviors. An organization that holds secrecy as a basic assumption or value of its
culture is unlikely to benefit through the open communication of pay information.
Several features of the organization – in addition to its culture – may also predict in
which unique matrix cell that its pay secrecy policy is likely to fall. As noted above, an
organization that values secrecy and ambiguity may choose to enact a more secretive pay
communication policy, perhaps of the Cell 1 or 2 variety. The organization’s culture may be
further influenced by characteristics of the industry in which it primarily operates. For example,
organizations doing business in industries with heavy R&D investments into top-secret product
development may choose to guard the pay information of employees just as closely as they
choose to guard all other aspects of the organization’s day-to-day functioning. For these
organizations, it may be that this secrecy is viewed as a strategic choice, thereby limiting the
likelihood that any information – even that related to pay raise administration – is openly
communicated and shared. Similarly, an organization may choose a specific pay communication
policy from the matrix cells as a strategic choice. For example, an organization with the strategic
goal of promoting intense competition among employees may choose a pay communication
policy of the Cell 8 or Cell 9 variety. By communicating specific distributive information in
conjunction with at least general procedural information, individuals may be primed to make
direct comparisons with others. With procedural information also communicated, individuals
will know if performance is the basis for pay raise distribution, and may be motivated to compete
with one another in terms of both higher performance and the subsequent higher raises it
commands.
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Organizational size may also influence the type of pay communication policy that is
chosen. On the one hand, a smaller organization with fewer employees may be more capable of
executing a Cell 9 pay communication policy. With fewer employees, there are less direct
comparisons to be made, but the comparisons that are made may be viewed as more personal and
emotionally-charged, simply because interpersonal relationships may be based on deeper
connections than in organizations with thousands, or even hundreds of thousands, of employees
on its payroll. With fewer employees to manage, smaller organizations are more likely to have
the additional time and resources needed to explain the reasoning behind the pay information that
is communicated. Smaller organizations are also more likely to be able to take the time to
individually address any questions and concerns that may arise among employees in response to
the pay communication policy. Conversely, a larger organization may choose to communicate
only general distributive and procedural pay information (i.e., Cell 5). For the very largest of
organizations, any pay comparisons that are made are more likely to be general in nature (i.e.,
making comparisons with averages, ranges, etc.). Any direct comparisons made are likely to be
bounded by job family, work group, or some other factor that makes these comparisons more
salient by reducing the number of individuals cognitively available for comparison. Finally,
larger organizations may not have the additional time and resources needed to address employee
concerns and complaints that may arise if the unique raise amounts of other employees are made
public. These large organizations should be especially careful to avoid pay communication
policies of the Cell 4 or Cell 7 variety, as communicating distributive pay raise information
without corresponding procedural information may ignite workplace gossip regarding who
received what pay raise amount and why.
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An obvious second direction for future research in this area involves data collection and
the empirical testing of the stated propositions. More generally, management scholars must
continue investigating how the communication of different combinations of pay information
influence the psychological mechanisms of motivation and satisfaction. At the same time,
careful attention must be paid to ensure that pay communication is not studied in isolation from
other compensation system elements. As noted by Bamberger and Belogolovsky (2010),
“several researchers have warned of the risk of making incorrect inferences by studying pay
strategy in isolation (Gerhart, 2000; Bamberger & Meshoulam, 2000)” (p.991). Similarly, pay
communication policies should not be studied in isolation from other compensation system
elements such as pay basis, measurement criteria, and allocation rules.
Moving forward, the next step for this project involves testing the theoretical framework
and propositions developed here. Two research designs are particularly well-suited to the testing
the model developed here. Any design has strengths and weaknesses, and more than one
research design and study will be needed to empirically address the full range of secrecy’s
effects. First, an experimental design is outlined below as a quantitative method for investigating
the causal nature of the proposed relationships. Next, a parallel mixed methods design is
explored as a means to assess both exploratory and confirmatory questions while generating new
theory.
Experimental Design
The development of the pay secrecy literature has been hindered by a lack of empirical
investigations, particularly those using a research design that permits causal inferences. As an
alternative to the over-abundance of survey methodology used in the investigation of pay
secrecy, a laboratory study could instead be designed. To investigate the causality of secrecy’s
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proposed effects, the nine cells of the matrix can be used to create experimental conditions.
Using this design, participants could be brought into a laboratory setting and randomly assigned
to one of the nine conditions. The study could be framed to participants as a study on the effects
of performance-based pay raises. Participants could perform a specific performance-based task,
such as the “magic stones” game from the Bamberger and Belogolovsky studies (2014, 2017), or
other tasks commonly used by researchers in studies of performance-based pay (e.g., basic
addition or subtraction, entering data into a spreadsheet, etc.). Measures of pay raise satisfaction
and pay raise equity perceptions could be collected from participants as self-report measures.
Dependent variable information could be gathered from objective performance data (e.g.,
number of rows “turned to gold” if the magic stone game were used, or the number of correct
math problems or data entries, etc.) and self-reported turnover intentions (i.e., by asking if the
participant wants to continue to additional rounds of the task).
Turning to the actual experimental pay communication manipulations involved, the
distributive pay information independent variable requires three levels (none, general, specific),
and the same three levels exist for the procedural pay information independent variable.
Participants can be paid a set base amount (e.g., $1.00), and then told that pay increases may be
available as they progress through the three to four rounds of the experimental task. The
communication of no distributive pay information may be manipulated by telling participants
that, “You will receive a pay increase at the end of each experimental round” (with the
individual’s own raise amount becoming known upon receipt of the pay amount). For general
distributive information to be communicated, participants could be told that, “Total pay increase
amounts for all participants range from $0 to $1.00, with a median value of $.60.” The median
value that is stated can be further manipulated such that the individual is paid above or below the
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median pay raise amount, to reflect high v. low range position. To communicate specific
distributive pay information, participants may be provided with the following prompt: “Shown
below is a list of the pay increase amounts received by you and your fellow study participants
during the last experimental task round. Pay raise amounts are listed by seat number, and are
posted above each cubicle in the lab so that you may identify who was paid what amount.” By
explicitly identifying the raise amounts of unique individuals instead of using confidential code
numbers, participants now have the identifying information needed to make direct pay
comparisons with unique others. This design feature should help overcome some of the issues in
prior experimental studies identified at the beginning of this dissertation, particularly in relation
to the use of code numbers to protect participant privacy (e.g., Bamberger & Belogolovsky,
2010; Belogolovsky & Bamberger, 2014).
The communication of procedural pay information manipulation also contains three
levels. To communicate no procedural information, participants may be told that, “You will
receive a pay increase at the end of each performance round.” To communicate general
procedural pay information, participants may be told this pay increase is given “for every row
that is turned to gold by placing stones such that they match the adjacent stones in color, shape,
or both.” To communicate specific procedural information about the pay raise formula,
participants may be told that “The total raise amount is determined by multiplying the number of
rows correctly turned to gold by the pay increase amount”. Depending on the type of distributive
information that is also communicated (i.e., to which of the nine matrix cell conditions the
participant has been randomly assigned), participants may or may not know the actual pay
increase amount that is paid for each row correctly turned to gold.
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The distributive and procedural pay manipulations could then be integrated to produce
experimental conditions that replicate the nine matrix cells. For example, an individual assigned
to the Cell 3 condition (no distributive, specific procedural) would be told: “You will receive a
$.50 pay increase at the end of each performance round (secret distributive), for every row that is
turned to gold by placing stones such that they match the adjacent stones in color, shape, or both.
The total raise amount is determined by multiplying the number of rows correctly turned to gold
by the pay increase amount (specific procedural)” In contrast, a participant randomly assigned
to the Cell 4 condition (general distributive, no procedural) could be told, “You will receive a
$.50 pay increase at the end of each performance round, with total pay increase amounts for all
participants ranging from $0 to $1.00, with a median value of $.60.” Finally, a participant
randomly assigned to the Cell 8 condition (specific distributive, general procedural) could be
provided the following prompt: “You will receive a $.50 pay increase at the end of each
experimental task round, for every row that is turned to gold by placing stones such that they
match the adjacent stones in color, shape, or both (general procedural). Total pay increase
amounts for all participants range from $0 to $1.00, with a median value of $.60. Shown below
is a list of the pay increase amounts received by you and your fellow study participants during
the last performance round. Pay raise amounts are listed by seat number, and are posted above
each cubicle in the lab so that you may identify who was paid what amount (specific
distributive).” In addition to the nine pay communication manipulations, pay raise amount (and
how it relates to the raise range and median values) would also need to be manipulated using a
high and a low condition, in order to test the propositions developed in relation to the sorting
effect (Chapter 4).
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The primary benefit of experimental design is that it allows for causality to be inferred.
Through manipulation and control in a laboratory setting, plausible alternative explanations can
be eliminated, and confidence in the observed results increases. Second, the use of nine different
pay communication manipulations aligns with the matrix framework. It also remedies some of
the issues noted with extant experimental studies that have manipulated transparency simply as
the dissemination of pay amount (e.g., Greiner, Ockenfels, & Werner, 2011), often by code
number alone (e.g., Bamberger & Belogolovsky, 2017; Belogolovsky & Bamberger, 2014). In
this proposed experimental design, raise amounts will be attached to unique study participants by
identifying numbered seating locations within the lab.
While random assignment with experimental manipulation allows for causal inferences,
the design also has limitations. With any laboratory setting, there will be questions about
whether the findings generalize to external settings. It would therefore be interesting to conduct
a field experiment to test the model in a real organization, with employees performing real work
in exchange for actual performance-based pay increases. However, this would require finding a
company that already distributes raises on the basis of performance, and that is also willing to
reconsider its pay communication policy. Again, using the distributive/procedural framework
outlined here, the organization could explore the effects of the communication of different
combinations of pay information on employee performance, satisfaction, perceptions of equity,
and turnover intentions.
Despite the inherent difficulties of finding an appropriate organization for study, field
experiments and other variations of field research are being used by a growing number of
management scholars, in order to study “real people, real problems, and real organizations”
(Edmondson & McManus, 2007: 1155). In their review of the methodological fit of selected
154

management field studies, Edmondson and McManus (2007) suggest that theory development in
management research is also best conceptualized as a continuum. At one end of this continuum
is mature theory, involving the study of well-developed constructs and precise models; at the
other end of this continuum is nascent theory, which “proposes tentative answers to novel
questions of how and why, often merely suggesting connections among new phenomena”
(Edmondson & McManus, 2007: 1158). Near the middle of the continuum is intermediate
theory, presenting “provisional explanations of phenomena, often introducing a new construct
and proposing relationships between it and established constructs” (Edmondson & McManus,
2007: 1158).
This conceptual dissertation is one illustration of intermediate theory development. The
construct of pay secrecy, though not new, continues to be conceptualized and reintroduced by
different scholars in a variety of different forms. This dissertation aims to reconceptualize the
pay secrecy construct, and then propose relationships between this new conceptualization and
established constructs associated with the incentive (e.g., motivation, performance) and sorting
(e.g., pay raise satisfaction, pay raise equity, and turnover intentions) effects. As such, the
framework developed by Edmondson and McManus (2007) suggests that studies of intermediate
theory should integrate both quantitative and qualitative data, primarily to aid in the assessment
of the external and construct validity of newly developed measures through triangulation (Jick,
1979). Toward this end, the following section details one possible mixed method design that
could be used to integrate quantitative and qualitative methods into a single study of pay secrecy.
Mixed Methods Design
Mixed methods research involves the integration of both quantitative and qualitative data
collection and data analysis techniques (Johnson, Onwuegbuzie, & Turner, 2007). A parallel
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mixed method design involves the use of “at least two parallel and relatively independent
strands: one with QUAL questions, data collection, and analysis techniques and the other with
QUAN questions, data collection, and analysis techniques” (2009: 152). For the quantitative
strand of the mixed design, a survey could be administered in a field setting to measure different
components of the proposed models, such as employee perceptions of equity antecedents (i.e.,
perceived pay raise amount of referent, and perceived inputs of self and referent). Pay raise
satisfaction, turnover intentions, and each individual’s perceived position in the pay raise range
could also be captured using a survey methodology. Still within the quantitative strand of the
mixed method design, individual performance data could also be collected on each employee
from organizational records.
Parallel to this quantitative research strand is a relatively independent qualitative strand.
Simultaneously, the qualitative strand of this parallel mixed design could be used to ask
exploratory questions to begin understanding why individuals are more or less satisfied when
different types and degrees of pay information are communicated. Because the domain of pay
secrecy is still being mapped as part of this intermediate theory investigation, unstructured
interviews could be used to gather rich qualitative data from employees in a field setting. This
dissertation has organized employee outcomes along the incentive and sorting tracks. Pay
communication policies should have additional effects beyond performance and turnover,
however. Qualitative interviews could therefore be used to explore these effects and aid in the
identification of variables warranting inclusion in future investigations of pay secrecy.
The proposed parallel mixed method design outlined above provides several benefits that
single approach designs do not. First and foremost, this parallel mixed design of quantitative
surveys and qualitative interviews will provide the opportunity for triangulation when the results
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from each strand are integrated during the interpretation phase (Creswell, Plano Clark, Gutmann,
& Hanson, 2003/2008: 183). Second, this specific mixed method approach allows for
confirmatory and exploratory questions to be addressed simultaneously (Teddlie & Tashakkori,
2009: 33). While the quantitative survey data could be used to gather evidence to examine the
validity of the stated propositions, qualitative interview data may generate new information
about unknown aspects of employee attitudes toward pay secrecy policies. Because pay secrecy
research has been hindered by a lack of theoretical development, a mixed methods approach
could be a first step toward addressing this deficiency.
Mixed methods research is also popular because it uses methods “mixed in a way that has
complementary strengths and nonoverlapping weaknesses” (Johnson & Turner, 2003: 299).
While closed-ended, quantitative surveys are useful in generating large numbers of responses
both quickly and inexpensively, this data collection strategy simultaneously suffers from
potentially low response rates and missing data (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009: 239). To address
these shortcomings, qualitative interviews could ask probing questions while gathering rich
information from participants, moving towards a deeper understanding of employees’
perceptions of pay secrecy policies. Although these qualitative interviews will likely be
expensive and time consuming, these weaknesses can hopefully be offset via the strengths of the
quantitative survey component of the parallel mixed design (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009: 239).
Finally, it is important to note that parallel mixed designs are subject to several
limitations. The primary concern is that it “requires considerable expertise to examine the same
phenomenon using two different approaches in a parallel manner” (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009:
153). Furthermore, it can be difficult to compare the results of two analyses based on different
forms of data, and resolving any discrepancies that may come to light can be unclear (Creswell et
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al., 2003/2008: 184). Nevertheless, pay secrecy and its intermediate level of theory development
is a primary candidate for investigation using a mixed methods approach.
Conclusion
This dissertation develops a novel theoretical framework for understanding how the
communication of different combinations of distributive and procedural pay information
influence the incentive and sorting properties of performance-based pay. Propositions have
been presented about the potentially beneficial effects that the communication of open pay
information may have on employee motivation and performance via the incentive effect, as well
as on satisfaction and turnover intentions via the sorting effect. When pay information is
transparent, the signals that pay communicates to employees (e.g., regarding the results and/or
behaviors that are valued and rewarded) have a greater likelihood of being clearly received by
employees. And yet, an important caveat about the potential benefits of pay transparency must
be stated.
In short, transparency will only have beneficial effects if an organization’s implicit or
actual pay policy is congruent with its espoused pay policy. The assumption throughout this
dissertation has been that the theoretical propositions apply to performance-based pay raises. For
the propositions to hold true, pay raises must actually be distributed on the basis of performance.
If an organization says one thing and does another in regards to how it pays employees, the
proposed relationships no longer apply. Transparency will be of little help to an organization
claiming to use PFP but that actually distributes raises using non-performance criteria. If an
organization claims to distribute pay raises on the basis of performance, it must ensure this is
actually the case. Otherwise, making pay information transparent could have disastrous effects.
Employees may lose trust in the organization, morale may suffer, and – depending on the actual
158

criteria used to distribute raises – legal repercussions may surface if discrimination has occurred.
When pay is based on criteria other than performance (or some other legitimate factor), making
pay transparent is unlikely to have any positive effects.
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